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Abstract 
The Six-Day War in 1967 ended an era characterized by cultural exuberance and 
political optimism, ushering the Arab world into a period rife with economic anxiety and 
political unrest. Formerly powerful Arab armies disbanded. Firm social conventions were 
called into question. Radical movements (right and left) were on the rise. Maverick writers, 
philosophers, poets, and cultural critics authored influential critiques that profoundly 
undermined the ideals holding Arab society together, including Islamic faith and 
nationalism. The sea changes triggered by the war, however, resist easy categorization and 
defy simple historical narration that would attribute them only to the diverging trends of 
iconoclasm on the Left and traditionalism on the Right. The question of what exactly was 
defeated in the 1967 war continues to harangue historians and remains as relevant as it was 
in those tumultuous times. Historians may never stop arguing about which historical 
currents reignited the new intellectual debates that came to the fore in the wake of the 
defeat. These debates increasingly focused on the Turāth (roughly defined as the Arab past, 
cultural heritage, and authenticity) that irrevocably changed the political vocabulary and 
intellectual frameworks in the contemporary Arab region.  
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For the vanquished Arab nations, the 1967 war marked two fundamental 
developments: First, it asserted the growing power of culture on shaping people’s political 
orientation and social choices. Formerly it was economic disparity that seemed to hold 
Arab society back. After the defeat, however, it was dated cultural norms, values and mores 
that seemed to bedevil Arab society even more. Increasingly the military defeat in the Arab-
Israeli war in 1967 was conceived as a cultural defeat, steering many Leftist intellectuals 
to engage in cultural debates that relegated economic and political factors to the margins. 
Second, the defeat made it clear that the so-called Arab Turāth was not withering away. 
The war resuscitated Arab intellectuals’ attention to their past, cementing new cultural 
orientations that increasingly focused on Arab authenticity. While the debate surrounding 
the Turāth dates back to the late nineteenth century, it acquired new meanings and cultural 
relevance in the post-1967 era, as intellectuals began to take Arab post-colonial conditions 
into account. The Turāth challenged certain basic precepts that had been part of Arab 
culture, especially the faith in Western philosophies, the inevitability of progress, the 
linearity and homogeneity of time, and the universality of secularism. The Turāth 
encouraged a search for a forgotten Arab culture and gave rise to words like authenticity 
(Asalah) and cultural onslaught, which grew increasingly common. 
The discourse on the Turāth transformed Arab political and intellectual 
conversations in a variety of ways. It produced major political realignment, creating a 
coalition of previously left-wing and moderate Islamists in big-cities. It also strengthened 
North-African scholars’ presence in the post-1967 Arab intellectual landscape, spawning 
scholars like Jabiri who outlined the Turāth as the defining problem with which Arab 
intellectuals had to cope. It fundamentally altered the authority of the intellectual tradition 
that originated in Beirut and Cairo. It transformed the economy of the intellectual debates 
by introducing new cultural references, such as self-critique, that had been unpopular 
 vii 
before the war. Above all, it led Arab intellectuals to view the Turāth less as a reservoir of 
archaic norms, and more as the ultimate protector of Arabs’ human dignity under Arab 
regimes, which were prone to viewing modern constitutions and legal laws as instruments 
of power rather than justice.  
The debate over the Turāth not only brought a new breed of Arab voices into the 
intellectual landscape, but it also led to the creation of the first anti-Turāth movement in 
the Arab world. The Arab Rationalist Association, a constellation of Arab intellectuals who 
gathered around Syrian writer Jūrj Ṭarābīshī in Paris, formed in protest against the cultural 
obsession with “things authentic.” These intellectuals argued that the Turāth literature was 
a mere means of escapism, distracting Arabs from their real and pressing problems, 
reinforcing older values, and dampening political radicalism. For these cultural critics, the 
Turāth literature is not politically neutral, but rather a literature that fosters cultural 
sensibilities that antagonize difference and look suspiciously at Western philosophies. The 
Arab Rationalist Association questioned everything from false attempts to fashion modern 
forms of reliving the past, to moderate Islamic moral codes, through different forms of 
patriotism. Who were the members of the association? What are the cultural and social 
concerns that banded them together? Why did they reject the Turāth and to what ends?  
This dissertation illuminates why the Turāth gained more traction in post-colonial society 
and how it changed the Arab intellectual conversation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 1970, Morocco celebrated the graduation of the first student in the country’s history ever 
to be granted a Ph.D.. Moḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī was 34-years-old when he defended his work for six 
hours in front of a committee of five professors. The first recipient of a doctorate, Jābirī would soon rise 
to national prominence in a post-colonial state longing for national pride, a country that long suffered from 
French colonialism that inflected it with a legacy of cultural inferiority. Though a limited number of 
Moroccan students had previously attained doctoral degrees- in France- Jābirī’s was different. Defying 
established protocols, he insisted on writing his dissertation in Arabic, signaling the rise of a generation 
eager to explore its lost, unwritten history. Jābirī surely gave evidence to that unspoken cultural ambition 
when he wrote on Ibn Khaldūn, one of the eminent medieval Arab philosophers of North Africa.1  
Jābirī’s dissertation would not have stirred much intellectual commotion had it not signaled the 
profound change Arab thought was intensely undergoing. It gave a clear expression to a growing emphasis 
placed by rising intellectuals of the post-colonial state on what is called Arab and Islamic Turāth.2 Perhaps 
more than any other Arab intellectual, Jābirī illuminated the new modes in Arab thought, reinforcing its 
newfound anxiety with the Turāth. Soon thereafter, numerous works of Arabic literature would propose 
new ways to write Arab and Islamic history that disrupted the boundaries once separating the past from 
the present. Though the debate on the Turāth preceded Jābirī’s, his writings had immensely influenced the 
way the Turāth was examined and conceived, casting it as the chief problematique (Ishkāliyyah) in post-
colonial Arab experience.  
When Jābirī published Nahnu wal-Turāth (We and the Turāth) in 1979, a book that elaborated on 
the diverse ways current Arabic speakers are emotionally related and existentially attached to the Turāth, 
his work struck a chord with many readers. The remarkable reception of this book signaled that an age in 
Arab thought had begun just as the old era of detesting the Turāth faded away. Previously it was 
                                                 
1 Muḥammad ʿĀbid Jābirī. Fikr Ibn Khaldūn: Al-ʿAṣabīyah Wa-Al-Dawlah: Maʿālim Naẓarīyah Khaldūnīyah Fī Al-Tārīkh 
Al-Islāmī. al-Ṭabʿah 2 (Casablanca: Nashr al-Maghribīyah, 1979). 
2 Resisting an easy translation, scholars have referred to the Turāth in a variety of ways as we will see below. “Arab cultural 
inheritance,” “Islamic history,” “the past,” “tradition,” “cultural heritage.” The Turāth here denotes to the ways the past is 
practiced/conceived in the present. More on the meaning of this idea see below. 
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Qunsṭantīn Zurīq’s remarkable work Nahnu wal-Tārīkh (We and History) published in 1959, that captured 
the intellectual mood of the 1950-1960s. With the beginning of 1970s, however, it was clear that Zurīq’s 
method, with its condescending attitude towards the Turāth, had grown outdated.  
Yet, more than Jābirī’s rise and popularity announced the dethroning of Zurīq, it marked a more 
pervasive and far reaching trend in contemporary Arab thought: the rise of the Maghreb. Rarely had 
Morocco’s (as well as Algeria and Libya) intellectuals been seen as vital players shaping the architecture 
of Arab intellectual thought. For decades, the hubs of Arab thought clustered in the Mashriq (eastern 
Mediterranean), in cities like Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria, Aleppo, Damascus and Baghdad. The Maghreb 
was persistently viewed as the intellectual backwaters of the Arab world. It was in the Mashriq rather than 
the Maghreb (North Africa), where the literary ferment took place during the late nineteenth-century. In 
these flowering cities, the Arab nahḍa was articulated as Morocco played only a marginal role in its 
making. This unconscious geography of the nahḍa, endorsed and consecrated in current historiography,3 
was disrupted for the first time during the 1970s with the rise of intellectuals from the margins. These 
intellectuals, following Jābirī’s lead, gave rise to new cultural concerns and intellectual questions the 
Mashriq excluded and made almost unthinkable.  
This dissertation’s main concern is to interrogate the ways in which a growing swath of Arab 
intellectuals turned to study the Turāth. Though the Turāth is by no means a new idea, in the mid 1970s, 
scores of Arab intellectuals took to study the Turāth, following the path Jābirī paved.4 Previously despised 
and reviled, the Turāth now assumed a new symbolic meaning, transforming from a mere idea to an 
established field of study in the post-colonial Arab world.5 Examining the cultural and social 
                                                 
3 Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914, The California World 
History Library 13 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Fawaz A. A. Gerges, Making the Arab World: Nasser, 
Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); Charles Kurzman, ed., 
Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Christoph Schumann, ed., Nationalism 
and Liberal Thought in the Arab East: Ideology and Practice, SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East (Abingdon, 
Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2010); Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
4 In 1973, Syrian poet Adonis published his dissertation on the Turāth. See Adūnīs, Al-Thābit Wa-Al-Mutaḥawwil: Baḥth Fī 
Al-Ittibāʿ Wa-Al-Ibdāʿ ʿinda Al-ʿArab. al-Ṭabʿah 5 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1986). 
5 On the ways in which the “Turath has increasing acted as the marker of a consensus of communication” see Armando 
Salvatore, “The Rationl Authentication of Turāth in Contemporary Arab Thought: Muhammad Al-Jābiri and Hasan Hanafī” 
The Muslim World 85, no. 3–4 (1995): 191–214. 
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circumstances that prompted the trend toward the investigation of the Turāth after a decades-long 
obsession with Western philosophy that instilled a dismissive attitude toward the Turāth, this dissertation 
addresses a number of questions. Why did the shift in Arab intellectual frameworks take place during the 
1970s? What does it mean to (re)turn to the Turāth? What does this turn toward tradition look like and 
how did it play out in the lives of Arab intellectuals? While I approach all these questions from different 
angles, there is a special emphasis on the consequences (political and otherwise) of this engagement with 
the Turāth. What are the new cultural concerns the discourse on the Turāth generated and sustained? What 
were the public responses and reactions to the explorations of the Turāth? Arab intellectuals’ frantic 
explorations of the Turāth are quite baffling but also by no means unique or exceptional. What meanings 
did Arab intellectuals ascribe to the Turāth? Was it a search after their cultural authenticity? Was it a new 
reckoning with the past? The collective appeal to the study of the Turāth bears striking resemblance to 
other post-colonial experiences where intellectuals resorted to study their authenticity and pasts.6 The 
disenchantment with the performances of the nation state in a variety of non-Western spaces spurred 
intellectual trends that sought to reconstruct different pasts, which “denaturalize” and “provincialize” the 
linear and romanticized narratives nation states forcefully forged and circulated.7 While this was a general 
movement in a variety of post-colonial settings, it remains unclear what sets apart Arab intellectuals’ drift 
toward retrieving their “forgotten Turāth” as Jābirī’s forcefully demonstrated.  
While the Turāth debates serve as the focal point of this project, the thrust of this dissertation is to 
explore only the voices that rejected and condemned the newfound cultural obsession with the Turāth. 
One of the outspoken intellectuals who dedicated his life to casting off the Turāth was Syrian Jūrj 
Ṭarābīshī. Born in Aleppo in 1939 to a middle-class family, Ṭarābīshī was an enthusiastic translator who 
rendered more than one hundred Western works (Sartre, Campus, Hegel, Marx, and Freud, among others,) 
into Arabic before turning to engage Arab writers’ enchantment with the Turāth during the late 1980s. 
                                                 
6 In India, for example, post-colonial historians established the field of Subaltern Studies that calls into question the 
nationalistic narrative the state circulated. On the work of Subaltern Studies see: Dipesh Chakrabaty. Habitations of 
Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
7 The new understanding that “the past does not exist independently from the present,” and “what we often call the “legacy of 
the past” may not be anything bequeathed by the past itself” informed the new approaches in rereading the history. See 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot. Silencing the Past. Boston, Mass. Beacon Books, 1995.  
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Ṭarābīshī viewed the recourse towards the Turāth following the 1970s with the most condemning terms, 
a life-threatening project that breathes life into a “renewed and imagined medieval time.” With the 
beginning of the 1990s, he embarked on a project to debunk Jābirī and his followers, who presented the 
Turāth as an Arab post-colonial alternative to European parochial modernity.  
In March 2004, Ṭarābīshī joined forces with a group of Arab intellectuals who came together to 
call the Turāth into question, probing its centrality as an alternative model for European prescription. 
Though many members of this group contested the validity of the Turāth as a cultural model during the 
1980s, it took this group more than twenty-years to organize and establish the Arab Rationalist Association 
(Rābiṭat al-ʿAqlāniyyin al-ʿArab,) the first intellectual movement to call attention to the deleterious effects 
of the Turāth. This group included scholars like the late French-Algerian sociologist Mohammad Arkoun 
and scholars such as Ḥāmid Abu Zayd and ʿAziz Al-ʿAẓmeh. These scholars examined the cultural 
assumptions, perspectives and consequences of the “current slide toward the Turāth.” They posted 
questions about the meaning and consequences of the current Arab writing on the Turāth: what are the 
social and cultural repercussions generated by the recent turn to the Turāth? What world life was sustained 
in the process of the passionate re-adoption of the Turāth? What was endorsed and secured and what was 
obliterated and erased in the wake of the collective mania following the Turāth? Mostly comprised of 
scholars originated in the Mashriq, with its distinctive nahdawwi training and habitus, this group was 
unapologetic in professing European Enlightenment ideas, not the least of which were rationalism, 
secularism, and liberalism. As we will see, these ideas were articulated against what they conceive as the 
irrational return to the Turāth, the increased piety, and the emergence of a decidedly authoritarian post-
colonial state.  
Situating the Arab Rationalist Association in Contemporary Arab Thought 
As the big ideologies in the Arab world receded during the 1970s with the demise of Arab 
socialism, Pan Arabism, and the decline of Marxism, central questions regarding the Arab Left emerged 
but were never fully answered: where did yesterday’s eager Arab Leftists who translated Marxism and 
established credible publishing houses and disseminated Western theories and vocabularies during the 
1940s-1960s go after they had forsworn Marxism? How does one explain their departure and absence? 
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Did they melt away into the air as one scholar asked?8 The fact that these questions were rarely pursued 
by scholars of the Middle East speaks to the constraints of the current historiography of Arab thought. 
With very few exceptions, 9 these questions went unanswered, for they seem to approve the conventional 
assumption that the Arab Left is dead, given that many among the previously committed Arab Leftists 
have either converted to Islam or taken an Islamic turn.10 While this argument is not entirely inaccurate, 
it remains partial and dangerous. Partial because it by no means exhausts the magnificent scale and range 
of the Arab Left, but instead represents a minority which did indeed embrace Islamic epistemologies 
starting in the 1970s. Dangerous for it sealed the debate on the Arab Left, establishing unsubstantiated 
assumptions on its sudden disappearance. It is therefore not surprising that the Arab Left in the post-1967 
era is commonly seen as an anomaly, a fringe group with diminished power to shape major frames of 
reference and cultural references. Exceptional works are dedicated to the New Arab Left.11 The Arab 
Rationalist Association, particularly because of its adherence to Left ideas and perspectives, is perceived 
as an aberration.12 
This dissertation challenges this assumption, arguing that the Arab Rationalist Association attests 
to Arab Left’s expansive and compelling presence and undiluted power in shaping the discourse on 
                                                 
8 Fadi A. Bardawil, “When All This Revolution Melts into Air: The Disenchantment of Levantine Marxist Intellectuals” 
(Columbia University, 2010). 
9 Meir Hatina and Christoph Schumann, eds., Arab Liberal Thought after 1967: Old Dilemmas, New Perceptions, First 
edition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Samer Frangie, “Theorizing from the Periphery: The Intellectual Project 
of Mahdi ʿAmil,” International Journal of Middle East Studies; Cambridge 44, no. 3 (August 2012): 465–82; Hamzah Dyala, 
“The Making of the Arab Intellectual: Empire, Public Sphere and the Colonial Coordinates of Selfhood (Hardback) - 
Routledge,” Text, Routledge.com, accessed December 17, 2017; Sune Haugbolle, “The New Arab Left and 1967,” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 497–512.  
10 The thesis of secular Arab intellectuals converting to Islam was a forceful argument that was dominant in the 1980s. See: 
Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); 
Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam,” Commentary Magazine (blog), January 1, 1976, 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/print-page/; Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation’s Odyssey, 
1st ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 
1967 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Ali A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010); Meir Hatina, Ha-Islam Be-Mitsrayim Ha-Modernit: ʻiyunim Be-Mishnato Shel 
Farag’ Fudah, Ḳaṿ Adom (Tel Aviv: ha-Ḳibuts ha-meʼuḥad, 2000). 
11 Haugbolle, “The New Arab Left and 1967”; Frangie, “Theorizing from the Periphery”; Carool Kersten, Cosmopolitans 
and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals Andthe Study of Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
12 Joseph Andoni Massad, Islam in Liberalism (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Joseph Andoni 
Massad, “Al-’Irth Al-Mudamir Li-Libiraliyyin Al-ʿArab,” Al-Akhbar.com, January 24, 2015. Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, 
Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation,” Public Culture 18, no. 2 (March 20, 2006): 323–47,; 
Charles Hirschkind, “Heresy or Hermeneutics: The Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd,” American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences; Plainfield, Ind. 12, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 463–77. 
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freedoms, cultural authenticity, women’s rights, democracy and state policies. Rather than declaring the 
Arab Left dead, I explore the ways they had to adjust and reposition themselves against the turn toward 
the Turāth, which forced new questions, cultural concerns, and problematics previously unprecedented in 
Arab thought. With the beginning of the 1970s, as the new field of Turāth studies emerged, the entire 
intellectual discourse underwent major shifts. Within this new Arab intellectual landscape, which Arab 
intellectuals refer to as the second nahḍa,13 the Arab Left had to reinvent itself yet again. It is through the 
Arab Rationalist Association that these questions and assumptions on the absence of the Arab Left are 
revisited. 
Before delving into the debate around the Turāth that led to the creation of the Arab Rationalist 
Association, the idea of Turāth calls for some clarification to dispel its ambiguity. Curiously, the most 
controversial idea in contemporary Arab thought remains a blind spot in current scholarship. Even though 
it has recently garnered some attention, it nonetheless remains a relatively understudied area.14 One reason 
for this scholarly negligence is the continuous focus on the nahḍa period, when the Turāth was still an 
embryonic idea that did not play a central role as it would in the post-1967 era. The debate on the Turāth, 
though began to develop in the post-1967 era, has not been fully pursued by scholars either. The Turāth 
was studied only as a controversial idea at different conferences during the 1970s and 1980s that confirmed 
the unbridgeable gap between Islamist and modernist views.15 These studies only ventured to comment 
on the Turāth by way of mapping the general trends in Arab thought following the defeat in 1967.16 
Despite the headway made by scholars like Boullata and Kassab in broaching the topic, the Turāth's 
                                                 
13 Viewing the post-1967 as a second nahḍa becomes increasingly acceptable in Arabic thought, see: Kamāl Dīb. Tārīkh 
Lubnān Al-Thaqāfī: Min ʿaṣr Al-Nahḍah Ilá Al-Qarn Al-ḥādī Wa-Al-ʿishshrīn (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-Sharqīyah, 2016); ʿAbd 
al-Ilāh Balqazīz. Nihāyat Al-Dāʿiyah: Al-Mumkin Wa-Al-Mumtaniʿ Fī Adwār Al-Muthaqqafīn. al-Ṭabʿah 1 (Beirut: al-Markaz 
al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2000). 
14 Two recent dissertations have explored the Turāth as a rising framework in Arab thought, see: Iskandar Mansour, “The 
Unpredictability of the Past: Turāth and Hermeneutics” (University of California, Los Angeles, 2000); Nadia Wardeh, “The 
Problematic of Turāth in Contemporary Arab Thought: A Study of Adonis and Hasan Hanafi” (McGill University (Canada), 
2008). 
15 Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010). 
16 Issa J. Boullata, Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought, SUNY Series in Middle Eastern Studies (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990); Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi. Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab 
Intellectual History (London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2004). 
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meaning seems always to evade any definition in their works. These studies often fall short of accounting 
for the political and cultural effects generated by the Turāth. I propose that the Turāth was fashioned now 
as a solution to the growing collective despair over the post-colonial condition, an antidote to pressing 
questions of freedom, authenticity, and belonging. Much of the works that have engaged the Turāth have 
failed to note that it served as an organizing idea around which different intellectual groups were formed. 
Nor was the Turāth viewed as an emerging field of study that uniquely represented the Arab world’s search 
for its identity and authenticity. In short, the notion of the Turāth as a unifying field around which 
intellectual groups were articulated was rarely explored in-depth. The rest of this introduction attempts to 
distill this idea of the Turāth around which contemporary Arab thought took shape by addressing three 
issues: 
A) The rise of the Turāth to a framework.  
B) The cultural responses to the Turath: The rise of the Arab Rationalist Association.  
C) The historiography: de-orientalizing the debate.     
The Rise of a New Framework: The Establishment of the Turāth Studies 
In 1979, the Arab Writers Union in Syria wrested permission from Hafiz Asad to launch a journal 
entitled Majalat al-Turāth al-ʿArabī. It was hardly conceivable that a relatively secular body of scholars 
that branded itself revolutionary and national in character would establish a journal mainly focused on the 
interrogations of the Turāth. Only a decade earlier the vast majority of Syrian intellectuals thought ill of 
the Turāth, smeared it as a site rife with metaphysical thinking and took extra measures to avoid any 
engagement with it. Not only was the journal not feasible during the “roaring 1960s,”17 but the idea of 
Turāth also had little to no appeal at the time. The Turāth, it seemed to many Syrian intellectuals, put at 
risk the very principles many members of the Arab Writers Union stood for: rationalism, science, 
secularism, and liberalism. Yet, that numerous writers came to agree on the founding of a journal about 
the Turāth speaks loudly of the new cultural tastes that permeated Arab literary circles.  
                                                 
17 I borrow the idea “Roaring 1960s” from Kamal Dīb whose works establish the 1960s as a culture turning point in Arab 
cultural history where music, art, curation, ideologies, print, translation and architecture were stipulated in Beirut in ways that 
broke with previous structures. Dīb, Tārīkh Lubnān Al-Thaqāfī. 
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Remarkably, this was not the only journal on the Turāth to spring up during the 1970s in 
progressive Syria. In the opening editorial of al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, ʿ Ali ʿ Aqleh ʿIrsān thanks president Hafiz 
al-Asad for smoothing the way for the creation of this unique journal that bolstered the research of a 
forgotten Turāth, arguing on behalf of the editorial board that “When we conceived the idea of this journal, 
we were completely aware of the existence of other journals that are concerned with the Turāth, which 
played and continue to play significant roles in introducing the Turāth to Arab audiences by lightening its 
dark corners, most notably the [recently published] journal of al-Mawrid. We are also aware of the recently 
established Turāth Institute at Aleppo University and acknowledge its efforts.”18 Speaking of the new 
cultural demands for studying the Turāth, the author continued, “We have found, however, that there exists 
a void that our journal will fill.” That void has to do with the dogged biases against the Turāth and the 
persistent “accusations of some intellectuals (baʿḍ al-muthaqafīn) towards the Turāth,” and their 
unmitigated “suspicion of the significance and value in reconnecting with our Turāth.” Despite the marked 
spike in writings on the Turāth, the author complained that many among the younger generation are 
growing up “condemning the Turāth without knowing it.” Attributing this harsh judgment to young 
people’s compliance with “outdated frameworks,” the author pleaded with the younger generation to 
revise their attitudes toward the Turāth.  
The growing preoccupation with the Turāth in Syria was by no means exceptional but in line with 
other cultural developments in Arab states. A couple of years before majalat al Turāth had seen the light 
in Syria, Iraqi intellectuals were working intensely on the inauguration of a similar journal. In 1977 they 
launched the journal Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī al-Islāmī. It was soon followed by the establishment of 
Baghdad University’s Center of Revival of Arabian Scientific Heritage. In one of its early editorials “How 
a Nation loses its Character”19 chief editor Khairallah Ṭalfaḥ spoke of the Turāth as a foundational “pillar” 
that furnishes indispensable “historical experiences” in a time of uncertainty and tumultuous politics in 
which the Arab world is wallowing. He wrote that “A nation gains its character” through its “steep 
                                                 
18 Ittiḥād al-Kuttāb al-ʿArab, ed., Al-Turāth Al-ʿArabī (Damascus: Ittiḥād al-Kuttāb al-ʿArab, 1979). 
19 Jamʿīyat Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī al-Islāmī (Baghdad, Iraq), ed., Iḥyāʼ Al-Turāth Al-ʿArabī Al-Islāmī (Baghdād: Jamʿīyat 
Iḥyāʼ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī al-Islāmī, n.d.). 
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existence.” The author added, “the Arab-Islamic nation [of Iraq] is exposed to a real threat that debilitates 
its distinctive character,” deeming the Turāth a “true treasure,” in a society under threat.  
Long conceived at the forefront of revolutionary and progressive states, dominated by secular 
Baʿthist ideology, many assumed that the intellectual class in these countries is particularly insusceptible 
to reverting to the past. Hardly any one of the Arab elite could have anticipated that the intellectual classes 
in progressive Iraq and Syria would backslide to the Turāth. Yet, the strong tradition of Nationalism, Arab 
Socialism and Marxism, which animated this class for decades, could not inoculate it from the Turāth, 
now seen as a “pillar” and “true treasure” of Arab existence. The same cultural impulses could also be 
seen at play in other Arab countries. In Egypt, leading intellectuals increasingly engaged the Turāth in 
their studies, without necessarily giving up on their European ideas.20 Jordan, a latecomer to Arab 
intellectualism, launched a Center of Turāth Studies in 1980 in Amman. Even the Cultural Institute of the 
Arab League established a pan-Arab committee to administer the Turāth maerial and assigned sub-
committees to collect dispersed transcripts throughout the Arab world. As one Arab writer remarked at a 
conference on the Arab Book in 1983, if during the 1960s most publishing houses competed with each 
other for the publication of translated European ideas, during the 1980s, it was the Turāth and the 
publication of works related to the Turāth that dominated this industry.21 The proliferation of Turāth 
journals signaled the unmaking of previous intellectual debates and the unfolding of new ones. It is within 
this discourse on the Turāth as a rising cultural problematic that avowed secular scholars like Tunisian 
writer Lafif Lakhdar would embark on writing the biography of Mohammad (See Chapter 5).  
The growing centrality of the Turāth marked the beginning of the age of what many Arab 
intellectuals call the “return to the roots.”22 This tendency to return to the roots or “the reckoning with the 
past,” was instantly translated by Western writers as a return to Islam, reducing the field of Turāth to 
                                                 
20 Ghāli Shukri. Al-Turāth wal-Thawra (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿah, 1979); Ḥasan Ḥanafī. Al-Turāth Wa-Al-Tajdīd: Mawqifunā 
Min Al-Turāth Al-Qadīm. al-Ṭabʿah 1 (Cairo: al-Markaz al-ʿArabī lil-Baḥth wa-al-Nashr, 1980). 
21 Bashir al-Hashimī, “Wāqiʿ al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī,” in Al-Bayan, vol.204. March 1983.  
22 Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, ed., Al-Ḥadāthah Wa-Al-ḥadāthah Al-ʻArabīyah: Muʼtamar Ishhār Al-Muaʼssasah Al-ʻArabīyah 
Lil-Taḥdīth Al-Fikrī, Muhdá Ilá Idwārd Saʻīd, 30 Nīsān/Ibrīl - 2 Ayyār/Māyū 2004, al-Ṭabaʻh 1 (Dimashq: Dār Bitrā lil-
Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2005). According to Ṭarābīshī it is within the frantic return to the roots that ideas of Asālah, cultural 
onslaught, and authenticity resonated during the 1970s even if earler iterations of these ideas emerged during the 1940s.   
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Islam- a phenomenon Arab intellectuals like Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and Ṭarābīshī have strongly contested 
(see historiography below). Refusing to view the Turāth as merely an expression of Islamic revival, Abu 
Zayd and Ṭarābīshī conceived of the new engagement with the Turāth as a representation of a new mode 
of Arab thought that breaks with previous frameworks (nationalism). If during the nahḍa the Arab world 
came to discover modern Europe through a fervent exploration of Western ideas and philosophies,23 wrote 
Ṭarābīshī, then during the post-colonial era, the Arab world came to discover their Dhāt or their selfhood 
which was seen as rooted in their common past, or Turāth. Yet, while the idea of Turāth emerged in the 
late 19th century, it was only in the post-colonial era that it was politicized. It is precisely during the 1970s 
that the Turāth was endowed with a new meaning that broke with its earlier genealogy. One of these 
meanings was expounded by Syrian Marxist Tayib Tizīnī but propounded and popularized by Jābirī. 
Following Tizīnī, Jābirī argued that the Turāth represents a synchronic time between past and present. It 
refers to the relation contemporary Arabic speakers attach to their past. While modernity fashions 
linearity, Jābirī argued, the Turāth disrupts the order of this era by facilitating diverse times to co-habit 
simultaneously.24 In the absence of a word in English that captures this temporal heterogeneity in a world 
inhabited by the logic of modernity, which accounts only for empty homogenous time, English speakers 
might find it challenging to relate to this non-linear time.  
 To think of the Turāth as time rather than as a static past, a way of seeing rather than 
memory, and a relation between the present and the past, would better serve the understanding of the 
current debate in the Arab world. It is for that reason one should avoid forcing a translation on this notion 
that would lay waste its intellectual energy. Translating Turāth as tradition or past, cultural inheritance or 
Arab heritage only reduces its attending cultural dynamics and unnecessarily Westernizes the notion. 
Translation in this case represents a forceful familiarization that many scholars warned against. Talal Asad 
has recently thought of translation as a way to coopt differences between the East and the West, rather 
                                                 
23 Ibrahim A. Abu-Lughod, Arab Rediscovery of Europe; a Study in Cultural Encounters, Oriental Studies Series, no. 22 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1963); Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
24 Muḥammad ʿĀbid Jābirī. Takwin Al-ʿAql Al-ʿArabi (Dār al-Ṭalīʿah lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr, 1984), chapter two "Al-Zaman 
al-Thaqafi". 
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than making these differences appear. Asad writes that “Translation can be a form of assimilation, but 
also a mode of “giving over” to a countervailing perspective in an empathic vein.” Instead of this mode 
of intelligibility, which foregrounds Western-capitalist logic, Asad proposes a “different alternative for 
translation,” that emerges “when we are compelled to identify and sustain sites of untranslatability.” Asad 
Writes, 
letting the untranslatable situation stand sometimes opens up another field of understanding that serves at least two 
different purposes: the first is to map incommensurable views without seeking to reconcile them; the second is to see how these 
very incommensurable domains constitute, inflect, and even suffuse one another without projecting a broader dialectical unity 
to which they ultimately tend.25  
Much of the misperceptions and complexity that shroud and attend to the term Turāth stem from 
the fact that this idea does not lend itself easily to Western-capitalist logic or to articulation in Euro-
American languages. That the notion of Turāth resists any easy definition warrants it a genuine “site of 
untranslatability.” For purposes of non-Arabic readers, however, the idea of Turāth could be rendered as 
a cultural repertoire rather than merely a past that continues to live in the present. One of the advantages 
of the notion of cultural repertoire is that it never confines itself into time or any specific era. Following 
Asad’s suggestion, this notion will not impose any assimilative translation that might flood the intellectual 
explanatory of the idea.  
The Arab Rationalist Association 
The growing deliberations on the Turāth seemed to declare the death knell that sealed the fate of 
Marxism in the Arab World. In fact, the renewed debate on the Turāth rejuvenated the sluggish Arab Left 
after they had lost their Marxist identity. The new Arab Left would appropriate the Turāth vocabulary 
instead of the Marxist jargon, but that deployment didn’t mean that the Arab Left turned to Islam. The 
growing engagement with the Turāth set the groundwork for the new cultural war erupting in the Arab 
world. 
                                                 
25 Asad, Talal. Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech (Kindle Locations 166-170). Fordham University 
Press. Kindle Edition. 
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 A sense of excitement and anticipation permeated Arab dailies on the morning of March 30, 2004, 
when a remarkable assembly of Arab intellectuals flocked to Beirut for a three-day conference. Invitees 
traveled from Paris, London and Berlin to celebrate the official inauguration of the Arab Institute for 
Modern Thought (Muʾtamar Ishhār al-Muaʾssasah al-ʿArabīyah lil-Taḥdīth al-Fikrī), later the Arab 
Rationalist Association. When self-exiled Arab intellectuals paid a visit from the mahjar (diaspora) they 
often grabbed media attention. The public mood was high as the many media outlets passionately covered 
star-intellectuals like Mohammad Arkoun, Adūnīs, Jūrj Ṭarābīshī, Nasr Ḥamid Abu Zayd, Hāshim Sāleḥ, 
ʿAziz al-ʿAzmeh, Lafif Lakhdar and Fatḥi Ben Salama as they walked out of Hariri International Airport 
in Beirut. Coming from European capitals, they joined a group of local intellectuals with whom they 
constitute the core of this movement: Ṣāḍiq Jalāl al-ʿAẓm, ʿAbed al-Majīd Shurafī, Mohammad Houni, 
Saʿid Nāshīd, Rajāʿ Ben Salama, Mohammad Ḥadād, and Shākir Nābulsī. More than one hundred thirty 
intellectuals, carefully selected, attended the conference to mark the beginning of the official activity of 
this anti-Turāth movement. Though the number of attendees was described as “outstanding,” it was the 
identity of the invitees and organizers that stirred most of the commotion that inspired Arab media and 
journals. Many have wondered at the conspicuous absence of noticeable Egyptian, Jordanian, and 
Palestinian intellectuals. One journalist marveled at why the organizers extended an invitation only to one 
Egyptian intellectual- the self-declared secularist Sayyid al-Qimni?26    
That these anti-Turāth, secular critics have suffered from invisibility for decades partly explains 
the fanfare with which they carried out the event in Beirut. Intent on showcasing their presence and core 
ideas, this ‘secular club’ invited a great many local journalists, writers, feminists, artists and cultural 
critics, a far more significant share than the current literature on the Middle East is willing to concede. As 
befitting such a remarkable occasion, the gathering took place in Le Bristol Hotel with its spacious meeting 
                                                 
26 Fatima Hafiz, “Arab Rationalist Association: An Attempt in Deconstructing Religion and Ethics,” IslamOnline, March 4, 
2013, http://islamonline.net/2052. On Qimni’s mocking of Islamists in Egypt see in particular his “Shurkan-Bin Laden” 
(Gratitude to Ben Laden) in which he derides and taunts ‘moderate’ Islamists whose true face Bin Laden exposed to all: see 
Shukran-- Bin Lādin!! Dār Miṣr al-Maḥrūsah, 2004 
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halls in the heart of Beirut’s business center. For the Institute’s members, it was crucial to hold and affirm 
the role Beirut had played during the nahḍa as the seedbed of secular impulse in the Middle East.27  
The Genealogy of the Institute  
The idea of the Institute was conceived and developed in the late 1990s by expatriate Arab 
intellectuals. Disenchanted with what they deemed “the return to the Turāth” in their countries of origin, 
many of these displaced intellectuals wanted to take action to reverse the tide towards the Turāth. 
Numerous Arab intellectuals lived in Europe’s capitals at the turn of the new millennium, especially in 
the wake of the fifteen-year civil war in Lebanon that gutted Beirut and sent many off its shores. In the 
Netherlands, exiled intellectual Hamid Abu Zayd lived off a teaching grant in Leiden. In London, a great 
many Arab intellectuals and poets thrived since the mid-twentieth century, giving rise to original Arab 
journals and publishing houses that emerged during the late 1970s.28 In Paris, a plethora of Arab 
intellectuals had been integrated into the Parisian intellectual scene since at least the 1930s. A remarkable 
figure of these Arab intellectuals was Mohammad Arkoun, a professor of Islamic thought at Paris 
University and a French-Algerian author well-known for his vehement criticism of political Islam. Arkoun 
established a non-formal group, a “Parisian Circle”29 of Arab students. According to Ṣāḍiq Jalāl al-ʿAẓm, 
Arkoun was impatient to have his French writings translated into Arabic, so he “cultivated a circle of 
students,” key among them Jūrj Ṭarābīshī, Hāshim Sāleḥ, Lafif Lakhdar and Fatḥi Ben Salama. 
The rapid change in the global circumstances at the turn of the millennium breathed new life into 
the idea of the Parisian Circle. The events of September 11, 2001, left many Arab Leftists confused and 
confounded at the scale and scope of the human damage a group of Islamists could inflict. The need to 
counteract and criticize the use and abuse of the Turāth took on an unprecedented urgency. One of the 
                                                 
27 If other cities in the Middle East, particularly Dubai and Abu Dabi, increasingly lured in conservative publishing industry, 
Beirut remained the city of choice of the secular club. Many among the Institute’s intellectuals attached vast importance to 
cities as hubs of creativity. They could not hide their condescendence toward rural dwellers and villagers who flooded the big 
cities at the mid-century. The fall of Beirut into a fifteen-year civil war depilated the city as a social and cultural milieu that 
for a century provided a mechanism for transmission of knowledge and ideas. Launching the Institute in Beirut can be seen as 
an attempt to awaken the ideals this city stood for in the late nineteenth century.   
28 On the establishment of dominant Arabic publishing industry in London since mid-century, see: Riyāḍ Najīb Rayyis, Ākhir 
Al-Khawārij: Ashyāʼ Min Sīrah ṣiḥāfīyah, al-Ṭabʻah 1 (Beirut: Riyāḍ al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr, 2004). 
29 I refer here to the expression that Ṣāḍiq Jalāl al-ʿAẓm used in an interview I had with him in May 2015.  
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distressed Arab writers, dizzied by the consequences of the events that have cascaded throughout the 
world, was Mohammad Ibn ʿAbid al-Muṭalib al-Houni, an unknown Libyan businessman based in Italy. 
Houni burst onto the intellectual scene out of nowhere. Yet, his plunge into the Arab intellectual domain 
was remarkable. He proposed to bring the Parisian Circle to the public sphere.30  
Little was known of the man or his operations. Like many among the obscure Arab entrepreneurial 
class who make money in savory and unsavory ways, Houni was quite an unfamiliar face before offering 
to establish the Institution. He was an affluent man who made his fortune facilitating Libyan oil to Italy 
under Gadhafi for three decades. He described himself as an autodidact whose education was immensely 
in debt to the newly translated works of Mohammad Arkoun. Reading Arkoun’s writings, Houni testified, 
infused excitement and eagerness in pursuing such a cultural project. Houni, however, was not a regular 
reader of Arkoun. He was an able man bent on making change in this world. With his meddling, the 
Parisian Circle was transformed into the Institute, materializing otherwise ideal talks by disenfranchised 
intellectuals.31  
Houni was a staunch believer in the agenda of the Institute. His ideas reflected the core values that 
held the Institute together. The challenges that stand ahead of Arab societies, Houni asserted, come down 
from its culture rather than from its political system. Emphasizing the power of culture to shape Arab 
peoples’ behavior, Houni argued that it is the ethical and moral architecture, belief system, and values that 
clamor for a revision rather than the authoritarian or despotic regimes. For Houni this cultural challenge 
entails not only rethinking the historical narrative Arab peoples repeat to themselves, but also questioning 
the very national ethos and religious codes deeply entrenched in the Turāth. Houni intuitively realized that 
to buck the trend of the Turāth he needed to challenge the parameters and truths of the dominant narrative. 
In his keynote speech, which ushered in the Institute in Beirut, Houni remarks:  
                                                 
30 He donated $1 million as the first installment for the creation of this group. On the donations of this group see: Naṣr 
Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, ed., Al-Ḥadāthah Wa-Al-ḥadāthah Al-ʿArabīyah: Muʾtamar Ishhār Al-Muaʿssasah Al-ʿArabīyah Lil-
Taḥdīth Al-Fikrī, Muhdá Ilá Idwārd Saʿīd, 30 Nīsān/Ibrīl - 2 Ayyār/Māyū 2004, al-Ṭabaʿh 1 (Dimascus: Dār Bitrā lil-Nashr 
wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 2005). 
31 Houni lived in Rome for more than three decades. Enchanted by Italian Renaissance, especially Italian Arts, he purchased 
a 17th century estate outside of Rome. Italy provided not only new business opportunities for the Libyan businessman, but 
mainly afforded him a unique vantage point to observe events on the southern flank of the Mediterranean basin. Watching the 
turbulence rattling the Middle East from the safety of his suburban mansion instilled in Houni new illuminations. 
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“Until recently it was widely held that the regression from which Arab societies suffer is of 
technical, industrial, and developmental quality in the first place. A regression linked to corruption and 
political despotism. But today, in light of the defeats and the threat of the traumatic regression that is 
shaping up to a true catastrophe, we find that that regression has an intellectual and cultural quality. This 
is to say that the Arab body is not ill in its ends, but that illness has gotten hold of its brain… A short while 
ago we talked about Arab’s disability that obstructs us from accessing modernity, but today we suffer 
[from] a sheer Arab refusal of modernity.”32 
 
The meeting at La Bristol marked a significant milestone in the annals of Arab thought. It marked 
the peak of the cultural war on the Turāth that has been waged since Jābirī first published his dissertation. 
Yet, less than thirty months had to pass before the Institute dissolved into factions as the diverging ideas 
among its co-founders Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and Jūrj Ṭarābīshī on the place of Turāth grew unbridgeable. 
In its place, the Arab Rationalist Association was formally declared in Paris with none of the previous 
carnivals attending. Though the Association is a natural continuation of the Institute, it signaled a sharp 
turn away from Turāth, as will be made clear throughout the rest of this dissertation.   
The Historiography 
The main ambition of this dissertation is to fill the staggering gap in the current historiography 
regarding the Turāth. Despite the hundreds of Arabic books, conferences and heated debates on the Turāth 
since the 1970s, there is still an abject dearth in scholarship that appropriately address the topic. In fact, 
the absence of writings on the Turāth led to great confusion, reduction, and misrepresentations, which 
persistently plague many scholarly works on Arab thought. For example, Arab intellectuals’ growing 
immersion in the Turāth was instantly conceived as a breach with Western epistemologies and ideologies, 
stalling a process that earlier generations initiated.33 That shift gave rise to what I call here the “stagnation 
model.” According to this model, the Arab Left is stagnant and Arab secularism is dead  the on least at or 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 30-31. 
33 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, “Retreat from the Secular Path? Islamic Dilemmas of Arab Politics,” The Review of Politics 28, no. 
4 (1966): 447–76. 
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 over definitivelyprevailed  have to appeared regimes national when ago, century-half a Triumphant. ropes
of . Plenty without and from within from siege under now is it Islamists, austere and conservative the
works on contemporary Arab thought comport, in one way or another, with this model. Its logic lies in 
century into two major periods with two -the twentieth East duringdividing the history of the Middle 
a nationalist ideology gies. According to this model, molodistinctive ideologies or dominant episte
dominated the first half of the twentieth century; Islamic ideology replaced the model in the second half 
of the century.34  
This historiography viewed the war of 1967 as a tipping point where one ideology (Islamism or 
political Islam) superseded the other (Left, secular and nationalism). Scholars as well as journalists and 
political pundits took this model to be true. One journalist noted, “Following the 1967 war with Israel in 
which Arab forces suffered a humiliating defeat, Arab nationalism went into decline- along with secularist 
ideas that had often accompanied it. Inevitably, some [Arabic speakers] saw military defeat as a 
punishment from God, wreaking upon Muslims for deviating from the righteous path.”35 Meanwhile, as 
Arab writers’ debates on the Turāth went along unrecognized and invisible, all commentaries on the Turāth 
were haphazardly viewed as no more than a return of Islam.36  In the Arab speaking world, Islam did not 
return but morphed and adopted a new shape. The prevalent modes of Islamic religiosity in the post-1967 
era increasingly emphasized religious rituals (veils and beards) and the role of institutions (by building 
mosques and other Associations). As Ernest Gellner argued the new Islam of the cities became 
increasingly legalistic.37  
                                                 
34 Many Middle Eastern historians subscribe to this model: see Michaelle Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World: 
Accommodation and Transformation, Cambridge Middle East Studies, 31 (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2009); R. 
Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubledage (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999); Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation’s Odyssey, 1st ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1998); Meir Hatina and Christoph Schumann, eds., Arab Liberal Thought after 1967: Old Dilemmas, New Perceptions, First 
edition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
35 Brian Whitaker, Arabs Without God, 1 edition (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 49. 
36 One of the authors who translated the re-emergence of the cultural Turath to mere “return of Islam” is Bernard Lewis. See: 
Bernard Lewis, “The Return of Islam,” Commentary Magazine, January 1, 1976. 
37 Sami Zubaida, 1995 “Is There a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner's Sociology of Islam," In Economy and Society 24 (2): 
43-58. 
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This dissertation argues that the advent of the Turāth studies in the Arab world is a sign not so 
much of a return of Islam as a clear mark of the emergence of a new field that shaped new ways of seeing 
and tasting. This transformation in intellectual aesthetics gave rise to newfound cultural references that 
began eating away at the dominant conversations of the dominated Arab intellectual circles during the 
1950s-60s. This new development has less to do with the West so much as with the new conditions of the 
post-colonial affairs. Yet, the establishment of the Turāth went along unacknowledged most likely because 
of a failure of translatability. In the absence of a corresponding term that captured the meaning of Turāth, 
Arabs’ genuine interest in their Turāth was translated as a turn to Islam, especially because Islam is part 
of Turāth. How did this happen? 
From the early 1980s, the Arab Left was narrated as the one and ultimate class of intellectuals that 
was defeat. This conception was essential to writing out the debate on the Turāth. In a famous article in 
the New Republic entitled “The Impossible Life of Moslem Liberalism,” Fouad Ajami reaffirms the 
stagnation model by speaking of the death of liberalism, the Arab Left and secular thinking in the Middle 
East. He declares that “in one Moslem society after another, to write of liberalism…is to write obituaries 
of men who took on impossible odds, and then failed.”38 Ajami architected a theory of the passing of the 
secular age from the Arab world. In The Arab Predicament, one of his well read books, Ajami gave voice 
to this thesis of a short-lived secular experiment and liberal thought in the Arab world, writing “An era in 
Arab politics had ended, and the struggle for the shape of the Arab order had begun” “Yesterday’s radicals- 
the Baʿth Party and President Nasser- were the principal victims of the defeat.”39 In the Dream of the Arab 
Palace he reiterated the same idea, writing that “the young had taken to theocratic politics; they had broken 
with the secular politics of their elders.”40 Two generations, two modes of being: the former is inherently 
secular, the latter is religious. 
Ajami was not alone in upholding and propounding the stagnation model but was one of its incisive 
progenitors. Other judgments were unambiguously condemning in asserting the passing of Arab Left and 
                                                 
38 Quoted by Kurzman, Liberal Islam, 12. 
39 Ajami, The Arab Predicament, 30. 
40 Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs, 7. 
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Western ideologies from the Arab world. In the article, “Partisans of the Heritage,” which discusses the 
shifts in modes of Arab thought, Alexander Flores argues that “many political thinkers throughout the 
Arab East who used to hold secularist views now subscribe to political Islam.”41 Though the title promises 
to account for the return to the Turāth as signified by the word heritage, Flores could not set himself free 
from the duality between secularism and Islam. He immediately assumed the prevailing and overriding 
thesis of the return to Islam that excludes any other possibility to account for changes in Arab thought, 
other than a shift toward Islam or against it.  
Yet others presumed that secularism and the Arab Left in the Arab world, particularly in the 
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, was steadily losing ground. In “Retreat from secularism in Arab 
nationalist and socialist thought,” Michaelle Browers furnishes an account in which yesterday’s seculars 
relinquish their Western-originated philosophies. She writes that “Arab nationalist and socialist 
intellectuals began to find meeting points and to develop a shared language with Islamists.”42 Others ruled 
out any possibility of secularism in the Muslim societies whatsoever.43 In this context the unusual 
statement made by the anthropologist and theorist of social studies, Ernest Gellner, is remarkable: “no 
secularization has taken place in the world of Islam.”44 Gellner grew accustomed to seeing the secular 
develop against the religious and could not think of Arab secularism as developing in opposition to Turāth, 
rather than against Islam.  
These arguments notwithstanding, no other scholar has methodologically affirmed the duality of 
Arab historical experience with secular modernity as Bernard Lewis. If most of the surveyed literature 
underlined the theme of ‘passing’ and ‘death’ of the Arab Left as the standard-carriers of the secular and 
liberal forms in the Arab world, Lewis gives the stagnation model its most coherent form. In What Went 
Wrong, he argued that secularism, cultural change, or liberalism had failed miserably in Islamic society 
because “the idea that any group of persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any sense 
                                                 
41 Alexander Flores, “Egypt: A New Secularism?,” Middle East Report, no. 153 (1988): 27–30. 
42 Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World, 30. 
43 Donald Eugene Smith. India as a Secular State (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1963), 40. Donald Smith 
suggests that Islamic societies are hostile to secular culture.   
44 Ernest Gellner, “Islam and Marxism: Some Comparisons,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 
1944-) 67, no. 1 (1991): 1–6, https://doi.org/10.2307/2621215. 
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outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim thought.”45 In his vast writings on 
the Middle East, Lewis rarely mentioned the idea of Turāth. In fact, he made up for the glaring absence of 
the Turāth by wantonly speaking of Islam.  
The secular logic through which much of the historiography on the Middle East is written 
precludes many historians from seeing the Turāth as a primary field of debate among Arab intellectuals. 
The secular logic accounts for everything social or cultural as religious or secular. This secular view 
emphasizes the spike in the number of mosques in the Middle East since the 1970s, while ignoring the 
number of schools, for instance. In particular, this secular oriented scholarship emphasizes the increase of 
veiled women in the Arab world, a phenomenon which is interpreted uncritically as a return to Islam. The 
veil, for example, was never referred to as a cultural symbol or expression of authenticity. Ironically, 
religious symbols in Europe were narrated differently. When the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights “ruled in 2001 … that the crucifix was a cultural symbol that represented the identity of 
‘Italian civilization’ and its ‘value system of liberty, equality, human dignity and religious toleration,’”46 
no one asked why the veil continues to signal the return to Islam.47 
Very few events in contemporary Arab thought, so vital to our nuanced understanding of the 
continuities and shifts within the Arab intellectual community, have been as baffling as the re-appearance 
of the Turāth. Yet, the return of the Turāth meant to reaffirm yet again the ubiquitous rise of Islam or 
Islamic literature. The idea of Turāth not only has no parallels in western languages, but has remained 
incomprehensible to many sharp minds writing about the Middle East. Rarely, if ever, was the advent of 
the Turāth interpreted as the rediscovery of the cultural repertiore that gave rise to a renewed interest in 
Arab classic poetry, Arab philosophy, songs, Art, and architecture. More often it was conceived as a 
triumph of the thesis of the Islamic revival. In the 1970s, as the field of Turāth studies expanded, as more 
                                                 
45 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford [England] ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 100. 
46 Cited by Scott, Joan Wallach. Sex and Secularism (The Public Square) (pp. 18-19). Princeton University Press. Kindle 
Edition. 
47 The Supreme Administrative Court in Italy which took the case first argued that “the crucifix did not have any religious 
connotation in Italy. Instead, it symbolized Italy’s historical and cultural value, which may have had religious origins in the 
past but did not anymore.” see Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Sovereignty, and Religious Difference: A Global Genealogy?,” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 35, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 197–209. 
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and more Arab writers and intellectuals disavowed Marxism and turned to explore their relation to the 
Turāth, a veteran historian of the Middle East, Charles Issawi, wrote “No observer of present trends in the 
Arab world can fail to be impressed by the strength of its revulsion against Western political and economic 
values and ideologies.”48 For Issawi that “revulsion” pervaded all aspects of Arab life without regard to 
class, society, gender or education, since it was a “question of a whole society turning against an alien 
civilization.”49 Issawi could not appreciate that what was sweeping Arab society was not a revulsion 
against Western values but an effervescent desire to belong in an age of increasing globalization.  
At a time when Arab scholars began fervently engaging Medieval literature, probing the 
boundaries and meaning of the Turāth, their cultural efforts were rarely understood. In 1980, a scholar of 
Arab societies observed that “A visitor to the Arab world cannot but note the intensification of Islamic 
identity that has taken place in the past several years. The Islamic nature of the area is apparent in the 
flood of conservative religious literature in the bookstores of Egypt.”50  
While there is little doubt that religious literature has gained appeal in recent decades, the fact that 
the author felt uncompelled to provide details on the nature of this “religious literature,” clearly speaks to  
the assumptions that guide many scholars who write on the current debates among Arab intellectuals. 
Subsuming the vast literature and debate on the Turāth under “conservative religious literature” affirms 
the view of the Islamic resurgence while precluding alternative ways to account for the debates among 
Arab intellectuals. Haddad seems too indifferent to a critical understanding of the secular and the religious. 
In particular, one should ask, what happens when the boundaries that separate religious literature from the 
secular become meaningless and increasingly porous? How do we determine whether a discourse or action 
is “religious” or “secular”? Still, it is intriguing that the post-1967 era was described as a period of 
“intensified Islamic identity,” ruling out Arabs’ genuine struggles with their Turāth and with authenticity.  
                                                 
48 Charles Philip Issawi, The Arab World’s Legacy: Essays (Princeton, N.J: Darwin Press, 1981), 231. 
49 Issawi, 231. By alien he meant Western. 
50 Yvonne Haddad, “The Arab-Israeli Wars, Nasserism, and the Affirmation of Islamic Identity,” in John L. Esposito and 
Hossein Askari, eds., Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change, 1st ed, Contemporary Issues in the 
Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1980), 107. 
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While the historiography that placed Islamic resurgence at the forefront of the Middle East has 
expanded the horizons of our understanding of the Arab peoples, it nonetheless limits our understanding 
of the fundamental development of the Turāth question. Even if the “religious literature” is verifiable to 
some extent, it has simply eliminated, and made unthinkable, all other alternatives to it, to borrow Edward 
Said’s words from another context. This historiography mobilized the entire system of representation 
while excluding the possibility of the return to the Turāth in a society seeking to lead a more authentic 
life. The Turāth was rarely portrayed as a topic around which Arab intellectual opinions diverged and 
articulated. Instead, it is still Islam that is being deployed as the main battlefield upon which cultural wars 
are being fought. The gap between this Western historiography of Arab thought and the ideas which Arab 
intellectuals are genuinely debating has been growing over the years. This dissertation locates itself in the 
yawning gap between Arab intellectuals’ discourse and Western scholars’ representations of Arab thought. 
Why did the current historiography on the Middle East suffer from such a pitfall? Each field of 
study suffers from constitutive absences and silences which make legible what the field agents deem 
significant. The marginalization and systematic suppression of the Turāth is foundational in giving rise to 
the dominant view of the (re)turn to Islam or the increase in religious literature, without which it would 
be hard to make this theory coherent. No doubt the “return of Islam” offered to account for many political, 
social, and economic events of the last few decades. Yet examining Middle Eastern societies solely 
through the lens of this model ignores vast spaces of human activity. This model only captures a fragment 
of the reality that is neither absolute nor generalizable. In other words, though the current scholarship on 
Arab thought had created new areas of research, these discoveries also generated new domains of 
ignorance in Arab thought. When the idea of “Islam” is brought to the center, the idea of Turāth is 
suspended.  
Another reason for the many pitfalls in scholarship on the Turāth was the persistent exclusion of 
the recent intellectual development in North Africa, which contributed considerably to the rise of the 
Turāth as a field of study. With only few exceptions, the prominent scholarship on Arab thought continues 
to follow the framework of the liberal age of the nahḍa. The recent attempts to go “beyond the liberal age” 
have met with partial success, for it is impossible to expand on the nahḍa framework so long as North 
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African intellectuals are muted or excluded. Despite their claim to write a revised history beyond the 
liberal age, Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss’ recent work committed this fallacy. Of the almost three dozen 
articles they put together, only two articles addressed the North African intellectual landscape while only 
one addressed the question of Turāth. The vast majority of the articles focused on the geography of the 
nahḍa of the eastern Mediterranean: Beirut, Cairo and all that lies between. Though Hanssen and Weiss 
offer an earnest revision of Arab thought, they reaffirm the geography of the nahḍa where Beirut and 
Cairo are viewed as the center and Morocco and Algeria the periphery. More than twenty articles focused 
merely on Egypt and the Levant, re-establishing the same geographies that Albert Hourani 
institutionalized half a century ago.51 It is through marginalizing North Africa and its vibrant intellectual 
scene that the field of Turāth evades scholarly attention and remains invisible. Hanssen and Weiss 
reinforce their assumption in the introduction of the second volume by claiming that, “After the Cold War 
and the end of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1989), the nahḍa reemerged as a theme in wider Arabic public 
discourse.” Resorting to the nahḍa, they rationalize, emerged from the narrowing of freedoms in the Arab 
world. “As the space for critical thinking appeared to shrink in this atmosphere of economic, political and 
religious violence… leftist intellectuals ‘began to invoke the nahḍa as an emblem and a shield.”52 
One has to immediately ask whether the renewed interest in the nahḍa was a cause or a result of 
something else, much broader that rekindled intellectual debates in those years- namely the engagement 
with the Turath. As this dissertation demonstrates, the Arab Left, reflected in the Arab Rationalist 
Association, invoked the nahḍa primarily to fend against the return to the Turāth. Branding the nahḍa as 
the recent past, the members of the Association called to deploy and appropriate its spirit to stave off the 
drift toward the far past of medieval Islam. Ironically, many members of the Arab Left in the Association 
had criticized the nahḍa before the 1970s, and they now seemed to embrace it as a means to disarm the 
forces of the Turāth. As I show in chapter four, “From Revolution to nahḍa,” Arab intellectuals resorted 
to the nahḍa in the context of disputing the Turāth as an alternative trajectory to Arab modernity.     
                                                 
51 Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, eds., Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
52 Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, eds., Arabic Thought against the Authoritarian Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the 
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Chapters’ Outlines 
“Just as the modern West drew and continues to draw on its last five centuries of experiences and 
traditions, on its Renaissance, Enlightenment, and liberal thought, Muslims nowadays are challenging this 
traditional narrative and are increasingly developing their own history—as a discursive moral practice—
in such a way as to provide a source of their own. This is not to say that any of their major discourses calls 
for the restoration of the Sharīʿa in its traditional form, in its traditional institutions, practices, and 
hermeneutical conceptions of life, for all these, as anyone can see, have vanished without hope of return. 
But it does mean that Muslims still find in their history—just as the West finds in the Enlightenment—a 
resource on which they can capitalize while facing the challenges of the modern project, a project that has 
proved incapable of solving even those problems of its own making.”53 
In this quote, Columbia professor of Islamic law, Wael Hallaq, provides an essential point of entry 
to the study of the Turāth. Hallaq rightly insists on the undeniable cultural demand of post-colonial Arabic 
speakers to restore their “own history,” which could “provide a [moral] source of their own.” However, it 
remains unclear why Hallaq limits this “history” and “moral sources” to the Sharīʿa only, which constitutes 
only one aspect, albeit a significant one, of the broader cultural repertoire of the Turāth. Despite the fact 
that he reduced the Turāth to Sharīʿa, Hallaq’s ideas are crucial to my argument about the Turāth. He calls 
upon students of this region to heed to something that takes shape in the horizon against the failures of the 
nation state. That thing is the Turāth that emerged within the discourse on Asālah (authenticity) and Ghazū 
Fikri (cultural colonialism/onslaught).  
What makes the Turāth a stand-alone scholarly field of study is discussed at length in each chapter 
of this work. Chapter one “Countering the Turāth: The Rise of the Arab Rationalist Association” 
introduces the controversy between so called Turāthiyyin (the partisan of the Turāth) and the anti-Turāth 
intellectuals around the idea of the secular. Though the debate focuses on the Western idea of the secular, 
the background of the debate is based on the new politics of the Turāth, which split the Arab Left into 
different groups. Chapter Two, The Emergence of a New Field, elaborates on the generalization and spike 
                                                 
53 Wael B. Hallaq. The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament, Kindle edition (Columbia 
University Press, 2012), 12–13. 
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of the writing on the Turāth and contextualizes its emergence at the beginning of the 1970s against the 
apparent failure of the post-colonial nation state and the cultural projects it made possible: Nasserism, 
Socialism, and Islamic reformism.54 The establishment of Turāth studies as a relatively autonomous field, 
from which secular sensibilities emerged, was one response to these devastating experiments. After 
establishing the thesis on the Turāth, this dissertation transitions to account for the voices that vehemently 
opposed the trend of the Turāth in contemporary Arab thought.  
My journey in chapters three and four starts with the great, brutal culling of the defeat in 1967 and 
the loss and cultural disorientation that settled in the Arab world following the 1967 war, which brought 
along a new disenchanting perspective to the world. Chapters three and four zoom into the life of Jūrj 
Ṭarābīshī, one of the most productive writers in the Arab world since the late 1960s. Ṭarābīshī had his 
moment of “rediscovery of the Turāth,” which signaled a turning point in his intellectual trajectory. 
Chapter three narrates the life anf thought that made up the young Ṭarābīshī, the revolutionist, 
Existentialist, and Marxist. The second Ṭarābīshī is presented in chapter four as an anti-Turathist, secular, 
and the representative of the Arab Rationalist Association.  
Chapters Five and Six account for two other members of the Arab Rationalist Association. Lafif 
Lakhdar, the Tunisian writer and a sworn secular who lived most of his life displaced between Tunisia, 
Algeria, Beirut, Amman, and Paris, offers a thorough analysis of the Turāth as a memory that nullifies 
history. His membership in the Arab Rationalist Association endowed this group with its secular title. The 
battle in which he envisioned himself engaging is no longer for discrediting the foundational text, as his 
earlier Marxist abortive attempt proved in the 1960s; nor is it for legitimizing different heuristic means to 
address the arcane language for the collective good. Rather, he wished to establish a different set of 
epistemological protocols that dispose with uncritical, traditional thinking that blocks different 
possibilities of readings and behavior. As I will discuss in more detail, Lakhdar would make genuine 
psychological use of the Qurʾān to discard some verses that “straddle the 21st century Muslim with an 
overwhelming sense of guilt.” 
                                                 
54 On the failure of these experiments, see Sami Zubaida where he argues that the failure of the “secularization process” in 
the Middle East turned religion to a matter of politics. See: Zubaida, “Islam and Secularization.” 
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The last chapter looks at the younger generation of the Arab Rationalist Association. Focusing on 
the radical sensibilities the younger generation embraced, this chapter accounts for Tunisian Rajaʾ Ben 
Slāma’s criticism of the Turāth. When Ben Slāma opened her eyes to the climate of ideas, many 
intellectuals in the Arab world began revising their previous, negative attitude toward the Turāth. Born in 
1968, Slāma espoused a discourse that despises politics and fully trusts the power of ideas to bring about 
change. If her countryman and member of the Association, Lafif Lakhdar claimed that the current wars in 
the Middle East revolve around shaping Arab collective memory of its iconic figures, then Slāma insists 
that the essence of the battle comes down to shaping ideas about the Turāth. Thus, for Slāma, intellectuals, 
rather than politicians, are the new engineers of society. On their shoulders falls the sheer responsibility 
for forging alternative narratives, coining new terminology, and writing a new history to re-imagine the 
Turāth, which traditional and conservatives dominated for centuries. The raging confrontations in many 
Arab societies, Slāma maintains, boil down to a battle of ideas, assumptions, and cultural orientations, 
which all masquerade in a political veneer. At their core, however, they are intellectual rivalries. Slāma 
speaks from a unique positionality. Unlike many among the previous generation of intellectuals, Slāma 
insists that reforming Islam in fact reins in change, and impedes the true transformation of cultural 
attitudes. Rather than reform, she calls for forging a new history to regulate the relationship between the 
present and past.  
At a time when secular Arab national movements began receding in the post-1967 era, many 
scholars argue that Arab intellectuals faced the tribulations of the post-colonial state by embracing Islam. 
While few ex-Marxists did look to Islam, the vast majority turned to explore the Turāth, launching a new 
field of studies that restructured what it means to be a member of the Arab Left and redefined what it 
means to be a progressive in the Arab world today. It is through the Turāth frenzy that one can approach 
these questions, long dismissed as resolved and inconsequential. Drawing on the original works of Arab 
intellectuals’ writings, memoirs, and interviews, this dissertation ultimately argues that only when 
historians of the Middle East bracket their assumptions on “Islam” are new insights toward an enriched 
understanding of Arab intellectual debates made thinkable and legible. 
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CHAPTER I: COUNTERING THE TURĀTH: THE RISE OF THE ARAB 
RATIONALIST ASSOCIATION 
Abstract 
The Turāth has been central to Islamic societies in the Middle East for over a millennium. It 
provides the values, beliefs, and guidelines for conduct that help forge Arab communities into organic 
wholes. A crucial force that tied one generation to the next, the Turāth had been waning since the 
nineteenth century with the sweep of modernity and the integration of the Middle East in the global capital 
market that installed new modes of communalities. Over the last three decades of the twentieth-century, 
however, there was a sudden return to the Turāth among Arab intellectuals which demonstrated that it has 
never been a dead tradition. It lived on in the nooks and crannies of modern life, and though it receded 
from the public sphere, it existed on the private level. In the wake of the new turn toward the Turāth, the 
Arab intellectual landscape witnessed a shocking earthquake that shattered the Left camp into smaller 
units, changing the definition of what it means to be progressive in the Arab world today.     
Introduction 
In Spring 1989, the French based, Arabic journal, al-Yaūm al-Sābiʿ embarked on a series of debates 
between two celebrated intellectuals: the Moroccan scholar Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (1935-2010) and 
the Egyptian philosopher Ḥassan Ḥanafī (1935.) Circulating for over ten weeks under the title Ḥiwār al-
Mashriq wal-Maghrib, the series covered ten hotly-debated topics.55 While Jābirī represented the Maghrib 
in this dialogue, Ḥanafī represented the Mashriq, since Egypt was--and still is--considered part of the 
Mashriq.56 The debate drew much attention and outstanding public interest, propelling once indifferent 
TV networks to engage intellectuals in interviews and shows that resulted in the shaping of ‘star’ Arab 
                                                 
55 The debate was later published in a book. See: Ḥasan Ḥanafī and Muḥammad ʿĀbid Jābirī. Ḥiwār Al-Mashriq Wa-Al-
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56 The extensive intellectual exchanges between Egypt and the Levant unified these two spheres into what Khuri-Makdisi 
called “geography of contestation.” See Ilham Khuri-Makdisi. The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global 
Radicalism, 1860-1914. The California World History Library 13 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 
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intellectuals.57 The weekly reactions following each debate brought to the open pent up disagreements not 
only among individual intellectuals on the Left, but also among journals and publishing houses.  
The scale and extent of written and oral reactions to these debates attests to their extraordinary 
significance among Arab intellectuals, so much so that some have referred to this phenomenon as the 
“Dialogue of the Eighties” (Ḥiwār al-Thamanīnāt).58 A couple of years later, the editor of al-Yaūm al-
Sābiʿ, Fayṣal Jalloūl conceded that the rash of commentary in the form of books, articles, lectures and 
interviews had “exceedingly surpassed our expectation” and for that reason many have “named it” the 
most important “cultural event” (ḥadath thaqāfī) of this era.59 
One of the topics that sparked much commotion was, predictably, secularism, the subject of the 
third debate.60 The secular idea had grown more contentious during the 1980s, as many Arab Marxists 
who had renounced Marxism adopted a secular identity. Yet, it was intriguing that both of the Leftist 
debaters, whose critical writings against Islamists qualified them as progressives, deemed the secular 
question in the contemporary Arab world a “spurious question” (masʾlah muzayyafah) and unanimously 
called to “pull out the secular slogan [sic] from Arabic dictionaries,” given the complexity and ambiguity 
that shrouds the term. The true cultural demand, they proclaimed, is democracy and human rights rather 
than secularism.61  
Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī and Ḥassan Ḥanafī’s backing away from secularism signaled a radical 
move in the Arab Left, an act that jolted many of these progressives out of their complacency. The Arab 
Left (a hodgepodge of Marxists, nationalists, communists and liberals) had previously fashioned itself the 
predominant revolutionary party in Arab politics and viewed itself as inherently secular, forward looking, 
anti-past and anti-religion.62 Despite the fact that Arab secularism was still a nebulous idea, it nonetheless 
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unified the Left as an organic whole and pitted them against Islamists. Yet, the denunciation of the secular 
idea by two notable progressive intellectuals set the course for the beginning of an intellectual backlash at 
the end of which a new group, the Arab Rationalist Association, emerged, heralding the establishment of 
a new brand of Arab progressivism.  
While repudiating secularism was instantly viewed (by Western scholars) as a proof of Arab 
intellectuals’ “retreat from secularism”63 or “the return to Islam,”64 I show, in what follows, that this 
repudiation was a more complex and subtle development that defied these simplistic descriptions. Instead, 
I locate the new revisionism among Arab intellectuals in the context of the growing debate on Turāth in 
the post-colonial age, where ideas like cultural authenticity gained more popularity and currency. 
Remarkably, while Jābirī and Ḥanafī disavowed secularism, they by no means ruled out other western 
ideals, notably democracy and human rights.65 Their rebuttal of the secular idea has less to do with the 
West as it does with their opposition to the intellectual frameworks originated in the Mashriq. As the Arab 
world entered the age of authenticity, Jābirī and Ḥanafī’s reservations concerning the secular idea 
represents a growing challenge to the intellectual assumptions and consensus that developed in the 
Mashriq. Ironically, though the book title signaled a dialogue between the two wings of the Arab region, 
it represented a rejection of the ideologies emanating from the Mashriq (Beirut and Cairo.) 
This debate ushered in a new dawn in the Arab world, wherein the conversation focused on current 
Arabic speakers’ relationship to their cultural repertoire (Turāth.) In the wake of these exchanges among 
Arab intellectuals, Jābirī and Ḥanafī began forging a new definition of the Arab Left. Displeased with the 
secular and excessively westernized “framework of reference” adhered to by progressive intellectuals in 
Beirut and Cairo, Jābirī and Ḥanafī called to form a new Islamic Left, al-Yassār al-Islāmī, by grounding 
their new identity in the Turāth. This call did not go unanswered. It had many writers wondering whether 
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Jābirī and Ḥanafī had abruptly turned away from their previously progressive intellectual positions and 
ended up embracing atavist/Islamist positions after spending years criticizing Islamists for their ahistorical 
narratives of medieval Islam. The apparent reversal in attitudes promptly instigated a torrent of reactions 
from old and close friends on the Left, setting out a process at the end of which the intellectual 
configurations reshuffled, resulting in the creation of new intellectual groups, each with its own publishing 
houses, journals, and even affiliated universities. In the wake of these newfound polarizations among the 
Left block, one should ask what it meant to be progressive in the contemporary Arab world in the age of 
authenticity. Can one be progressive and still embrace the Turāth? Or should one do away with the Turāth 
in order to be progressive and maintain a coherent Leftist identity? This chapter explores the evolution of 
new debates around the Turāth and the new identities they generated. Apprehended by the authority that 
Jābirī and Ḥanafī exerted upon many intellectual institutions, a group of intellectuals headed by Syrian 
Jūrj Ṭarābīshī and Tunisian Lafif Lakhdar declared the establishment of the Arab Rationalist Association 
to protest the new cultural tendency to use history as a resource for establishing new modes of modernity.  
The examination of the history of the Arab Rationalist Association, the standard bearers of this 
protest, illuminates a variety of aspects which the current scholarship kept in the dark. While conceiving 
the debate as one between Arab seculars versus Islamists, the major debate took place among the ranks of 
the Arab Left. This debate did not concern the West, either, but rather revolved around the relation to the 
Turāth, as will be made clear below. The Association’s history reaches back to the post-1967 era, yet it 
stood out in the dusk of the old millennium, amid the heated debates on the Turāth. In what follows, I 
investigate the most common threads, insights and concerns that brought the Association’s members into 
one group. Three moments stand out as particularly essential to the formation of this group, which 
ultimately led its members to break with the classical Arab Left that formed in the first half of the 
century.66 The first moment was the roaring 1960s. Despising the Turāth seemed the order of the day 
during the stormy years of the 1960s, when ideological thinking dominated Arab thought. This moment 
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informed the ideas of a great many Arab Leftists who thought ill of the past. The second moment, in the 
post-1967, saw the breakdown of ideologies, a disenchantment that led to a new intellectual curiosity 
about the past. As earlier attempts to freeze the past into a distant memory proved futile and fruitless, 
many of the imported ideologies were defeated and scores of Arab scholars turned to the Turāth during 
the late 1970s in search of authentic frameworks to give meaning and answer to their anxieties, setting the 
stage for the defiance of the ideological age. The third moment involved pluralizing the Turāth. During 
the 1980s, as Turāth studies reigned supreme, exiled intellectuals challenged these emerging readings and 
interpretations of the Turāth. The remarkable efforts made by Mohammad Arkoun in Paris began to 
resonate among his students, who aimed to defunct the Turāth and the voices of authenticity. Offering a 
scathing critique of modern Islamic practices, Arkoun’s scholarship opened the way to pluralizing the 
Turāth, which was the departure point for the Arab Rationalist Association’s counterattack.  
From these three moments and debates, the outlook of the Arab Rationalist Association unfolded. 
For the Association members, this outlook was normally called secularism (ʿAlmaniyya rather than 
ʿIlmaniyya.) They propounded it as a Rational understanding of the misguided historical interpretation 
that sent the Arab world into its current historical impasse (ʾInsidād al-Tārīkhī). This Arab secularism, as 
manifested among the Association members, bore only a slight resemblance to the intense debates on 
secularism in western academia, where secularism is commonly conceived in relation to the emergence 
of the nation state and around the religious wars that raged within Christianity.67 In these Western debates, 
recent scholarship has not only differentiated between political secularism and the secular,68 but has also 
called into question the conventional ideas and concepts associated with the secular. In 2007, Charles 
Taylor disputed the rise of modernity as a story of loss, or “subtraction.” He argued that “stories of 
modernity in general, and secularity in particular, which explain them by human beings having lost, or 
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sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations 
of knowledge” is misrepresented.69 Taylor is among a growing group of scholars who called into question 
the conventional account of secularism as simply the separation between church and state, religion and 
law, public and private. In his account, he presenting scathing critiques of this “minimalist formulation.” 
Instead, Taylor, Assad, Connolly, Mahmood and others forcefully argued that the secular in fact “entails 
fundamental shifts in conceptions of self, time, space, ethics, and morality, as well as a reorganization of 
social, political, and religious life. The secular, in other words, is not the natural bedrock from which 
religion emerges, nor is it what remains when religion is taken away.”70 For these scholars, Mahmood 
writes, the secular “is itself a historical product with specific epistemological, political, and moral 
entailments—none of which can be adequately grasped through a nominal account of secularism as the 
modern state’s retreat from religion.”71 
In the Arab world, however, this scholarship had not fully developed. Since Arab secularism 
lacked the originality and “authenticity” of European secularism, the Association members would re-read 
and re-interpret the Turāth to find seeds of secularism in past Islamic practices.72 This is the context against 
which the members of the Association began conceiving Arab secularism to reflect a stance to be taken 
on religion and the Turāth. In this sense the secular philosopher Akeel Belgrami’s definition of secularism 
is valid with regard to Arab secularism. Belgrami argued that “Secularism as a political doctrine arose to 
repair what were perceived as damages that flowed from historical harms that were, in turn, perceived as 
owing, in some broad sense, to religion.”73 This definition of secularism captures the meaning of the new 
outlook the Association fashioned. To grasp the meaning of this vague notion of the secular, I turn to a 
critical assessment of the historical debates around the Turāth as they emerged since the 1970s and led 
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ultimately to the birth of the Arab Rationalist Association. Before considering these three moments in 
turn, a look at the background discussion Jābirī and Ḥanafī had started is in order. 
Breaking Up the Arab Left Camp 
Jābirī and Ḥanafī’s forthright disavowal of the secular idea set the course for a new and elaborative 
discussion on the secular idea that the Arab world had never witnessed before.74 Remarkably, the ground 
upon which they had come to rebuke secularism appears flimsy when compared to rigorous Western 
scholarship. They fell short, for example, of demonstrating that secularism has instigated more interfaith 
tensions, infighting and civil wars than it has resolved, as Saba Mahmood has amply shown.75 Nor did 
their misgivings toward the secular idea stem from the fact that secularism had a hidden Christian 
genealogy76 or that it belied an unmistakable Protestant implication.77 In fact, Jābirī and Ḥanafī did not 
take that path in their repudiation of the secular. Their resistance to secularism proved (strangely!) 
orientalist in nature, describing secularism as an “imported problematic” (Ishkāliyya Mustawradah) 
imposed upon a society hardly trained and familiar with it’s history and mechanisms. Like many 
Orientalists, they claimed that since Islamic historical experience lacks an analogous concept of the 
separation between Church and State, secularism remains foreign to the Arab land and extraneous to its 
intellectual structure.78 For Jābirī and Ḥanafī, this absence explains why Arab societies shall not endeavor 
to embrace or accommodate secularism.79 More than this unconvincing rejection illuminated these writers’ 
opposition to the secular idea, it implied a rejection of intellectual agendas in Beirut and Cairo. 
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Jābirī and Ḥanafī’s outright rejection of the secular idea was unforeseen in intellectual circles given 
their long literary record and an established reputation steeped in liberal and progressive writings. Since 
the beginning of the1970s, both scholars had expressed strong opinions against Islamists’ approaches to 
the study of Islamic tradition and the Turāth. In their writings, Jābirī and Ḥanafī mounted an unrelenting 
assault against “quaint and clumsy Islamic interpretations.” By virtue of these critical writings they gained 
more exposure and visibility among the more established intellectuals of Beirut and Cairo. By the mid-
1980s, Jābirī and Ḥanafī rose to national prominence because they were able to reclaim the study of the 
Turāth from the “chaotic treatment” at the hands of “traditionalists and Islamists” (al-Turāthiyyin wal-
Islāmiyyin) or what Ḥāmid Abū Zayd called “the hold of reactionary thought over tradition.”80 They 
offered a thorough scholarship that faced down Islamists, explicitly revealing inherent lapses and 
scandalous limitations in their epistemology, showing to all Islamists’ lack of basic historical 
understanding.81  
Of the countless attempts to challenge and undermine Islamists’ hold on the study of the Turāth,82 
very few works cut as deeply into the essence of the Turāth question as Jābirī and Ḥanafī.83 Theirs amounts 
to a radical shift away from reading and interpreting the Turāth within a linear history. With the 
introduction of structural methods to the study of Islamic history, their works sent shock waves to the 
bastions of conservative circles like al-Azhar. Yet their uncertainty and fumbling towards the secular 
question, which evolved into a firm repudiation of the secular idea during the 1990s, raised some serious 
questions among progressive intellectuals regarding the new trail Jābirī and Ḥanafī were blazing.  
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In light of this literary background, one might not expect Jābirī and Ḥanafī to recant on their 
affirmed affiliation with the Left. Yet this is exactly what transpired. By calling into question the secular, 
however, Jābirī and Ḥanafī were not opposing a Western idea so much as revolting against the assumptions 
that underpinned progressive thinking in the Mashriq. More than any other intellectual in the Arab world, 
Jābirī was immensely frustrated with the intellectual hegemony of Cairo and Beirut. His mission to “pull 
back the secular slogan” was not a call against the West or a “retreat from the secular” but should rather 
be understood within the context of the newfound cultural war between the Maghrib and the Mashriq. 
Jābirī, one critic maintained, did not appropriate Gaston Bachelard’s “epistemological break” in order to 
do away with the past, but instead to call for a break with the Mashriq.84  
Jābirī represents the uprising of the intellectual margins against the center, the rise of the Meghrib 
against the Mashriq. When Jābirī argued that the “redundant idea of secularism” entered the intellectual 
horizon of the Arab world through Lebanon, he meant to denounce Lebanon as a center of misguided 
intellectual ideologies more than the secular idea. Ḥanafī was even more straightforward in his 
condemnation, writing that secularism was facilitated by Mashriqi Christian scholars like “Shibli Shmail, 
Yakub Saruf, Farah Anton, Niqula Hadad, Salamah Musa.”85 To dispute the very assumptions the old 
progressives in Beirut and Cairo took for granted, Jābirī and Ḥanafī hoped to forge a space essential for 
the creation of a new brand of progressivism that foregrounded the Turāth as a source of alternative 
modernity.86 
To parochialize the old hubs of Arab intellectualism, Jābirī and Ḥanafī called attention to the 
hitherto disregarded Turāth, exposing progressives’ disdain to a source of knowledge that gained more 
currency in the age of authenticity. Jābirī and Ḥanafī challenged the old guard of the Left with the simple 
question: What to do with the centuries-old Islamic Turāth? In an age when Europe made it clear to all 
non-Western societies that disowning their histories stands as a condition for being modern, the question 
of the Turāth takes on a form of cultural dilemma from the viewpoint of these challengers from North 
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Africa. Indeed, the renewed intellectual conversation on the Turāth not only fit well in this age, but it also 
personified the Arab authenticity that defined this period. In this sense it brought to the open some of the 
simmering disputes among progressive intellectuals. While embracing the Turāth represented the revenge 
of the intellectual margins against the intellectual center, the Turāth debate also launched a conversation 
about whether it could serve as a model for modernity and social change. As in many non-Western spaces, 
the age of authenticity rendered the previous ease Arab intellectuals in Cairo and Beirut entertained with 
regard to Western secularism into a liability, for it implied an apparent contempt for Arab culture and 
Islam.  
The call to look past the West in search of an alternative modernity, one that resides within the 
historical experience of the Arab Turāth, sparked a cultural reaction from intellectuals in Syria, Lebanon, 
and Tunisia. This cultural reaction was not only a proposal but a recipe for a new cultural war inside the 
Arab Left. During the 1990s, the Left camp fashioned two groups that began to take shape along parallel 
lines. The first group represented intellectuals who possessed an unyielding commitment to Arab-Islamic 
Turāth without relinquishing the demands for democracy and human rights. Members of this group 
protested the brand of modernity that took its inspiration solely from the west and viewed the Turāth with 
contempt. For this group, the genuine Hadātha, or the Arab brand of authentic modernity, emanates 
directly from Arabs’ history. They denounced and deplored the modernity valorized by progressives in 
Beirut and Cairo, one that offered only dashed hopes and false dawns, since it failed to diversify the 
trajectories of modernity. This version of linear modernity that completely overlooked the Turāth and 
depended only on Western sources merely represents one instantiation among many other possibilities of 
being modern. While unwilling to reject western ideals, this group also refused to rule out the Turāth as a 
source of cultural renewal and modernity. Members of this group clustered around the Center for the Study 
of Arab Unity that began in Beirut in 1975 but was inhabited by mostly Moroccan scholars. Jābirī and 
Ḥanafī soon emerged as the forerunners of this group.  
The other group consisted of intellectuals bent on casting the weight of Arab and Islamic Turāth 
aside to facilitate new models of living that past Islamic historical experiences only inhibited and excluded. 
Viewing the Turāth as a burden that inhibits Arab society’s progress, these intellectuals’ insistence on 
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thrashing the Turāth and Arab history more generally emerged as the main objectives which afford new 
possibilities to live fully in “the contemporary world.” This group came to be known as the Arab 
Rationalist Association (Rābiṭat al-ʿAqlānīyīn al-ʿArab), an organization founded in Paris. Established in 
2003 as a separate intellectual movement, the Association offered a new framework within which to 
observe the dynamic of Arab intellectual debates over the last few decades. Though its history can be 
traced back to the 1960s, the Association’s members come together only in the late 1990s to represent a 
different voice in the age of Arab authenticity. While most of the current scholarship on Arab thought 
focused on the first group, 87 the Association has never been acknowledged or explored except through 
negative references.88 
Indeed, both of these intellectual groups worked together in the 1960s under Dār al-Taliʿah and 
Dār al-Ādāb in Beirut and shared common concerns and cultural anxieties. They had a similar national 
upbringing, came of age in the late 1950s, and grew up in a relatively secular environment. Yet these 
common characteristics could not gloss over the divergent sensibilities among them that eventually led to 
the split in the Left camp. The members of the Arab Rationalist Association were a group of self-imposed 
exiled intellectuals from Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut, and Tunis who deemed the Turāth an epistemological 
obstacle, an unsurpassable challenge on the road to advancement and progress. They fostered literary 
tastes and cultural propensities that vastly differed from those intellectuals in Morocco and elsewhere, 
who deemed the Turāth a richly intellectual tradition that could facilitate a different model of un-Western 
modernity.  
Though the secular question on the pages of al-Yaūm al-Sābiʿ triggered new intellectual frictions, 
the controversy boiled down to the question of Turāth. The new consensus around the Turāth left the anti-
Turāth movement, i.e. the Association, distraught and discontent. The Arab Rationalist Association 
                                                 
87 Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Suha Taji-
Farouki, ed., Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qurʼan, Qur’anic Studies Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press in 
Association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2004); Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʻ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in 
Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History (London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2004); Azzam Tamimi and John L. Esposito, eds., 
Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Co, 2000). 
88 Massad, Islam in Liberalism; Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic 
Reformation,” Public Culture 18, no. 2 (March 20, 2006): 323–47. 
 38 
formed in protest against the return of scores of intellectuals to the Turāth. One of its founding members, 
the Syrian scholar Jūrj Ṭarābīshī, pleaded with his readers to question the increased values Arabs had 
recently placed on authenticity. He called on his readers to ask themselves whether purity and authenticity 
are even desirable. He asked them to consider who benefits and who is being excluded from the debate on 
the Turāth. While Arab progressives in the 1960s used the West as a focal point of their debates about 
their relationship to the future, Ṭarābīshī wrote, they are now, ironically, arguing about their relationship 
to the past through the Turāth. For many members of the Association, this shift in direction indicated that 
Arab culture had taken a vast step backwards through its growing obsession with the Turāth.  
*** 
The Roaring 1960s: Thrashing the Past 
During the mid-twentieth-century, many Arab Leftists conceived the eclipse of the Turāth as 
emancipatory. The Turāth seemed not only to straddle ordinary people with weighty traditions but also to 
stifle other human possibilities. This attitude toward the Turāth manifested in individual writings, journals 
and publishing houses that fashioned this newfound animosity toward the Turāth and the past in general. 
Dār al-Adāb, Dār al-Taliʿah and Dār al-ʿilm lil-Malāiyyin, three notable publishing houses in Beirut, firmly 
believed that creativity was released only after the Turāth had been relegated to the past. In the couple of 
decades after its establishment in the late 1950s to 1970s, Dār al-Taliʿah made a conscious decision not to 
publish works on the Turāth or the past in order to facilitate the emergence of new forms of artistic and 
cultural expression.89 Dār al-Adāb published very few articles on the Turāth during its first two decades 
as compared with the post-1970s.  
One expression of this attitude can be found in the writings of Syrian Marxist Ṣādiq Jalāl ʿAẓm, 
whose early books captured the sensibilities of this generation. Expounding on the cultural defeat against 
Israel in 1967, ʿAzm writes that “Arab masses are clearly lurching under the heavy weight of feelings, 
sentiments, forms of expression and styles of thinking which were formed as a result of centuries-long of 
decadence and cultural and scientific stillness.” Trying to explicate the meaning of his position, ʿAẓm 
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elaborates that “This burden” of the Turāth “is poised to stall progress, revolution, socialism and any 
change or transformation in Arab life because of the power of continuity implicated in this past.”90 For 
ʿAẓm, in other words, steering clear of the Turāth represented the very definition of revolutionary.  
Yet in 1967, as Israel dealt a harsh blow to the combined armies of three Arab states, these 
convictions that once gave unity to young progressives and revolutionaries began to crumble. The defeat 
demonstrated that Arab progressives and their ideologies are misleading, and therefore left many people 
searching for refuge and consolation in the Turāth. “After defeats, vanquished nations rely on their morals 
to survive the brunt of the military defeat,”91 writes Wolfgang Shivelbosch, author of Culture of Defeat. 
“Nations do not usually embrace defeat in their mythology. Indeed, they do everything in their power to 
deny it.”92 In the wake of their countries’ humiliating defeat in the war of 1967, Arab intellectuals turned 
to their Turāth in search of better models for living, as the ideologies of the time proved vacuous and 
destructive. “Nations that lose their state often take refuge in their church.”93 The defeat in 1967 was 
indeed a watershed moment. Jens Hanssen has recently argued that the tragedy of “1967 signaled the 
abandonment of historical reasoning for esoteric and essentialist logics.”94 This is the social reality which 
Arab progressives encountered as they began countering the public slide toward the past through the 
Turāth. 
The Islamic rebound that snatched public discourse from progressive Arab intellectuals did not go 
unchallenged. It inspired a soulsearching among members of the Arab Left, who sought ways to curb the 
pervasive proclivity toward religious-mythical thinking.95 Namely, the resurgence of mythical thinking 
triggered a wave of historicity whose first signs appeared on the horizon of the Arab world in the mid-
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century.96 For a growing number of progressives, historicity held the promise to disarm, or at least derail, 
the mythical thinking that began to take possession of the public imagination.97 The early essays and books 
published in the wake of the defeat in 1967 offer concrete evidence of a surges in mythical public thinking. 
In Egypt, for example, Virgin Mary was reported to have made an appearance as her shadow hovered over 
a mosque in central Cairo, a story that preoccupied journalists, media networks and newspapers.98 Feeling 
besieged by a straddling defeat, many Arabic speakers found relief in escapist alternatives, explained al-
ʿAzm, a keen Marxist from Syria.  
The resurrection of ahistorical thinking (mythical and gnostic, theological and linear), in the 
aftermath of the 1967, convinced many revolutionaries and progressive writers of the necessity for 
breaking with the Turāth, the wellspring of all irrational thinking. In 1955, Michael ʿAflaq, one of the 
three founders of the Baʿth party, marked the way as he called for challenging the “old ways” that feed 
corruption and sustain mythical thinking, insisting on the value of opposing the current conditions. 
According to ʿAflaq, “he who fails to firmly confront these conditions upfront, he who refrains from 
deconstructing them or paving the way to their destruction, is clearly biased.”99 In more forceful ways, 
ʿAflaq spoke of banishing the current norms and values: “The central idea of a revolutionary movement 
that addresses itself to change the course of life of a nation is to undo the common values. There is no 
doubt that the prevalent and embedded values are in harmony with and nurturing the [corrupted] current 
order; thus, it makes little sense to have these [old] values common among us while we are 
revolutionaries.”100 Shedding these values paves the way for change. 
In 1967, another Marxist historian, ʿAbdallah Laroui (b. 1933), emerged to countervail the Turāth 
and the values it represented. Laroui chafed at the prevailing conception of history among many Islamists 
who viewed themselves on a continuum with the Turāth, portraying themselves as the only authentic 
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holders of a tradition that Mohammad launched in in the 7th century. Laroui claimed that this history 
pandered to a cultural nostalgia among Islamists longing for a vanished past in which Muslims were still 
able to lead the world.  
Laroui was among the first to present historicity as a new approach through which to read and 
examine the Turāth. Calling to historicize the current “truth regimes of Islamic reason” and questioning 
its “normative claims,” Laroui’s historicity was seen as an antidote to Islamists. Laroui’s main goal was 
to prepare the grounds for a new thought system to take hold in Arab society, one with a critical account 
of the Turāth. Laroui’s historicity fashions a radical nonlinearity. This historicity accounts for ideas in a 
given time, a specific place, and within the context in which they take place. Laroui’s notion 
of“imprisoning thought” meaning to constrain thought to a specific time and place, led Islamists to wage 
a cultural war against his ideas. They scoffed at his attempts to relativize eternal truths and beliefs. The 
very claim that truth (read: Islamic truths) is relative and proportional, and  by no means absolute, left 
many Islamists distressed. Laroui was not alone in this cultural war against Islamists, however. Though 
he made many enemies, he nonetheless found many followers in Beirut, not the least of which was Yassin 
al-Hafiz, who propounded Laroui’s opaque language to many readers.101 Laroui’s thrust resonated among 
a growing class of Arab progressives who adopted his argument that historical truth is contingent 
(mashrūt) on context, time, and place. The realization that truth can only be relative, conditional, and 
situational was a genuinely revolutionary idea. In its wake, the lines between Islamists and progressives 
were drawn, accentuated and formed. The chief adversary of historicity, Laroui remarked, is the belief in 
absolute truths (al-ḥaqāʾiq al-muṭlakah) that are conceived beyond time and place.102  
History has no destiny, Laroui argued. History is created by people within their given conditions, 
not above or beyond them. Everything that takes place in human society is the outcome of human 
interaction with nature and with each other. Historical events have particular causes that historians have 
to characterize, trace down, and stipulate. Laroui’s exclusion of any transcendental meddling in the 
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making of history or its procession, incensed many in conservative circles who worked hard to negate his 
ideas. If, until the late 1960s, the lines that separated Arab Left from Islamists were blurred and vague, 
Laroui’s ideas of historicity recreated them anew, polarizing the two parties. 
When Laroui published his book The Arab Ideology, it was a remarkable departure from the 
established discourse among Arab intellectuals, which focused on the question of crafting a unique Arab 
philosophy and determining its constitutive components103 Zakī Najīb Maḥmūd (1905-1993), one of 
Egypt’s towering figures in the second half of the century, writes that he spent his life wrestling with this 
question. In January 1964, Maḥmūd launched a new journal “Majalat Fikr Muʿāṣir” dedicated to 
unpacking the meaning of this question.104 In his writings, Maḥmūd gives a sample of literary tastes and 
the kinds of issues with which many writers coped. Maḥmūd writes that he swung between leaning toward 
the Turāth and leaning toward the Ḥadātha, offering vague answers. Despite his late-life tilt toward 
embracing western models, Maḥmūd shied away from declaring the death of the past in his well-read 
works.105  
Laroui looked beyond this discourse that beleaguered Arab thought since the late nineteenth 
century. He deemed Islamists’ insistence on following the example of the past  a failure to instigate any 
substantive change in current society. He therefore aimed to affect an epistemological break (katīʿah 
maʿrifiyyah) with the Turāth, a fundamental break to create new possibilities for Arab growth. Explaining 
the necessity of this epistemological break, Laroui argued that a society that is hiding in its “shell” or 
“authenticity cocoon” sharnaqat al-ʾAṣālah requires an “epistemological shock”.106 Yet, claiming that 
“man is historical by nature” and that “man is defined by time” did not appeal to Islamists who could see 
in Laroui’s historicity nothing more than an abortive attempt to de-glorify a Turāth they grew up admiring. 
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Nonetheless, Laroui expressed Arab progressives’ disregard for the Turāth more than he defended 
historicity.   
Ideological Breakdown and the Turn to the Turāth 
Mohammad ʿAbid al-Jābirī (1935-2010) became the first to counter the arguments propounded by 
his countryman Laroui. Jābirī was an emerging intellectual in Morocco during the 1970s, and he realized 
that Laroui’s proposals were inapplicable because they followed the European script, according to which 
Arabs had to disown their Turāth to become modern. Inspired by seventeenth-century German writer 
Novalis, who famously said, “only the gaze that is turned backward can bring us forward, for the gaze that 
is turned forward leads us backward,” Jābirī argued that Arab Marxists’ call to abandon the Turāth proved 
vacuous and gravely misleading. He assailed Arab Marxists propensity to apply ready-made Marxist 
categories and concepts, which were executed with little to no attention to the particularities and nuances 
of Arabs’ historical experience. Ever since the mid-1970s, Jābirī had confronted Arab Marxists’ and 
Islamists’ (mis)reading of the Turāth in a series of seminars at Mohammad V University in Rabat where 
he taught for the entirety of his career. The collection of these lectures was later published in an 
extraordinary book entitled “Contemporary Arab Discourse”.107   
Jābirī proposed an entirely different approach to the Turāth. For Jābirī, the Arab past was not 
detached from the present. Unlike the West, where the past is separated from the present, the Arab world 
does not regard the past as a distinctive unit. The past continues to live on in the present, and therefore the 
call for a clinical break between the two appears ludicrous. This articulation of the past and present leads 
Jābirī to develop a new conception of time (al-zaman al-mutadākhil) which views the Turāth as a 
constitutive mechanism of Arab thought. The social imagination of Arabic speakers attests to the 
“synchronized time” that views past and present on the same level. Jābirī goes on to fault Marxists and 
Islamists for adhering to outdated notions of linear time that posited the past as either a problem or an 
example to be followed. For Jābirī, past historical events, though they initially seem far removed from 
current political structures, still condition the way politics unfold and are imagined in the Arab world. 
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Arab Marxists’ primary fault, according to Jābirī, was in their unrelenting attempt to preach for a 
disengagement with and a departure from the Turāth. The very conception of time in Marxist theory is 
therefore misguiding and meaningless.108 This is because Arab Marxists were oblivious to the fact that the 
Arab world lives simultaneously in the past and present.109 Jābirī refers to this new articulation of time as 
(mutazamin) where different times merged with one another and lived in full correlation and synchrony.110  
The more urgent question is not to look past the Turāth, but to explore it. By overlooking the 
Turāth, Arab progressives did not remove its impact on the way current Arabspeakers lead their lives. 
Therefore, the call to embrace new models from the West only exasperates rather than alleviates the 
challenges ahead. The more compelling question has to do with the Turāth itself. At the center of Jābirī’s 
project stands the question: why does the Turāth, which no longer represents a lived experience, retain a 
hold over Arab people’s imagination? How should we deal with it? Over the next few years Jābirī would 
become one of the most-read Arab intellectuals, not only overshadowing his countryman Laroui, but also 
publishing a series of books under the title “Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabi,” which was translated into more than 
sixteen Islamic and non-Islamic languages. 
Jābirī provided a rewarding but nonetheless laborious answer to the Arab need for the Turāth. He 
accepted Laroui’s basic idea of the necessity for separating the present from the past but the two of them 
disagreed regarding the method . If Laroui demonstrated the Turāth‘s loss of validity over the present by 
way of historicity, Jābirī maintains that only by returning to the Turāth is one able to dismantle, dislocate, 
and displace the fortress of the Turāth that looms large over the present. One of Jābirī’s students, Kamal 
ʿAbd al-Latif put it succinctly when he wrote that Jābirī meant to “disengage the Turāth by re-engaging 
it.” Namely, the way to nullify the authority of the Turāth passes through the Turāth rather than by 
“escaping” from it (as Arab Marxists thought.)111 
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Jābirī established his analysis on the assumption that the Turāth indulged unfettered sway in 
contemporary Arab societies, an authority that has not been challenged despite all the Iṣlaḥ movements.112 
It shapes the way Arabic speakers conceive the world around them and define their tastes, aesthetics, 
morals and ethical attitude toward the family, faith and the Other. Jābirī extended his arguments by 
maintaining that the question of Turāth is not merely about understanding the past per se but also remains 
essential to the question of Hadāthah (suʿal al-Hadāthah.) In other words, Jābirī maintains that it would 
be impossible to grasp the current paralysis in post-colonial Arab affairs without first understanding 
twentieth-century Arabs’ “unhealthy relationship with the Turāth” by revising it. Rather than calling for 
the disposal of the Turāth, Jābirī insisted on displacing it by means of making the past a gateway for Arab 
rationalism. 
Turning his attention to the Islamists, Jābirī contended that they also did no justice to the Turāth. 
Islamists failed to appreciate temporality and time-constituent concepts of history, bogged down by 
teleological and linear historical narratives. They arranged the Turāth according to certain patterns and 
periodization that make little sense of history. Yet, while Jābirī spent less time deconstructing Islamists’ 
visions and conceptions toward the Turāth, he nonetheless compelled many to ask why it is no longer 
possible to ignore the Turāth the way many progressives desired. This questioning rendered Laroui’s call 
for a break redundant.  
Yet, Jābirī’s passionate advocacy for the Turāth led him to highly problematic positions and 
conclusions. Jābirī, for example, argued that Arab Hadātha should emerge from within (min al-dākhil) the 
Turāth, not outside it. Namely, the Turāth, if read and examined from a non-ideological position, could 
provide a new trajectory for Arab modernity from within Arab cultural soil. He viewed any modernity 
external to the domain of the Turāth as doomed to fail because it is borrowed, faked, and imposed from 
above. In the second volume of Naqd, he made this conclusion clear: “there is no path to renewal and 
Hadātha except from within the Turāth, its mechanisms and possibilities.”113 This was not only a direct 
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rebuttal to Laroui’s ideas, which viewed European modernity as the only pathway out of Arab post-
colonial plights. Jābirī’s excessive reliance on the Turāth as a source of renewal clashed with the ideas of 
a growing circle of intellectuals who had clustered around Mohammad Arkoun in Paris. Many of these 
scholars rightly claimed that though Jābirī started off progressive, he ended up reaffirming Islamists’ 
positions. Jābirī not only condemns western modernity as “extraneous” but also limits the possibilities of 
Arab renewal and modernity to the Turāth.  
 
Pluralizing the Turāth 
As the twentieth century drew to a close Arab Left progressives gradually began to assume a 
secular identity. Secularism, though vague and ambiguous, caused a split within the Arab Left. The secular 
Arab critics of the Left had to face a truth they increasingly fretted over but did not confront: many aspects 
of culture, high and low, that once seemed securely in the progressives’ possession appeared to be 
vulnerable to capricious appropriations by the now-emboldened and empowered Islamists.114 Jābirī, a 
member of the old Arab Left, ended up boosting, rather than warding off, Islamism. His project did little 
to allay secular intellectuals’ concerns and anxiety. A backlash against Jābirī was in the making. Not only 
did Jābirī view the Turāth as the only possible pathway for renewal, but he also warned that Arab 
modernity must not follow on the path of Europe. The age of catching up with Europe, he claimed, is over. 
Mohammad Arkoun (1928-2010) was among the first to dispute Jābirī’s project, claiming that the 
latter failed to account for the Turāth in its entirety.115 Arkoun did not deny the merits of the Turāth as a 
source of the Arab self, yet he assailed Jābirī for politicizing and weaponizing the Turāth. Arkoun 
criticized Jābirī for malfeasance and mis-application of the epistemological method to Islamic history. 
Writing from Paris, where he studied and taught at the Sorbonne, Arkoun was not beset with the same 
questions that agonized Jābirī. Rather, Arkoun asked a different set of questions that framed his 
intervention in these debates. As he embarked on writing about the Turāth, Arkoun had two goals in mind: 
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contesting biased Western knowledge on Islam and calling into question the historical knowledge being 
produced by traditional circles in the Middle East. His protest was a call against “the established symbolic 
and semantic system of how to approach Islam.”116 
Arkoun’s concern focused on definitions: How was one to define the field of Turāth? Where should 
one draw the boundaries? How should one  read the Turāth? What does the Turāth consist of? These 
questions led him to create what he hoped to be an Applied Islamism (Appliquèe Islamologie) that would 
counter the ill-equipped knowledge on Islamic societies generated in both the West and the East. Arkoun’s 
notion starts with the premise that Arab Turāth was predominantly developed in an oral culture; the 
examinations of collective memory and social imagination therefore take precedence in his intellectual 
pursuits.  
In 1984,  the same year in which Jābirī published his masterpiece Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabi, Arkoun 
published Naqd al-ʿAql al-Islami. Both Arkoun and Jābirī found inspiration in French theories, Foucault’s 
work in particular, and both of them used epistemology to examine the reasons and the mechanisms that 
generated and organized Islamic knowledge, steering away from what they called the obsolete history of 
ideas. They also shared one similar conclusion: far from being a dead tradition, Islamic Turāth is still a 
living tradition in the social imagination of the contemporary Arab world (as unconscious knowledge). 
Yet, Arkoun argued that cultures that invoke long-gone pasts are hardly unique to Arabic-speaking people, 
while Jābirī viewed the dominant presence of the Turāth as a symptom of post-colonial Arab malaise. 
Arkoun countered that the turn to the Turāth was an integral part of “theological societies.” Through this 
reversion to the Turāth, Arkoun claimed, Arab societies preserve the story they tell themselves about the 
past and keep coherent their notion of cultural identity. Though they shared methods and approaches, 
Arkoun and Jābirī took two different paths. Jābirī’s was a case study that looked primarily at Islamic 
philosophy to understand the way in which Arab reason performed styles of speeches, linguistic 
categories, etc. through its modes of reasoning,. Arkoun’s was a highly theoretical work that examined 
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the Turāth as an integrated unit, trouncing Jābirī for fragmenting the unity of the Turāth into three 
epistemic mechanisms: philosophy, mythology and gnosticism.  
Disputing various definitions that limited the Turāth to Fiqh or philosophy or mysticism, Arkoun 
argues that much of the historical writings on Islamic societies were bedeviled by definitions. Rather than 
studying a single case or an event, Arkoun’s project was an invitation to carry out extensive research on 
the Turāth over a long span of time. For Arkoun, Jābirī’s works had not only reduced the Turāth to rational-
philosophical thinking but also created correspondence between Islamic philosophy and Turāth. Jābirī 
followed Islamists in creating parallelism between Islamic jurisprudence and Turāth. Both Jābirī and 
Islamists have constrained and limited the scope of Turāth to one salient aspect. Arkoun, instead, 
demonstrates that the Turāth should not be reduced to its components. His was a protest against the view 
that “Islam was mostly reduced to Sunnism and Arabism.”117 To fully grasp the meaning and scope of the 
Turāth, scholars should not rule out anything as they investigate Medieval Islamic societies. Myths are 
equally significant as rational thinking and Sufism, since all provide priceless historical insights on the 
different modes of knowledge transmission and social imagination in Islamic societies.  
Arkoun criticized classical Islamic methods, which led the field of Islamic studies to “an 
intellectual closure and methodological deadlock.”118 Arkoun reminds his readers that Islam emerged in 
a distinctly oral culture, which developed according to a different logic than the written or scientific 
culture. In their treatment of oral culture, Arkoun argues, historians, anthropologists, linguists, and 
sociologists had to heed to different sets of cultural expressions, most notably drawings, songs, dance, 
urban planning and architecture, all of which are fundamental to the understanding of the “Quranic 
societies”. “Finding the neglected, forgotten and imagined are essential to grasping the Islamic 
phenomena, without which, historians squander the expression energy to read the intellectual-cultural map 
of Islam.”119 
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In his investigations Arkoun emphasized three methodswith which to approach the Turāth: 
impense`e (unthinkable), impensable (impossiblility of thinking), and Islamic Reason. Arkoun’s proposals 
were promptly embraced by his students. By opening up the field to new questions, exploring new themes 
and understudied or marginalized areas of study, Arkoun’s project afforded scholars the opportunity to 
explore new areas: Islamic ethics, humanism in Medieval Islam, the dialectical relations between violence 
and the sacred, history and truth, the relations between sovereignty and legitimacy, and the study of the 
diverse forms of ritualization in Islamic piety. This inquiry amounted to a tremendous break with past 
definitions of the Turāth that were portrayed by Jābirī and others as authentic. This conceptualization 
allowed Arkoun’s students and followers to call into question many assumptions that casted a sacred aura 
on the Turath.120 
Remarkably, many scholars were disappointed by Arkoun, given that his project did not provide 
concrete answers to the cultural questions that had risen out of  post-colonial conditions.121 His refusal to 
resolutely rule out the Turāth, and his resistance toward fully embracing it, amplified this dissatisfaction 
with Arkoun. Indeed, Arkoun tread a middle ground, uncharted and un-articulated. His work offered new 
problematics and made thinkable new topics from the Turāth that others had neglected. Yet he rarely 
provided answers. Given Arkoun’s concern with the question of periodization and the “content” of the 
Turāth he suggested new definitions while rarely offered a solid opinion on any movement in the Turāth. 
For this reason, his work was rightly accused of beingis rife with theories and abstract ideas, structural 
and post-structural idioms. For example, Arkoun used the idea of power in Islamic experience to measure 
its applicability and utility. Power, in Arkoun’s work, embodied through acts of emission rather than 
commission, the power to erase rather than to register. By introducing these new topics, definitions and 
theories, Arkoun hoped not only to unsettle the absolute truth regimes in history, but also to re-establish 
what he called the ideal of plurality of meaning in Islam. For Arkoun it is not enough to deconstruct the 
mechanisms through which meanings are constructed, for which Jābirī’s work was credited. Arkoun took 
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this idea a step further and maintained that historians should deconstruct the mechanisms of managing 
meaning, which the “guardians of orthodoxy” elevate as sacred and transcendent.  
In sum, the vocabulary and analysis Arkoun put forward opened a new intellectual avenue for a 
group of self-exiled intellectuals and students to stake their own claims on the Turāth. What Arkoun called 
“the construction of belief,” for instance, sparked an interrogation among his disciples, who endeavored 
to search the divergent paths through which the Turāth made possible certain beliefs while precluding 
others. Though unhappy that their teacher did not take a more resolute position against the Turāth, his 
students thanked him for making breakthroughs that facilitated fresh interpretations of the Turāth. 
*** 
The rise of anti-Turāth sentiments 
The debates between Arkoun, Jābirī, and Laroui established the Turāth as the main playing field 
on which ideas and intellectual positions were articulated. The growing consensus regarding the value and 
centrality of the Turāth signaled a radical change in the modes of production, styles of writing and 
publication in the Arabic-speaking region in the closing decades of the twentieth-century. Previously 
mocked and derided, the Turāth found a new symbolic meaning in the raging cultural war at the beginning 
of the 1980s. As a trove of cultural texts, styles of thinking, and modes of behavior, the Turāth, a product 
of a millennium, emerged yet again as the main area of study with which every scholar had to reckon.  
By the turn of the twentieth-first century, the demands of yesterday’s revolutionists and 
progressives in the 1950s-70s to dispose with the Turāth were seen as travesty. The Turāth’s endurance 
and hold over the minds of ordinary citizens could no longer be brushed aside as many Marxists initially 
thought.122 Arabic-speakers’ attachment to the Turāth proved deeper and more intrinsic to their existential 
conditions. So rather than trying to manage these relations, the new secular critics conceded that they now 
sought to demonstrate that these relations could be dangerous,123 could inflict violence,124 and could be 
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irrational.125 By way of displacement and deconstruction, these writers aimed to limit the Turāth’s 
authority in contemporary times. When the vast majority of Arab intellectuals took part in “managing the 
meaning” of the collective memory of the Turāth (what should be eliminated, memorized, re-
conceptualized or reconstructed), the secular critics of the Association found themselves delving into the 
Turāth to demonstrate the adverse effects it had on contemporary Arabs. Their point of departure was 
taken from Arkoun’s works that Islamic thought was developed under a different episteme and has a 
different reason and truth order.  
Secular critics’ interrogations remade the field of Turāth studies and reconfigured the intellectual 
tastes of these scholars. In 1984, Jūrj Ṭarābīshī, whose book Heretics gained him notoriety, admitted that 
Jābirī’s works had “changed” him and stimulated him to “return” and “rebuild his philosophical education 
of the Turāth.” “After reading Jābirī,” Ṭarābīshī confessed, “the mind (al-thihniyya) would no longer 
remain the same. This thesis not only educates, but also stirs up a radical change.”126 Ṭarābīshī, whose 
gratitude belied a critique of this backward pull toward the Turāth, would champion the first intellectual 
movement that opposed the Turāth.  
Jābirī’s position on the Turāth carried the day. The Turāth was not a dead tradition but a field of 
study clamoring for renewed intellectual explorations. The previous smugness of Arab revolutionaries in 
Beirut and Cairo, who proclaimed themselves progressives, proved no more than empty talk. Their 
ideologies were far removed from the average Arab’s concerns, insensible to his piety and belief system. 
Yet, the alternative that Jābirī valorized was equally unsettling. In his writings, Jābirī returned to the same 
grooves of the Islamists, failing to live up to his premises as he returned to the Turāth and remained there. 
A growing number of intellectuals saw that Jābirī has succumbed to Islamists’ ideologies and offered 
unmistakable indications that validate these accusations. In one essay after another, Jābirī adopted a new 
line of thinking to strip the Mashriq of its intellectual superiority, casting doubts on the genesis of the 
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Arab nahḍa and arguing instead that the first true roots of Arab reforms began with Mohammad Ibn ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb in Arabia, roughly five decades before Napoleon invaded Egypt.127  
Turning the intellectual conversation to the Turāth collided with the contemporary values of 
universalism, the unity of the human mind, universality of human rights and basic human norms that many 
secular critics cherished and upheld for years. The renewed re-enchantment with the Turāth was seen by 
these secular critics as lacking a critical thrust. Distasteful and sullen towards the institutionalization of 
new intellectual norms that sprung from the Turath framework, secular critics began to coalesce together. 
They grew firm in their belief that the order of the day was not to enchant people with a glorious Turāth, 
but rather to ensure that Arabic speakers inculcated the idea that there could be no literal return to some 
earlier point in time and there could be no forced or artificial reconstruction of the Turāth within the 
present post-colonial conditions. The only choice for Arabs today, they professed, was to embrace 
modernity instead of running away from it.   
The call to exert a healthy dose of critique towards the Turāth soon developed into a call to assume 
rationalism, implying that any return to the Turāth constituted irrationalism. The demand for rationalism 
gained popularity against the growing literature that elevated the Turāth above scrutiny. Deeming the 
return to the Turāth irrational, these otherwise sporadic secular critics found a common cause in urging 
rationalism in order to stave off the sweep of irrational thinking in Arab society toward the past. These 
scholars, aghast at the new dominant intellectual paradigms, challenged Jābirī’s articulations of the Turāth. 
Their deep disenchantment with the new mainstream that formed around Jābirī’s ideas and reverberated 
through a newly built network of publishing houses, sustained anti-Turāth sentiments among these 
scholars. Soon they began probing for a way out of these stifling frameworks.  
Fighting Jābirī became the first item on the agenda for this group of secular scholars. In practice, 
this meant demonstrating that the Turāth could not stand alone as an alternative model to modernity, nor 
as a prescription for forging a new Arab subjectivity. In their extensive writings, secular critics refused to 
accept the common conception of the Turāth as an inventory of permanent values, which are seen as 
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authentic and indigenous. They argued that the Turāth not only contains Ibn Rushd’s philosophy, Ibn 
Khaldun’s social theories, and al-Shatibi’s rationalism but also teems with harrowing experiences, 
gruesome murders, and horrendous civil infighting. Ṭarābīshī, ʿAzīz al-Azmeh, Ben Slāma, Lafif Lakhdar, 
Sharafi, and many others called attention to the deleterious effects generated by the Turāth. In Spring 2004 
they came together and declared the establishment of the Arab Rationalist Association.128  
The launching of the Association marked a significant event in contemporary Arab thought. It 
signified that the intellectual debate was no longer between seculars and Islamists, as it was previously 
thought to be, but between different brands of Leftists like Jābirī and secular critics like Ṭarābīshī. The 
foundations of this debate were no longer rooted in Marxism, Existentialism, Nationalism or any Western 
philosophy as they were in the 1950s-60s. The new frameworks of contemporary Arab thought were 
articulated against the Turāth, upon which the cultural war was fought.  
In the years following its establishment, the Arab Rationalist Association undertook to confront 
and dismantle the framework of the Turāth. Fashioning a new discourse, they adopted a two-pronged 
strategy: they contrasted the Turāth discourse with the more inclusive human story and the universal ideals 
of Third Worldism that they fostered during the 1960s. Human rights and universal values, they argued, 
do not discriminate between nations, ethnicities, or religious groups the way the Turāth does. Utilizing 
universal values carried its own faults, but for the members of the Association these values called into 
question the meaning of the Turāth. The human story, they maintained, has many virtues as an organizing 
story. It welcomes each new group and provides a template for how it fits into the common move of 
humanity from religion to secularism, oppression to dignity, and tyranny to liberty. The unifying story of 
the Turāth, they argued, leaves many ethnic and unorthodox groups out of the social consensus in Arab 
societies. The Quran, for example, though filled with examples of social justice- care for the vulnerable, 
equality of all souls- discounts and rules out deviancy and invalidates untraditional views. The prevailing 
story of the Quran, as promulgated by Muslim theologians, does not offer a compelling message to all 
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citizens in the post-colonial age as far as the members of the Association are concerned. In fact, it excludes 
vulnerable groups as misfits, outcasts, and heretics, a category that includes secular critics. For these 
scholars, no matter how enriching the Turāth could be, it constitutes only a small fraction of human history. 
It blocks Arabs from drawing on more diverse and colorful histories that could enrich and educate them. 
This essential human history has dropped from the public and educational agendas in many Arab states. 
To invalidate the Turāth as the sole model of Arab modernity, secular critics assumed another 
strategy. They focused on disseminating the ideas that emerged in the recent past, namely the nahḍa, as a 
model for renewal in the post-colonial times (see chapter four). The nahḍa stood as a remarkable era in 
Arab thought for offering a full expression of intercultural borrowing. It bears witness to a willingness to 
open up to other cultures. Before the discourse of the nahḍa was expunged from the grand narratives of 
the Arab world, it sustained a distinctive willingness to lean on the West and adopt social and cultural 
models from diverse cultures.  The Lebanese scholar Jamīl Bayyham, one of the intellectuals of the nahda, 
said at the beginning of the twentieth century that “The East today exists in a learning and developing 
[stage], and his teacher is the West.”129 Commenting on his ideas and attitude, Ṭarābīshī explains that 
“Contrary to subsequent generations of the nahḍa, who desired to assert their identity not through taking 
from the West but against it, Jamīl Bayyham did not feel uneasiness asserting the imperative and 
indispensability of teaching the East on the hands of the West.”130  
This forgotten perspective of the nahḍa was now retrieved and weaponized to push back against 
the narrow-mindedness within the discourse of the Turāth. To reconnect with the overlooked nahḍa, the 
Association began reconstructing histories of diverse nahḍawi figures131 to counter the narrative of Turāth 
as a discourse of authenticity. As Slāma, Ṭarābīshī, and Lakhdar have illustrated at length, , the nahḍa 
writers did not shut themselves off from the world, unlike the current generation of Arab writers. In their 
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openness lies the antidote to the current short-sightedness that has triumphed over all sorts of intellectual 
investigations.   
Conclusion 
Even if the turn to the Turāth did not give rise to a paradigmatic shift, it nonetheless constituted a 
break with previous patterns of Arab thought. The frenzy with which intellectuals pursued the debates on 
the Turāth signaled a departure in the ways the Arab Left defined itself. While in the 1960s, the Arab Left 
rallied around Nationalist132, Marxist133 and Existentialist134 agendas, at the end of the century it was the 
anti-Turāth sentiments that unified the new Arab Left progressives. In fact, the involvement with the 
Turāth question led ultimately to the emergence of the secular question, reintroducing it to public discourse  
after years of disregard.  
The late 1970s heralded the end of an era in Arab intellectual history and launched a new period 
of Arab thought characterized by its grappling with the Turāth. Suddenly fundamental issues that evaded 
any comprehensive treatment in the roaring 1960s emerged. Questions like how to organize Arab society 
in an inclusive fashion that incorporates its unique history were up for debate. The modern institutions 
and European constitutions that the post-colonial state introduced right after independence were now seen 
as alienating and oblivious to people’s faith, indigenous values, and family principles. The main question 
with which Arab intellectuals grappled concerned the unfolding post-colonial condition. With the sweep 
of national politics that both crushed local communities and tore apart the social fabric (tribes, Sufi circles, 
villages etch.), these intellectuals, earnestly struggled to find ways to heal Arab society, especially after 
the passing of Nasser and the apparent failure of the pan-Arab ideology How would they reweave the 
social fabric in the post-colonial Arab state? Was it through the renewal of the Turāth? or was the Turāth 
merely a weak glue that would temporarily hold diverse ethnicities and religious minorities together? For 
the Association, tthe Turāth could not provide an antidote, for it most likely poised to rip through Arab 
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society and fragment the social cohesion created by the national idea, one that melted difference into one 
nation.   
The intellectual themes around which the notoriously fragmented Arab Left united lost much of 
their previous momentum and critical thrust. With the rise of the Turāth as a cultural problematic against 
which intellectual positions were articulated, the intellectual center of gravity moved westwards. Morocco, 
previously marginal to Arab intellectual thought, began asserting its place and calling into question the 
ideas, assumptions and ideologies that emanated from traditional centers of Arab intellectualism :Beirut 
and Cairo. As the intellectual margins of the Arabic-speaking world widened, new intellectual themes 
emerged, challenging Beirut’s monopoly on knowledge production. Exploring the work of the Association 
through its publication, organs (al-Awan), and vehement opposition to current intellectual debates in the 
Arab world offers a clearer picture of the fluid debates in the current Arab world. While many observers 
of current intellectual movements have recently asserted the pertinence of the formula of Islam versus the 
West,135 this chapter demonstrates that unlike the 1960s, contemporary Arab intellectual debates focused 
more on the Turāth and less and less on the West. As we will see in the next chapter, the making of the 
Turāth not only constituted a cultural response to the defeat in 1967 and to the bankruptcy of the Marxist 
ideology, but the process was fraught with politics that had far-reaching implications.  
  
                                                 
135 Taji-Farouki, Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qurʼan. 
 57 
 
CHAPTER II: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW FIELD  
In 1971, Zakī Najīb Maḥmūd, the Egyptian positivist and author of many philosophical works in 
Arabic, prefaced his remarkable The Renewal of Arab Thought, with the following: 
“The author of these pages had no opportunity over the past years of his life to read the pages of 
Arab Turāth prudently. He is one among thousands of Arab intellectuals, who opened their eyes on 
European thought -classic and modern- that instilled the belief that it is the only possible human thought; 
this is because these blinded [us] from seeing any other [possibilities]. This author upheld this attitude too 
and for [too many] years: Studying European thought as a student, teaching European thought as a 
professor, reading European thought for entertainment in free time. The Turāth’s figures (aʿlām) and 
schools (mathāhib) did not come to him but as fragments and sporadic echoes, like leery ghosts popping 
up on his pages.”136  
Known for his eloquence and lucid writing style, Zakī Najīb Maḥmūd captures in very few lines 
the main “absence” in the dominant modes of Arab thought before 1970s. His recognition that the Turāth 
continued as an invisible influence in its absence from intellectual discourse made this revelation, 
arguably, one of the most debated paragraphs in recent Arab thought. Since 1970, Arab intellectuals have 
changed the way they mobilized, deployed and appropriated the discourse of Turāth. Once seen in a 
negative light by the majority of the Arab Left, it increasingly gained positive associations in these circles. 
The negative connotations of Turāth, in its earliest usages, testify to its placement within national-centered 
discourses. If before the 1970s the Turāth had been subsumed within national discourse as its antithesis, 
now the tables had turned: the national became the negative other of the Turāth. The main question is why 
the Turāth was invisible for so many years? How does one explain the late (re)discovery of the Turāth 
among a growing number of Arab intellectuals?   
Maḥmūd’s testimony on the Turāth resonates with the debates between Jābirī and Arkoun. Taken 
together, these debates attest to a significant development within the Arab intellectual scene since the 
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beginnings of the 1970s. As the writings of these scholars amply demonstrate the Arab Left had begun 
organizing itself around new themes, rarely explored in the current academic historiography. More than 
just illustrating a dithering, debilitated Arab Left, these exchanges on the Turāth bear witness to an 
animated Arab Left in the throes of significant change. Zakī Najīb Maḥmūd’s revelation above captures 
the moment in which the Arab Left began restructuring itself around a new set of problematics, 
inconceivable a mere decade earlier. The new intellectual groups that formed around and against the 
question of Turāth suggest that the declarations of a lethargic Arab Left were premature and 
unsubstantiated.137 The unmapped polemics explored here, led eventually to the emergence of the Arab 
Rationalist Association, and provide yet more compelling evidence for the importance of revisiting the 
normative story of Arab Left. Rather than lamenting the divisions and new realignments within the Arab 
Left as a mark of inherent “weakness” and “inefficiency,”138 they point to an extraordinary and dynamic 
conversation that, if fully investigated, defy these significations.  
The discovery of the Turāth as an undead past caught many of the Arab Left by surprise, for it 
came with the recognition that an influential dimension of reality was living on yet unseen and 
unaccounted for. This “discovery” accelerated the pace of the waning of Arab socialism and the 
precipitous decline in the numbers of committed Marxists. With the advent of the Turāth discourse, a 
discourse that ushered in a reckoning about the ways Arabic speakers lead their lives authentically, the 
Arab Left was conceived on the losing end of this debate. The rebuttal of Western ideologies by Arab 
Leftists could have meant different things, but for some scholars it only confirmed the hypothesis of the 
return to Islam in the Arab world.139 Though this orientalist view had long been discredited, the 
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alternatives fell short of fully accounting for the Turāth and the added values Arabic speakers placed on 
it in shaping their political positions.140  
The story of the Arab Left told here does not abide by a pattern that equates the death of the Arab 
Left with the passing of the big ideologies and the emergence of Turāth. Instead, the story of the Arab 
Left presented here begins precisely with the demise of these ideologies (pan-Arabism, socialism, 
Marxism.) To steer clear of the current scholarship on the death of the Arab Left, one should call into 
question the assumption that the Arab Left reached its peak in the 1960s and its nadir in the 1980s. With 
the visible retreat of many Leftists from ideological commitments that both time and political events 
rendered untenable, the Arab Left was not thrown into disarray but was reinventing itself around new 
cultural concerns, which reshaped the conversation about authenticity and being. As the Arab Left 
repositioned itself against the ascending question of the Turāth, the old affiliations/identities of 
Nationalism, Existentialism, and Marxism outreached itself. Renouncing that system was necessary for 
the Arab Left’s rebirth.  
  I argue here that the defeat of the Marxist and Pan-Arab ideologies did not expunge the 
Arab Left nor did it give a boost to the Islamists. The defeat only marked a new intellectual adaptation as 
the Arab world entered the age of authenticity. The return to roots “al-Rujūʿ ila al-Juthūr” was universal 
among western and non-western societies and by no means uniquely Arab. Yet it represents a response to 
a whole set of concerns wherein no winners or losers could be found. Nothing could so accurately capture 
this transition into the age of authenticity as the newfound intellectual conversation on the Turāth. The re-
appropriation of, and re-engagement with, the Turāth, and not least of all the intellectual polemics it gave 
birth to, were a landmark in the emergent intellectual landscape of the post-1970s era. In the wake of this 
transition, the outdated intellectual fault line between secularists and religious scholars remained in place 
but lost much of its relevance and explanatory thrust.  
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Admittedly, very few intellectual changes have been as groundbreaking in the field of post-1967 
Arab thought as the rediscovery of the Turāth.141 Whether it was manifested as A) the epic collection of 
Arab historical books in law, theology, jurisdiction, literature and poems, or B) the collective and oral 
memory, or old practices that seeped into modern Arab peoples’ routines and rituals, or C) a tradition of 
styles of thinking that reflected in the compendiums of Islamic history, enrapture with the Turāth became 
a marked feature of the new intellectual and public debates and feeling in the last three decades of the 
twentieth century.142 Almost instantly the cultural tide toward the Turāth conferred a new identity on the 
Arab intellectual landscape. 
The evident upsurge in scholarly works engaging the Turāth or topics from the Turāth led to a 
cultural backlash. Jūrj Ṭarābīshī was one of the main voices to subject this cultural drift to a critical 
analysis. Ṭarābīshī offered genuine psychological explanations for the unexpected turn of the majority of 
Arab intelligentsia toward the Turāth, while fretting over the cultural dynamics it had unleashed. This 
chapter empirically examines the intellectual and social contexts in which the Turāth gained traction and 
popularity before addressing Ṭarābīshī’s massive project in response to it in the following chapters. This 
chapter addresses the fundamental question: where did this discussion begin? Who were its standard-
bearers and major propagators? What are the intellectual and social conditions that underlay (and fueled) 
a renewed preoccupation with the Turāth? How did the Turāth come to bear on questions of politics, 
society and even modernity? These questions entail a rather expansive look at the formulation of different 
events and figures who contributed in varied ways in creating the Turāth as a new field of research.  
The Shift in Cultural Attitudes 
Historically speaking, the engagement with the Turāth question is not utterly new. The term Turāth 
appeared in the writings of the late nineteenth century nahḍa pioneers, whose new editions and printings 
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of classic Arabic manuscripts launched a new interest in the Turāth.143 The tense encounter with Europe 
and the “rediscovery of Europe”144 during the nineteenth century prompted Arab intellectuals (mostly 
ʿUlama) to look into their cultural heritage. While many medieval manuscripts and documents slowly 
began seeing the light for the first time during this period, the vast majority of these forgotten manuscripts 
remained buried until the next century. Remarkably, Western Orientalists played a dual role that informed 
the process by which Arab intellectuals discovered their own Turāth. Not only did orientalists assume an 
active role in unearthing these priceless manuscripts that made Arab history legible, but they also helped 
define the main contours and shapes of Arab history.145 It was not until the late 1970s, however, that the 
Turāth took on a new form and meaning, transforming from a mere intellectual ihtimām (interest) to a 
discourse that bears on political and cultural problematics (Ishkāliyya Thaqāfiyyah-Siyasiyyah.) How did 
this happen?  
Long the private and exclusive domain of the religious and quasi-religious scholars (ʿUlama,), the 
Turāth was conceived primarily a source for scholars of Arabic grammar, synthetics, poetry, and above 
all Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic institutes were seen by everyone (Islamists and nationalists) as the 
primary and natural sites for poring over the study of the Turāth. Secular and nationalist intellectuals, on 
the other hand, rebuffed any engagement with the Turāth, viewing it as a hindrance to the secular path.146 
The gap between the seculars/nationalists and the religious men was almost unbridgeable. Each focusing 
on his own domain, they rarely shared a common intellectual platform or agenda. Yet, by the beginning 
of the 1970s, their common concern over the undead past ended almost a century of remoteness. 
Commenting on a specific case study in Saudi Arabia, one historian observed that “ʿulama and intellectuals 
simply were not speaking the same language. While the former dealt with medieval treatises on theology 
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and law, the latter were promoting concepts such as “modernity” (hadatha) and “development” (tanmiya) 
unknown to their counterparts. As a result, no debate between the two groups was possible.”147  
Indeed, before the beginning of the 1970s, secularists brushed aside any engagement with the 
Turāth, finding their calling in translating western thought into Arabic. Their vision was directed toward 
questions of modernity or Hadatha: how to assimilate modernity and instill modern ways into Arab 
societies. The only path to achieve that goal, nationalist intellectuals believed, was through disparaging 
the Turāth and its order altogether.148 This dismissive attitude towards the Turāth was a direct result of a 
century of social and cultural changes, as Nafi and Farouki affirmed, “the ulma were rapidly losing much 
of their economic and cultural capital, as modern schoolteachers, lawyers, engineers, journalists, 
government officials, army officers and politicians, and even actors and actresses, speaking new languages 
and promoting different ideals, crowded the social field.”149 Significantly, ever since its emergence, the 
Turāth carried a negative association: it signified a dark past that must be forgotten, old and entrenched 
habits that inhibit modern citizenry, superficial and timeworn styles of thinking, and metaphysical Islamic 
thoughts that prevent Arab societies from embracing new models of socialization. For Arab nationalists, 
the Turāth, which makes sectarian and religious distinctions more pronounced, works against the very 
idea of nationhood that strove to cancel out linguistic and ethnic differences among citizens. In its place, 
Arab secularists and nationalists embraced Western revolutionary ideologies. During the first years after 
independence, 1945-1970, Marxism, nationalism and socialism commanded uncontested authority that 
defined the prevalent condescending attitude towards the Turāth. National Arab intellectuals’ resolution 
to steer clear of the Turāth was not a diktat, but rather emanated from a common understanding reflecting 
the spirit of the time.  
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In light of this thorough aversion to the Turāth, one might not expect many seculars and nationalists 
coming to terms with the Turāth. Yet, this is precisely what transpired in the course of the 1970s and more 
intensely after the 1980s. More and more secular writers broached the Turāth with original research 
questions and developed full-fledged projects that directly embraced the Turāth rather than skip over it. 
This singular shift in themes and tropes signaled a rapture marked by the expansion of a field. As Lacroix 
argued in his investigation of Arabia, “an intellectual field had indeed come into being.”150  
Many works published during this decade (1970) attest to this dramatic transition. The eminent 
Syrian poet Adonis (Adūnīs) whose work engaged poetry from the Turāth, is perhaps the best-known, but 
by no means the only case in the Levant. Adonis al-Thābit wal-Mutaḥaūil 1973 (continuity and Change) 
was bewildering in light of his previously celebrated radical writings that rebelled against the Turāth. This 
work perhaps rises to Freud’s notion of a “literary event” that presaged a shift in the dynamics and tastes 
of Arab intellectuals toward the Turāth. In this work, Adonis looked to the formative centuries of Islam to 
distill the nature (or what he termed as ethos) that governs poetic taste in Arab culture. He argues that the 
Turāth’s ideas of conformity and continuity had been valorized and prioritized over ideas of creativity and 
innovation.151   
In the same year, Egyptian writer and committed materialist Ghālī Shukrī addressed the Turāth in 
his book, al-Turāth wal-Thawrah. With this title, the once paraxodical ideas of Turāth and Revolution 
became compatible within mainstream intellectual discourse. Many Marxists and seculars followed suit, 
enhancing the same trend. Lebanese Marxist Ḥusayn Murūwah published a work on Islamic history by 
seizing on materialist tools in his analysis of the formation of the first Islamic community. Three years 
before Murūwah’s seminal work, Syrian preeminent Marxist Tayyib Tīzīnī published his first volume (of 
twelve) in 1976, offering a materialist reading of the Turāth. Not only Marxists wrote on the Turāth, but 
also avid liberals like Egyptian Zakī Najīb Maḥmūd, who in 1975 published his first work on Arab heritage 
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after years of writings on western philosophy.152 The change in literary tastes and intellectual frameworks 
had never been more obvious.  
Reviewing the history of the Arabic book during the 1970s, one Arab intellectual noticed with 
sorrow the turn to the Turāth. The newly installed intellectual trends, he argued, are both lamentable and 
worrisome. They reflect a substantial “decline in creativity” [hubūt al-Qīmah al-Ibdaʿiyyah/ that plagued 
Arab publications during this decade as Beirut replaced Cairo as the epicenter of Arab scholarly 
publication. Writing in 1983, Bashīr al-Hāshimī maintained that “most of the books and publications 
during the seventies do not reflect new additions in terms of general culture. But they come to digress on 
previously extant literature in one way or another. One can possibly argue that even highly significant 
books and publications of this time are tied to old themes and expressed past time conditions.”153    
Hāshimī views the new writings on the Turāth as a dangerous “degradation” in the quality of Arab 
thought. While baffled by the new intellectual trends of the 1970s, his bewilderment rarely led him to 
offer an explanation beyond passing condemning judgments about the emerging Arab intellectual 
landscape. The question of why so many secular intellectuals who previously denounced the Turāth and 
antagonized any treatment of its literary corpuses wrought up embracing it, barely finds its resolution. 
Yet, his observations on the new trends in Arab thought remain valid and significant.  
Undead past: The Rediscovery of the Turāth 
The realization that Arab cultural heritage resists its demise was disheartening for many 
intellectuals. In particular, the discovery of the Turāth afforded a moment of disenchantment for the Arab 
Left, whose assumption that the Turāth had longed perished proved a dangerously misguided hypothesis. 
Though belatedly, the realization of the Turāth’s centrality opened their eyes to account for a new 
dimension of reality that they had long thought insignificant. When it slowly dawned on these intellectuals 
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that the Turāth is not even in the past, they began changing their writing and styles of reasoning. Even 
publishing houses had to make some changes and adaptations to the old patterns of printing in order to 
accommodate new cultural tastes. One vibrant publishing house in Lebanon that gained much esteem was 
Dār al-Taliʿah. Established in 1959, al-Taliʿah is credited for introducing its readers to countless western 
works in Arabic. The mouthpiece of radical and revolutionary intellectuals, al-Taliʿah played an integral 
role in molding the ideas of an entire generation of scholars on Western philosophy, notably Marxism and 
Freudianism. Significantly, during its first two decades of operation, al-Taliʿah published only one book 
on Turāth. By the beginning of the 1970s, however, more and more books on the Turāth began to appear 
in this adamantly secular publication. In 1977, al-Taliʿah found itself goaded by cultural powers to launch 
a new series called “contemporary Arab Turāth” that would meet public needs and ensure the press kept 
abreast with the new intellectual trends of the Arab world.154  
Yet, the advent of the Turāth was not completely new. The engagement with the Turāth set to 
begin at the first decade of the twentieth century with the publication of Faraḥ Antūn’s Ibn Rushd wa-
Falsafatihi in 1903. Antūn, one of the leading figures of the nahḍa, returned to the study of the Turāth to 
respond and refute French orientalist Ernest Renan, whose Averroes et l'averroïsme 1866 established the 
claim that Arabs were only translators and carriers of Greek philosophy with little original philosophical 
thought of their own. 155 In his response Antūn had to reread the philosophical writings of the long 
disregarded and unappreciated Ibn Rushd in order to articulate Arab intellectuals’ answer to Renan’s 
accusations. Antūn’s revisiting of classical philosophy however, was the first bird that heralded and 
established a new tradition in modern Arab thought. This tradition interested in combining rational 
philosophy and classical Islam, while evading the old ways of writing on the Turāth through Islamic law 
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and theology. This work was commonly lauded as the first genuine study of the Turāth because it utilized 
a new topic (rationalism) and appropriated an unfamiliar method (philology).156  
A few years later, in 1911, Lebanese polymath Jūrjī Zaydān published his epic Tārīkh al-Tamadun, 
which elaborated on the reading and methods of the Turāth that Antūn had started.157 Zaydān, however, 
did not confine his interest to one Islamic aspect of the Turāth (rational philosophy), instead he offered to 
account for a variety of social aspects of Arab culture. In a manner that recalls Norbert Elias’ Western 
Civilization, Zaydān writes on the ways Arab culture refined its manners and behavior over the centuries. 
In his multi-volume work, he provides a sparkling portrayal of the multifaceted ways of eating, drinking, 
dancing, seating postures, shopping and haggling in bazaars, and scores of other daily practices. 
Underlining “profane aspects” in Islamic history was groundbreaking since these daily life errands and 
pursuits seemed inconsequential to the Islamic law.   
Even if Antūn and Zaydān mapped new directions and tapped into unexplored themes in the 
Turāth, their works fall short of establishing a new tradition of scholarship in the Arab world. They 
signaled the beginning of a new interests that faded away after their deaths. One Arab reader commented 
that Antūn offered only a “fragmentary cultural history” of rationalism in Islam, while Zaydān offered a 
“comprehensive cultural history” of Muslim daily life. These two works only stood out because they 
focused on new topics from the Turāth that had long been discarded while playing down the traditional 
focus on Islam and Islamic law. However, despite being forerunners in establishing the study of the Turāth, 
they did not succeed in creating a field of study with clear themes and definitions.158 
The question of the Turāth was taken up by the second generation of the nahḍa, a generation that 
struggled to liberate it from the grasp of traditional ʿulama. Yet, despite the new explorations on hitherto 
unknown aspects of the Turāth, the field remained securely dominated by religious scholars. One of the 
most significant figures of this generation to challenge ʿulama’s grip on the Turāth was Taha Husayn 
(Hussain). With the publication of his masterpiece Fī al-Shiʿr al-Jāhilī in 1926, Hussain stirred both 
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excitement and anxiety as he raised fundamental questions regarding the spurious Islamic narratives 
underpinned by unsubstantiated truths. In this work Hussain amounted an attack on the truth regimes in 
Islamic history and denied the factuality of much of the Islamic historical writings. In particular, Hussain 
argued that all the knowledge and negative associations Muslims assigned to the “pre-Islamic world” were 
forged and recreated under Islamic rule with the preconceived intention of demonizing life before the 
emergence of Islam. Doubting the integrity of the dominant Islamic narratives, Hussain soon faced a social 
and political backlash that forced him to rescind, or at least modify, his radical conclusions.  
Hussain’s contemporaries however, namely ʿAbbās Mahmūd ʿAqqād159 and Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal,160 followed in a slightly different path by focusing primarily on literary history. The historical 
novels these intellectuals circulated established new bridges with the Turāth. Literary history, one scholar 
observed, “creates continuities” with the past, and in the process “confer[s] legitimacy” on that 
romanticized past.161 The “historical novels” published by these Egyptian scholars augmented the status 
of the Turāth and prompted many among their followers to ask whether these two scholars had established 
new bridges with the Turāth. This take on these two scholars differed from the heated historiographical 
debates among Western historians regarding the orientation of these historical novels.162 However, despite 
conferring new meaning on the Turāth, the scholars of the nahḍa were less compelled by investigations 
of the Turāth than the introduction of Western ideas.163 In fact, their works on the Turāth had an 
undiminished teleological bent and lacked a binding theme and guiding questions essential to setting up 
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an independent field for studies of the Turāth. If so many Arab intellectuals had written in one way or 
another on the Turāth since the beginning of the century, then why did it not emerge as a compelling topic 
of inquiry and field of study until the last three decades of the 20th century?  
To address this question one should turn to look at the social and political transformations that 
forced the Turāth as a dominant framework on Arab intellectuals. While the Turāth was always there, it 
only existed as an “absence” and a “negative” while intellectuals busied themselves with western ideas. I 
argue that the notion of the Turāth as a problematic Ishkaliyya, namely a self-reliant theme that bears on 
political and existential questions with social and religious repercussions, was born, most saliently, in the 
1970s as the Arab world entered a new age of authenticity. Of all the diverse manifestations of Arab 
authenticity, the Turāth seems to undeniably represent its most accurate expression. Much debated, highly 
complex and multifaceted, the idea of authenticity emerged to fend off against the sweeping modernity 
that rippled through Arab society, altering its ‘authentic’ mores and values, and radically upsetting 
entrenched modes of belonging. Within Arab intellectual discourse, the secular was the ultimate antonym 
for authenticity. More than the nationalist, the secular depended on translations and on borrowing an 
alternative set of modern models from the West, to keep his identity coherent. The notion of authenticity 
meant to repulse against this by reverting to a genuine Arab Turāth in search of an authentic model to fit 
Arab particularity.164  
Even though previous scholars engaged diverse aspects of the Turāth, not until the late 1970s did 
the vast majority of Arab seculars become aware of the value and centrality of the Turāth to their projects- 
a theme that subsumed the battle not only about the past, but also about the narrative of the future. As 
Jābirī had convincingly demonstrated in 1984, the way the Turāth is conceived has a direct bearing on 
how people behave in the present and plan for the future.165 With these newfound truths, secular and 
revolutionary scholars’ willingness to engage the Turāth in their scholarship, has never been so 
indispensable. Their intervention in the Turāth, however, not only exponentially diversified the 
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perspectives (and takes) on the subject but also revolutionized the field. These newcomers had expanded 
Turāth studies quantitatively and qualitatively, re-establishing the idea of Turāth anew. Questioning the 
Turāth, it turns out, inspired new topics and themes in its course.  
Arab intellectuals’ recourse to the Turāth came as an answer to a new reality of increased theology 
and piety. The new commitment to study the Turāth, after a long period of disregard, unambiguously 
demonstrates the impossibility of making social progress without first deconstructing the Turāth, a burden 
that slowed their way to Hadatha. Less than a decade after the defeat in 1967, the Turāth began to emerge 
as the new battleground for religious and non-religious intellectuals. This turn toward the Turāth was 
attended to by western epistemological tools (hermeneutics, literary analysis, and psychoanalysis,) 
effecting a genuine earthquake in the works and perspectives of many Arab intellectuals. The study of the 
Turāth, to sum up, has not only signaled the end of religious scholars’ hold on the field. With the 
establishment of Turāth, new research possibilities came into being, not least of which were the emergence 
of new conceptualizations of rationality, secularism, the rise of new types of intellectuals not only in the 
centers of Arab culture, but mostly “from the historically marginalized regions of the Arab world.”166  
The Creation of a Framework  
The return to the Turāth did not only occur at the discursive level. Rather, many social 
transformations helped sustain the cultural trend towards the Turāth. The epistemic authority of the Turāth 
derives from a constellation of political, social, and institutional considerations that have unfolded since 
the 1970s. To demonstrate the ways in which the Turāth drew more attention, one should move away from 
discourse analysis and focus on examining how these discourses were reflecting in reality. A unique set 
of political events, institutional developments, and social changes combined to prop up the Turāth as a 
major framework that intellectuals could no longer ignore. To discuss these factors, I turn to examine four 
developments: 1- The Archival breakthrough: the exhuming, editing and publication of substantial 
documents and works unknown in the nineteenth century- an intellectual enterprise that was taken most 
earnestly by Egyptian writer ʿAbd al-Rahman Badawī. 2- Institutional: the proliferation of a publishing 
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industry concerned with ideas of unity, nationalism and authenticity. 3- The rise of new types of 
intellectuals: the emergence of a new class of intellectuals infatuated with Turāth studies- the case of 
Mohamad Jābirī. 4- The eclipse and erosion of the traditional hubs of intellectual thought in the Arab 
world especially following the destruction of cities like Beirut with the onslaught of the Lebanese civil 
war. The conflation of all these factors set into motion cultural dynamics that sustained the restoration of 
the Turāth, making it almost inevitable.  
The Archival Breakthrough 
Against all odds, it was secular intellectuals rather than Islamist scholars who gave rise to the 
Turāth as a field of study. Islamists continued to adhere to one aspect of the Turāth, the fiqh or 
jurisprudence, while disregarding its other significant aspects. Many observers maintained that the 
Egyptian publishing industry played a vital role in establishing the field of Turāth. In particular, many had 
credited eminent Egyptian writer ʿAbed al-Ruhman Badawī for overseeing a national project that aimed 
at editing and publishing different works from the “million manuscripts” of the Turāth. In Naqd al-Turāth, 
Moroccan writer ʿAbd al-ʾIlah Balqazīz attributes the inauguration of the Turāth as a field to “one figure 
who stood out above all of his generation in bringing the Turāth to the fore”: the Egyptian philosopher 
ʿAbed al-Ruhman Badawi. In a very detailed chapter, Balqazīz salutes Badawī for supervising the creation 
of a field: “one man worked meticulously to match the work of an entire institution.”167  
Balqazīz offers one of the most comprehensive accounts yet for the emergence of and the growing 
engagement with Turāth in contemporary Arab thought. Though he fails to see the Turāth as a new field 
of study, Balqazīz’s analysis is significant. He argues that the Turāth as a “subject” appeared in the late 
19th century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. He continues that starting in the late 1960s, 
Turāth studies began to establish itself as a “theme.”168 Namely, even if writing on the Turāth reaches back 
as early as the late nineteenth-century, it was yet “unthinkable” to consider the Turāth as a theme before 
the late 1960s, Balqazīz asserts. Egyptian writer Badawī, whom Balqazīz showers with compliments, was 
a mid-century student of philosophy, a pre-eminent graduate of Cairo University when most of its faculty 
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consisted of classical Orientalists.169 His two main professors were Taha Hussain and ʿAbed al-Rāziq, the 
only two Arab faculty professors at Cairo University at the first decades of the twentieth century. “No 
other scholar of Arab history and Islamic thought, modern and contemporary, has written as much as 
ʿAbed al-Ruhman Badawi” writes Balqazīz. Badawī is credited with supervising the most extensive 
project on the Turāth, which brought to light much of the archival manuscripts on Arab Turāth.170 Badawī 
applied a philological method to his research on the Turāth that helped him in the editing, proof-reading 
and publishing of a great deal of literature hitherto unknown to many Arab writers. “Badawi was working 
like an Arab orientalist” Balqazīz writes. By midcentury it became increasingly clear that nineteenth-
century knowledge of the body of work of the Turāth was tiny and insignificant, dwarfed by the greater 
discoveries of oceanic manuscripts unknown to previous generations. For Balqazīz the editing, copy 
editing, and rewriting of this extensive material during the nineteenth century was only the tip of the 
submerged iceberg. With the beginning of the twentieth century, the massive treasures of Arab Turāth 
material were still buried and awaited the skills of Badawī to bring them to light. Not only did Badawī 
bring to light unknown works by al-Ghazāli, Ibn al-Nadim and other significant figure from Islamic past, 
but he also successfully established new writing on topics no one before him dared to broach, such as his 
well-known work on The History of Atheism in Islam. The number of classic books, in Sufism, Kalam, 
and science, brought to light by Badawī amount to a genuine establishment of modern philosophy of 
Turāth studies, according to Balqazīz. Comparing Badawī’s work with those of other eminent Egyptian 
scholars of the previous generation, Balqazīz writes, “If [Egyptian writer] Ahmed Amin’s eight volumes 
“Fajir al-Islam” pursued a comprehensive history of Islamic jurisprudence beside rational sciences, and if 
ʿAbed al-Raziq pursued a search of Islamic rationalism, then Badawī’s was the first to search for the 
history of sciences and philosophy and reason in Islam.”171 Balqazīz leaves the impression that the Turāth 
as a field of study was “impossible” before Badawī’s multi-volumes and works that he helped edit and 
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publish. With Badawī, the efforts made by nineteenth century scholars now viewed by twentieth-century 
intellectuals only as hesitant beginnings that brought to light Arab manuscripts. While significant works 
like those of Ibn Khaldun, were discovered during the nineteenth century, many of the most significant 
writers and Islamic philosophers remained forgotten.172  
Tunisian historian, ʿAbed al-Majīd al-Sharafī affirms this conclusion in his book Taḥdith al-Fikr 
al-Islami. For Sharafī, only when one comprehends the scale and range of classical Arabic books that 
were rediscovered and edited for the first time between the 1930s and 1970s, does one begin to appreciate 
how the Turāth started to develop as a field: “The last thirty years has witnessed the publication of a 
significant number of primary sources, so that the reassessment process of the old jurisprudence became 
feasible only now.” Sharafī adds, “Among these valuable sources that had been published since 1965 one 
can point to al-Muʿtamad fi ‘Usual al-fikh for the Motazilite Abi Husayn al-Basri, ‘Usul al-Sarkhasi, al 
Burhan by Jouini, al-Mankhul by Ghazali, Ahkam al-Fusul by Baji, Mizan al-‘Usual by Samarkundi, al-
Mahsul by Razi, al-Hasil wal-Mahsul by Armaui, al-Tamhid by Kalwadhani, and probably the last sources 
to be published was al-Ibhaj fi sharh al-manahij by Sabki. This list is by no means comprehensive.”173 
Even if some scholars had previously aspired to edit the “million manuscripts” sitting in the archives, this 
mission only became possible in the second half of the twentieth century. These new publications brought 
fresh insights and understandings of past Islamic cultural history that increased the value of the Turāth.   
The Center for Arab Unity 
Badawī’s outstanding work of exhuming valuable Turāth texts and the publication of new editions 
of unknown texts did not go beyond a preliminary survey and mapping of old texts. Badawī played an 
undeniable role in tapping into important texts of the Turāth, his primary contribution was in making 
Arabic texts available and accessible to the Arabic reader. Yet, his editions were not immune to his ethical 
judgments as he emitted and erased unbecoming textual works that include “sexual contents” that he and 
                                                 
172 Farah Antun has complained as late as 1903 that while Ibn Rushd’s medical books are available in Arabic his 
“philosophical works are rare.” He expressed a bafflement that if one wishes “to attain Ibn Rushd’s philosophical works in 
Arabic is impossible…if you seek them in Latin or Hebrew, European big libraries rarely lacked them.” See: Anṭūn and 
Muḥammad ʻAbduh, Ibn Rushd Wa-Falsafatuhu, 85–86. 
173 ʿAbd al-Majīd Sharafī. Taḥdīth Al-Fikr Al-Islāmī, Munāẓarāt (al-Dār al-Bayḍāʼ, al-Maghrib: Nashr al-Fanak, 1998), 26. 
 73 
his team deemed inappropriate or morally corrupt.174 The Turāth as a scholarly field began to loom large 
due to the proliferation of new cultural institutions seeking Arab authenticity. The creation of the Center 
for Arab Unity Studies, one of the most important cultural institutions the modern Arab world has ever 
known, was exceedingly important in this regard. Presiding over the most significant conferences of the 
last three decades, the home of thousands of intellectuals, the Center has turned in few years into a 
dominant powerhouse for exchanging ideas.175  
With its establishment in March 1975, very few could have appreciated that this intellectual edifice 
would change the intellectual conversation in the Arab World. The Center was created only a month before 
the Civil War in Lebanon, when sectarian tensions boiled to the point of explosion. Because many 
publishing houses shut their doors, hardly anyone could have anticipated its weight and epistemic sway 
over the new paths intellectual debates would take. Nonetheless, within a few years of its establishment 
the Center had become an indispensable instrument in steering the debates toward the Turāth. Though the 
idea of Turāth did not figure into the “outline and principles of the declaration,” of the Center, the Center 
nevertheless took up the Turāth due to the underlining ideology of its members. From its inception, the 
Center was conceived to bring to life the now waning idea of Arab unity. Guided by this principle, the 
Center gave priority to “original writing [read: authentic] over translations, and non-controversial issues 
over more sharply contentious issues”176 This agenda that presumed to pander to the most basic common 
denominator, predestined the Center’s orientation toward the Turāth. 
As its name implies, the Center for Arab Unity was an immediate response to the fading idea of 
pan-Arab nationalism. Conceived by hard-core socialists and myriad secular intellectuals and publishers 
who came together to repel the onslaught on their ideology, the Center’s doctrines and principles were 
articulated against the death of Nassir, Egyptian leader who held the banner of Arab nationalism for almost 
two decades. At its core the Center was an intellectual endeavor to resuscitate the idea of Arab unity 
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against the unfolding reality of increasing division among Arab states.177 None of its founders, however, 
could have predicted that this institution would grow in such importance as to bend Arab thought in the 
direction of the Turāth. When the thirty-two authors and writers convened in Beirut to declare its 
foundation, what they had in mind was to assert the vitality of Arab Unity. Bashir al-Daouk, the founder 
of Dār al-Taliʿah was among the signatories. Suhayl Idriss, the owner and founder of Dār al-Ādāb 
publishing house, also played a fundamental role in putting together the logistics to facilitate the creation 
of this Center. Yet the presence of these two publishers who preferred “translated literature” could not 
erase the edge that the two co-founders of the Center had. Khair al-Dīnn Ḥassīb and Saʿdūn Ḥamādi were 
invested in the study of Arab history and the way this history shapes current political and economic 
conditions. Though both of them had a steep history with al-Taliʿah and Dār al-Ādāb, a history that reaches 
back to the early 1950s, Ḥassīb and Ḥamādi made it clear that this institute primarily prioritizes works on 
the Arab Turāth written by Arab scholars.  
The rise of the Center affords a rare window through which to examine the ways in which the 
Turāth percolated Arab intellectual debates. By ideologically underscoring authentic ideas over translated 
and “imported” ones, the Center was poised from its inception to look back into Arab history for ideas 
that could be grafted to modern conditions. This orientation set the Center to revive and invigorate the 
discourse around Turāth. Though the Center was born with no particular identity outside of its concern 
with the idea of Arab unity, its restoration of the Turāth endowed it with its true identity. This happened 
for a very simple reason: Starting in the 1990s, the Center was increasingly filled with a new type of 
intellectuals who channeled the publication of this institution toward their intellectual tastes.  
One of the most salient figures entering the ranks of the Center was Mohammad ʿAbed al-Jābirī. 
Thanks to the Center, Jābirī became a celebrity. His original research on the Turāth cannot be separated 
from the Center. Indeed, a marriage between the two seemed natural. When Jābirī took over the Center, 
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many of his adversaries described this move as “hijacking”, an act that presaged a genuine integration of 
the Turāth in the Center. 
Building on the Turāth: Mohammad ʿAbed al-Jābirī 
In the Summer of 1970, five years before the establishment of the Center, Morocco celebrated the 
graduation of its first Ph.D. student from the University of Mohammad V, previously Rabat University 
(est.1957). The new young graduate, Mohammad ʿAbed Al- Jābirī, came to symbolize the new type of 
intellectual to which the Moroccan educational system had given birth. An intellectual who conceived of 
himself as “breaking a new middle ground” between Islamists and their enchantment with the Turāth and 
modernists who looked past the Turāth and blindly emulated the West. Jābirī did not dismiss these two 
groups out of hand; rather, he utilized western analytical tools to demystify the Turāth. Yet, his misgivings 
on Islamists and modernists fostered his need to fashion a third way.  
Though many scholars have attempted to bridge the gap between Islamists and modernists, the 
most prominent example being Egyptian philosopher Khaled Mohammad Khaled,178 it was not before 
Jābirī’s works in late 1979 that a third way was conceivable. In his works, Jābirī hacked secularists and 
prepared the ground for reclaiming the Turāth from Islamists. At the beginning of the 1980s, with his rise 
to stardom and authority, Jābirī brought new interests (past is future), different tastes (Islamic rational 
heritage) and disposition to the study of the field of Turāth. Though it is hard to suggest that Jābirī forced 
the Turāth on the Arab intellectual landscape, it is also absurd to overlook his fundamental role in veering 
the research toward the Turāth, which he investigated in multiple works. Nonetheless, once Jābirī built 
ties with the Center, tightening his control over its publications, he successfully navigated contemporary 
Arab thought in directions he desired. His unmistakable penchant toward the study of the Turāth helped 
enhance the growing obsession with the Turāth.179  
Jābirī was born in 1936 in Figuig, a town in southeastern Morocco. For a brief period of time he 
attended religious school in his village before moving to Casablanca, where he attended state school. His 
most definite socialization took place in the national era when uncertainty shrouded Morocco's future. 
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Growing up under the Moroccan national movement instilled in young Jābirī some indelible nationalist 
feelings. The Moroccan national movement developed along different lines than those of the Levant, 
molding Jābirī’s intellectual tastes. Unlike the ethnic-linguistic nationalism of the Fertile Crescent, North 
African nationalism in general had an irreducible Islamic tinge. This nationalism was an inevitable 
outcome of the nature of the population that dwelled in this region: Arabs and Berbers shared a common 
religion that rendered Islam into a unifying background. As Ibrahim Abu-Lughod rightly observed, “The 
bifurcation of society along ethnic lines, Arabs and Berbers, made Islam the basis of social and political 
cohesion”180 in the Maghreb. This was not the case in the Fertile Crescent, where the presence of 
Christians, Alawites, Druz, and others remained noticeable, particularly in cities where ideas of 
nationalism emerged and germinated. For Abu Lughod, the “reasons for this difference” between these 
modes of Arab nationalism lay in the “presence of an active and articulate Christian minority” that was 
absent in North African scene. “When the national movement in Syria and Lebanon developed it had 
assumed principles which necessitated a basis for identification that was not heavily religious in content.” 
The absence of a substantial Christian community in North Africa freed them “to evolve their Arab 
nationalism on a strictly religious basis.”181 It is not surprising, therefore, that “North Africans viewed 
Islam as their bastion of strength. All hope of success lay in the rehabilitation of Islam to serve as a basis 
for national unity. As a consequence, the encounter [with the colonial French] produced an even greater 
degree of clinging to Islam than would normally have occurred.”182 Jābirī kept this nationalism close to 
his heart. It was through his national activism that he embarked on a writing career. Working under Mehdi 
Ben Baraka, Morocco’s national leading figure, Jābirī began writing daily in the nationalist journal, al-
ʿAlām. During these years, Jābirī was indoctrinated in Islamic nationalism, which continued to exert 
influence on his intellectual tastes.  
Coming of age during a wave of national feeling, Jābirī’s identity was cast on a national idea that 
did not undervalue Islamic components. In fact, the national unity in Morocco was only possible because 
                                                 
180 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, “Retreat from the Secular Path? Islamic Dilemmas of Arab Politics,” The Review of Politics 28, no. 
4 (1966): 447–76. 
181 Abu-Lughod, 457. 
182 Abu-Lughod, 458. 
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it was founded on this mixture of nationalism and Islam. Growing up within the walls of the national 
movement, Jābirī appreciated Islam so much that even during the 1970s, when his career began to flourish, 
Jābirī could not toss away his Islamic socialization and habitus. Indeed, this socialization shaped his 
discontent toward other forms of secular nationalism, particularly in the Levant, which downplayed 
Islam's role in the cultural identity of contemporary Arab world.  
Jābirī viewed the cultural supremacy of the Levant in articulating intellectual discourses, 
buttressed by a developed network of publications and universities, as the source of the current intellectual 
crisis in the post-colonial state. Noticing that very few North African voices were featured in Beirut, Jābirī 
saw himself as articulating alternatives to the dominant ideological discourse that emanated in the Levant. 
“During the seventies al-Jabiri began publishing a series of papers on Islamic thought that immediately 
drew the attention of many intellectuals and academics in the Arab world, including for the first time those 
of the Levant.” 183 These articles formed the basis for his first book, which resonated with many Arab 
intellectuals, conferring on him an unprecedented reach and unheard-of authority.184 Soon Jābirī contacted 
the Center, severing his connections with Dar al-Taliʿah, with which he published all of his first works. 
Jābirī did not directly call for disengagement with the cultural hub of Beirut, but in these works he called 
for a renewal of Arab discourse away from the assumptions that found their basis in the hubris of Beirut’s 
seculars. 
In 1979, Jābirī published Nahnu wa al-Turath and a couple of years later his al-Khitab al-ʿArabi 
al-Muʿasir came out. The positive reception of these works set Jābirī to usher in the writing of his three-
volume magnum opus entitled Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabi (Critique of Arab Reason), published by Dar al-
Taliʿah in 1984, 1986, and 1990. After 1990, Jābirī would be the most-read writer in contemporary Arab 
thought. However, Jābirī would not have been able to steer the Center singlehandedly without the 
precarious developments in Lebanon in those years. It's no accident that the establishment of the Center 
                                                 
183 Muḥammad ʿĀbid Jābirī and Aziz Abbassi, Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique, Middle East Monograph 
Series, no. 12 (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University ofTexas at Austin, 1999). 
184 Most of North African leading intellectuals wrote only in French before the 1980s and their works rendered into Arabic 
only after decades of their publications. See the works of Arkoun, Laroui, Ben Nabi, and Al-Khattibi. 
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and the rise of Jābirī coincided with the beginning of the Civil War in Lebanon, the traditional seat of 
Arab intellectual debates.  
The Lebanese Civil War  
In the summer of 1984 the raging war in Lebanon took a dangerous turn, forcing many intellectuals 
to flee the Arab world for the first time in their lives. No one had anticipated the Lebanese civil war to 
endure so long. The war almost reached a conclusion early on in May 1976, one year after its outbreak in 
April 1975, when the allied Palestinian-Leftist party gained the upper-hand against ‘conservative’ 
Christian parties. But that outcome went against the invested interest of regional powers, especially Syria, 
setting the stage for the fighting to resume.185 Foreign countries attempted to mediate a ceasefire to no 
avail. After the Arab league failed to contain the fighting parties in an initiative in late 1976, the meddling 
of both the U.S. and France proved no more fruitful. The resignation of foreign countries left Lebanon all 
alone to face its predicament. The so-called open window of the Middle East slammed shut. Exhausted 
but determined, sectarians- Christians, Sunnis, Shiʿis, Druze, and Palestinians- proved impervious to 
international pressure. The unravelling of the state seemed all but inevitable as violence spun out of 
control.  
In 1984, eight years into the war, Lebanon had yet to descend deeper into medieval-style 
massacres. Beirut, the crown of Arab cities, the ‘Paris of the east’ and the long-time commercial and 
educational nexus of Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Turks, and Iranians,186 was practically carved up into 
“private fiefdoms.”187 The mounting violence dared many ordinary Lebanese to risk their families’ lives 
as they set to cross the 138 miles that separated Beirut from Cyprus, the closest island off Lebanon’s 
shores. When the civil war finally came to an end in 1989, with an estimated 120,000 fatalities, it left 
open, festering wounds.188  
                                                 
185 “Fearing that such an outcome would prompt an Israeli intervention, Syria’s president Assad won tacit US approval to 
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East: Transnational Encounters and Social History (I. B. Tauris, 2015), 120. 
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Lebanon has shown little signs of resilience from that war. Beirut has never fully recovered. A 
fifteen-year period of pillaging, looting, and mutual killing, took a toll on pluralist Lebanon that eventually 
led the country to surrender to sectarianism. The war shattered the hope for a better future that this small 
country stood for, wreaking havoc on the fragile business and intellectual class that set it apart in the 
region. Economically, the war dissuaded wealthy, oil-producing Gulf states to continue bankrolling the 
national infrastructure projects already underway. The ending of the financial investment sent shivering 
waves into Lebanon’s shaky banking system, erasing Lebanon's economic edge. As the war unfolded 
many journalists, academics, and scholars fled, further diminishing the already-reduced middle class. 
Lebanon offered an example of the high intellectual price the modern Arab world had to pay.  
The assassination of Malcolm Kerr, the president of the American University of Beirut, was 
particularly ominous. Kerr, Beirut-born American citizen, was a compassionate writer and a true 
sympathizer of the Arab world. One year before his assassination in 1984, as Israel overran Lebanon, the 
Syrian regime silently quelled the Islamic opposition in Hama, and the entire region stood on the verge of 
falling apart, he wrote, “For the time being, we must remain isolated from the conflicts of the country and 
the region. We can survive if we persuade everyone that A.U.B. is purely and simply a professional 
institution of good educational quality. Naturally, we sympathize with all the people of Lebanon and the 
Middle East on a human level, but we are not involved in any of their factional conflicts."189 Kerr’s attempt 
to insulate his institution were not successful. The war engulfed every corner of Lebanon and all Kerr’s 
talk to fend off and inoculate higher education proved premature. Kerr seems to have ignored his own 
insight, as expressed in the first page of his milestone The Arab Cold War in 1965, when he wrote “Arab 
politics have ceased to be fun.”190  
The grinding war in Lebanon not only eliminated Kerr but also unleashed a process that by its end 
undid Beirut’s role as the intellectual beating heart of the Arab world. Describing the scene, one Arab 
commentator wrote: “It was a generation ago, in the mid-1980s, that a whole world slipped through the 
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fingers of the Arab elite, formed on the secular ideals of nationalism and modernity. A city that had been 
their collective cultural home-Beirut-was lost to them. A political culture of nationalism that had nurtured 
them had led to a blind alley, and had been turned into a cover for despotism, a plaything of dictators. A 
theocratic temptation blew into the political world like a ferocious wind, and the secular Arabs were left 
thrashing about. Nothing today, no ship of sorrow can take these men and women of the secular tradition 
back to the verities of their world. A political inheritance has been lost.”191 The war precipitated the 
dispersal of Lebanon’s intellectuals, far beyond Cyprus.192 Distraught by the escalation of mutual sectarian 
manslaughter, especially the violence that breached the taboo on killing intellectuals, many of these 
scholars were looking for ways out of the beleaguered city.  
The destruction of Beirut increased the appeal of other stable regions (Tunisia and Morocco) to 
thrive intellectually. When Beirut unraveled an entire class of intellectuals dispersed with it. On the 
margins of the Arab world, scholars like Jābirī in Morocco emerged as the new challengers of the tradition 
represented by Beirut. Indeed, the eclipse of Beirut demonstrates how the project of Arab modernity 
veered off course. The very foundations that supported Beirut and its intellectual tradition were erased 
and a more vigorous tradition was on the rise to replace it. This center would be Morocco, where Jābirī 
ushered in and fashioned the Turāth.  
Among those who dared their lives and fled war torn Beirut was the Syrian writer and translator, 
Jūrj Ṭarābīshī. Ṭarābīshī was the ultimate opposite of Jābirī in every respect. He advocated for more 
engagement with the West and denounced Arab scholars’ engagement with the Turāth. Growing up in the 
Levant, Ṭarābīshī was not a regular reader of western philosophy, but a “gallant defender” 193 and purveyor 
of Western epistemology over the last four decades. For Ṭarābīshī, embracing the Turāth meant further 
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burying Beirut under the debris of once-living and secular rule. Ṭarābīshī, now exiled in Paris, had to push 
back against all these powerful forces that insisted on the return to the Turāth, defending a tradition that 
seemed all but long gone. The configuration of these four factors made the restoration of the Turāth 
inevitable. But for those intellectuals displaced from the Levant, the coming of the Turāth marked an 
unmasked ominous sign. 
Conclusion 
Ever since the beginning of the twentieth-century, the Turāth had come to be recognized as the 
source of a lost Arab authenticity. During this time period, the Turāth transitioned from an almost 
unthinkable entity to a thinkable object in Arab intellectual debates. As this chapter demonestrates the 
evolution of the Turāth into the central framework of contemporary Arab thought captures the shifts in 
modes of Arab intellectual production in the post-colonial era. While the first chapter covered the debates 
in the wake of the Turāth discourse, this chapter aimed to empirically reconstruct the ways in which the 
Turāth gained more ground in the republic of Arab letters. Beginning with the massive archival works that 
Badawī represented in Egypt, the advent of the Center for Arab Unity that increasingly sought Arab 
authenticity, the coming of age of intellectuals like Jābirī from the margins, and finally the eclipse of 
Beirut, the city that safeguarded and checked the slide backwards toward the Turāth. The combination of 
all these factors reshaped the intellectual sensibility in the Arab world, sensibility that drew much of its 
references from the Turāth.  
The Turāth should not only be understood as a limited conversation within the intellectual sphere 
but should also be seen as a discourse that reshaped daily practices. What cultural references were 
facilitated in the wake of the Turāth? What sort of self did this discourse on the Turāth fashion? The 
following chapters offer to answer these questions by examining the manner in which the discourse on the 
Turāth redesigned intellectual and ordinary conversations in the Arabic-speaking region. The next chapter 
examines Ṭarābīshī’s criticism of the ways in which various intellectuals appropriated the Turāth. 
Ṭarābīshī’s writings on the Turāth led him to unexpected reasoning, opening new and unforeseen horizons 
of thinking. It was precisely through his scrutiny of “Arab intelligentsia’s infatuation with the Turāth,” for 
instance, that his secularism came forth and took shape. As a former member of the vanquished Leftist 
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group, Ṭarābīshī possessed a special epistemic authority to comment on such subjects. His warning calls 
and caveats attest to a breed of Third World intellectuals who wholeheartedly adhered to the politics of 
the 1960s, politics that sought personal fulfilment and tended to dismiss the ideologies and traditions of 
their parents' generation. These politics, as we will see next, included a fashioning of universal ideals, 
radicalism, a belief in human rights, and a deep suspicion and aversion to religion, faith and the past.  
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CHAPTER III: THE MAKING OF A SECULAR CRITIC: JŪRJ ṬARĀBĪSHĪ 
At daybreak on June 5, 1967, Israel delivered a stunning preemptive strike in what marked the 
beginning of the six-day war. Within hours, the Israeli air assault devastated more than eighty percent of 
the Egyptian air force.194 Fighting on three separate fronts against a tripartite Arab military coalition, Israel 
would dictate the terms of a cease-fire ending a war that lasted only six days. The key to Israel's success 
was a new military strategy that stressed speed, force, and surprise; Israel ripped through its adversary's 
defenses by closely coordinating air power and mechanized ground forces. The war left millions of Arabs 
with a grim sense of shock and disbelief in their defeat. How could a tiny nation score one of history’s 
most stunning military victories with such lightning speed? The question seared the minds of Arab elites 
and intellectuals. The mere thought of a meagre number of 3 million Israelis overwhelming a 100 million 
strong nation of Arabs sent a chilling message across the world. Arab intellectuals could not help but raise 
questions concerning the very core principles holding their societies together. Their introspection brought 
under scrutiny the corrupt hierarchical political structures beginning with the highest echelons down to 
family unit. Individual subjectivity received no less critical attention.195  
From the wreck of the war arose many responses. One curious yet elusive response cohered around 
Dār al-Ṭalīʿah publishing-house in Beirut, where a small clique of young leftist Arabs came together. 
Their reaction was curious as it originated from a relatively small group, whose interpretations of the war 
gained predominance across the spectrum in the Arab society. Its members were quick to leverage the 
historical experience of a post-war national ethos to confer import on the war. Not only did they assigned 
meaning of the war, but in more important ways, they transferred the meaning of defeat from the military 
field to the cultural domain, turning the idea of colossal cultural failure (fashal ḥaḍḍāri shāmil) into their 
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symbol.196 The response they formulated was also elusive as the bulk of contemporary scholarship shifted 
its focus to the Islamic parties’ reaction to the crushing defeat. This is while very few articles and books 
looked into the circle that formed around Bashir al-Daʿuk, the founder and owner of Dār al-Ṭalīʿah.197 
Already active since 1959, this group consisted of previous members (dissenters and splitters) of the Baʿth 
party in Syria. Its evolution was made more visible in 1965 with the formation of The Arab Revolutionary 
Workers Party. One of its members, a 25-year-old translator, stood out for his profound insight and 
commentary on what accounted for the defeat.  
A young Syrian writer, Jūrj Ṭarābīshī (1939-2016) stepped into Arab politics in midcentury during 
his undergraduate studies at Damascus University. At the age of 18, he was recruited to the Baʿth party. 
As a dedicated member of the Baʿth he avidly read the writings of Zakkī al-ʾArsūzī, Michael ʿAflaq and 
Ṣalāḥ al-Bītār, the three founding fathers of the Baʿth in Syria. In the late 1960s, Ṭarābīshī emerged as a 
central voice and increasingly an important figure in the nascent Arab intellectual landscape in Syria and 
Lebanon. Although he began his political involvement as an activist within the revolutionary Baʿth party, 
Ṭarābīshī had to quit politics early on in his career to make ends meet. His advocacy for the core principles 
of the Ba’th, however, endured long after he turned his back on the party with contempt in December 
1965.  
Ṭarābīshī climbed his way up not through politics or the army, like many of his generation did. 
Instead he forged a career through translation, which brought him much success. Yet he shared a deep 
sense of frustration at Arab armies who failed to repulse Israeli forces, a stain that marked Arab 
intellectuals’ tribulation the way WWII’s atrocities afflicted post-war French intellectuals with moral 
dilemmas. It bears recalling that while during WWI, France held out against the German forces for four 
years, during WWII, French resistance lasted only two weeks. Ṭarābīshī who was highly attuned to French 
philosophical debates thought of the Arab defeat in 1967 as a scourge in a similar manner his French 
philosophers thought of France surrender during the war. He translated Jean Paul Sarter, Simon de 
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Buovour, and Albert Camus into Arabic during the 1960s when he was still in his twenties. His remarkable 
rendition of Emile Brehier’s seven volumes of the history of philosophy, Karl Marx and Hegel, Roger 
Garaudy and Herbert Marcuse in the 1970s, and not the least his translation of 21 of Sigmund Freud’s 43 
works. These translations, no doubt, led to a surge in interest in modern philosophy and psychology in the 
Arab world. Throughout the entire Arab world, students from as far east as Saudi Arabia all the way to 
Morocco continue to rely on Ṭarābīshī’s translations in the fields of critical theory, philosophy, 
psychology, and social theory.  
Ṭarābīshī, however, was not only a translator. In 1964, at the age of 24, he published his first 
collections of articles on Sartre’s critique of Marxism in a volume entitled Sārter wal-
Mārkissiya,198(Sartre and Marxism) an early display of his initial protest against contemporary Arab 
intelligentsia, which would rise to climax in his The Crisis of Arab Intellectuals.199 Before long, he turned 
to literary criticism during the 1970s, writing copiously on Arab feminism, and applying psychoanalyses 
on Arabic novel for the first time in the history of Arabic literature.200 Even critical writers of Ṭarābīshī 
concede that his “psychoanalytic approach is one of the more sophisticated critiques within these [Arab] 
debates.”201 It is in this period of his intellectual evolution that he famously stated “the attitude towards 
women determines the attitude towards the world.”202 Although he remained a staunch advocate of 
women’s rights, starting in the 1980s Ṭarābīshī’s interest shifted to the examination of the Arab past, its 
heritage and tradition. In one word, he zeroed in on the Turāth.   
  In what follows I examine the ideological chapter in Ṭarābīshī’s life before he turned to 
the study of the Turāth as soon as he migrated to France in 1984. What were the main ideological 
frameworks that he undertook in those years? What political commitments did these ideologies enable 
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and sustain? How did these ideologies frame his attitude toward women, Turāth, and Arab culture and 
politics? This ideological chapter of Ṭarābīshī’s life remains very critical for the formation of his ideas, 
presuppositions, commitments and sensibilities before he transitions, like hundreds of other Arab 
intellectuals, to engage the study Turāth.   
Ṭarābīshī became a notable cultural critic when his critique of Arab regimes slowly gave way to 
commenting on its culture and the lack of secularism therein. In 1998, he justified this transition in an 
interview to Al-ʿArabī newspaper when he invoked the cultural constraints that Arab civil society imposes 
on free thinking. Proposing that the real threat to the burgeoning Arab democracy and freedom comes 
from civil society rather than political regimes, Ṭarābīshī opined “I think that there are pressures not only 
from the [political] authorities, but also from civil society institutions. This is petrifying since throughout 
the history of cultural evolution pressure came from above. [Arab] civil society, its institutions and public, 
turn today to a suppressing authority. Therefore, I believe dark days are ahead of us.”203 That Arab civil 
society, rather than Arab regimes, impedes possibilities for change became characteristic to the broad 
thesis Ṭarābīshī developed after his migration to Paris in 1984. In this stage, he wrote a five-volume 
encyclopedia, Naqd al-Naqd, which is deemed, according to one established literary critic, one of the three 
most significant Arabic encyclopedias to be written in the course of the twentieth century.204     
Ṭarābīshī’s authority and influence came to him early on in his intellectual journey. No doubt, his 
broad intellectual interests and remarkable erudition stood to him, but it was mainly because of the Syrian 
educational landscape that Ṭarābīshī made a name. Syria in midcentury had just begun forging its educated 
intelligentsia. Not only Syria had no national army when the French left in 1946, more urgently it lacked 
a solid scholarly and intellectual class. One Syrian observer at the time talked about the “Syrian 
preliminary library,” an allegory that meant to describe the emerging educational and intellectual capacity 
that had just begun taking shape in the 1950s.205 Into this intellectual void, in such an intellectually 
disadvantaged backdrop, Ṭarābīshī made his grand entrance.  
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Ṭarābīshī grew up to assume much coveted positions the small world of modern Arab letters could 
offer. Between 1972-1984 he was the chief editor of Dār al-Ṭalīʿah, undoubtedly one of the most esteemed 
publishing houses in the Arab world in the second half of the twentieth century. As a chief editor, Ṭarābīshī 
was in charge of its influential journal Dirāsāt ʿArabiyya, the main stage and platform that set the tone for 
the Arab left for years. Ṭarābīshī was forced to give up on this prestigious position due to the escalation 
of the Civil War in Lebanon. When he migrated to France, he served as the chief editor of the nationalist 
journal, French-based al-Wiḥdah (Unity) between 1984-1989. Working these two precious positions kept 
him abreast with the flourishing Arabic publication industry in the post-1967 world.  
Ṭarābīshī belongs to a generation that straddled the colonial and post-colonial eras. This generation 
experienced both the sting of colonization and the ensuing momentary euphoria accompanying the rise of 
the post-colonial state. This generation, “the generation of losing wagers” as he referred to it, was defined 
by three events that partly explain its penchant to critique and its, one dares to say, imbedded pessimism.206 
In its teens, this generation witnessed the spectacular upsurge in nationalism and national feelings. The 
emergence of the post-colonial Arab states in the late 1940s boosted these feeling. The main event that 
validated and reinforced this euphoria was the gallant resistance Egyptian leader ʿAbed al-Nasser put up 
against Britain, France, and Israel in 1956. However, the ensuing crashing military defeat against Israel in 
1967, confounded by the disenchantment with which they saw the miscarried union experiment with Syria 
in 1961 (when Nassir sent General Hafiz al-Asad to Jail). These two events not only dampened the 
triumphant mood, but, thirdly, gave rise to a vigorous Islamic political activity. The rise of Islam and the 
enforcement of Islamic morals, began to inform popular and intellectual debates since 1967. It is against 
this growing cultural tide that Ṭarābīshī’s relentless pushback comes to fore.   
Like many intellectuals of his generation, Ṭarābīshī undertook the mission of critically engaging 
the past to offer a new reading of the present. What set him apart, however, was his adherence to the 
secular and his particular ‘against the grain reading of the past,” as IslamOnline, one of the most widely-
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read websites in the Arab world pointed out.207 Ṭarābīshī was portrayed as the first Arab intellectual to go 
as far to “establish secularism” in Islam “as an indispensable part of the historical experience of Arab and 
Islamic past, not an idea that came from outside [the West].”208 However, embracing secularism in an age 
of authenticity and growing Islamic morality cost him dearly. Ṭarābīshī quickly turned into the new 
outcast. Some has lay the blame for his tendency to self-flagellating claiming that he has contributed his 
part to embedding yet deeper the sense of defeatism or entrenching defeatism (Tāʾṣīl al-Hazīmah).209  
Ṭarābīshī’s uniqueness came to him not in virtue of his scathing critique of Arab intelligentsia. 
Criticism and self-critique marked the post-1967 age. Ever since Ṭarābīshī’s generation, born in the 1930s, 
came of age, it was obsessed with deconstructing prevailing social axioms, undermining the status quo, 
assailing cultural practices, and critiquing obsolete ways of readings. This is the first generation, one 
historian maintained, to dispute the order of things, contesting their naturalness.210 Ṭarābīshī’s 
distinctiveness, however, stemmed from his “gallant defense” of the west in the Arab world.211 In 
particular his unwavering advocacy of secularism and rationalism, ideas that to this day remain elusive to 
the vast majority of Arab intellectuals.  
Ṭarābīshī had many intellectual fathers including Yāssīn al-Hāfiẓ in Damascus, Suhayl Idrīs in 
Lebanon, Mohammad Arkoun in Paris. The final “murdering of the fathers”, a concept Ṭarābīshī knew 
well through his translations of Freud, was central and distinct to his identity. Meanwhile his persistent 
adherence to secularism drove a wedge among Arab intellectuals. Ṭarābīshī welcomed this moment of 
separation not only because it enabled him to re-examine his previous (ideological) positions, but also 
because it offered him a rare opportunity to shed off all intellectual godparents and authorities above him. 
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“My desire to revolt against my father was always stronger than my desire to tuck under the banner of 
a protective father.”212 The current chapter and the next have no claim to offering an exhaustive account 
of “the most industrious and productive Arab intellectual” in the second half of the twentieth-century.213 
At the center of these chapters rest the examination of the ways Ṭarābīshī’s thought evolved through three 
stations: In Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut. The examination of Ṭarābīshī’s career in the first half of his 
life affords a window through which to peek on the revolutionary age in the Arab world, an age where 
different western ideas were the main ground upon which intellectual wars were fought (nationalism, 
existentialism, Marxism, Freudianism.) The eclipse of the ideological/revolutionary age in the late 1970s, 
however, would send Arab intellectuals searching for new frameworks in what is known now as the age 
of authenticity. This chapter ends with Ṭarābīshī’s symbolic relocation to Paris as most of the ideologies 
that he spent his life defending were in a steep wane.  
The Man  
 “What a man is, only his history can tell him,” Wilhel Dilthey  
The study of Ṭarābīshī’s life and thought could not be divorced from the familial, social, and 
cultural context in which he lived and worked. Though Ṭarābīshī claimed that he had transcended his 
roots, changing his perspectives and worldviews frequently, his experiences in Syria and Lebanon 
informed his literary tastes and intellectual visions. This is because whatever happened around him plays 
upon his psychology and thoughts.  
From modest setting to stardom in the world of Arab letters, Jūrj Ṭarābīshī trekked a long yet 
smooth way up. His life reflects the common story of a full-blown hope that gradually vanished from the 
scene after the optimism of the 1950s-60s gave way to the harsh realities of the 1970s-90s. In his writings, 
he embodied the rise and fall of the aspirations of a great swath of Arab intellectuals: the aspiration of 
independence, the ending of a humiliating chapter of colonialism and economic dependency, and the 
achievement of Arab Unity through the liberation of Palestine. As the decade of 1980s demonstrated none 
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of these core issues around which Arab intellectuals set themselves to achieve was closer to attainment. 
Quite the contrary, Egypt was collectively conceived as a country that compromised its sacred 
commitment to Arab Unity and made a unitary peace with Israel, even when Israel invaded Beirut (first 
Arab capital) in 1982. Palestine was no closer to achieve its national aspiration of statehood. Colonialism 
morphed into marginalizing the Arab world against Europe, perpetuating a lopsidedness in the northern 
and southern rims of the Mediterranean. In what follows, I offer an intellectual biography of one of these 
disenchanted intellectuals in three stages: Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut.   
The Beginning: Aleppo 
  The northern Syrian city of Aleppo featured a degree of modern facilities such as electricity 
and running water when Jūrj Ṭarābīshī was born on 5 April 1939, six years in advance of Syria’s 
independence in April 1946. For years Aleppo was “one of the most important cities” which “sat astride 
global trade routes and served in the early modern period as a center of long-distance commerce in luxury 
goods, attracting merchants from all around the Mediterranean, north Europe, and South and Central 
Asia.” 214 An exceedingly multicultural city, Aleppo fashion diverse groups of not only of Arab Christians 
but also Jewish traders like the Sassoon family, Venetians merchant and adventurers and the Armenian 
silk merchants and even weavers marking the city “with a tremendous ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
diversity.”215 Being the first Arab city to welcome travelers from the Turkish logo-sphere to the Arabic-
speaking world, Aleppo had been functioning as a trade center between the Hejaz and Istanbul for 
generations. Yet, it was during the much-hated French mandate (1920-1946) that its infrastructure 
developed rapidly, triggering a drastic shift in the status and the well-being of the durable class of 
landowners. 
When the French took control of Syria after WWI, they received a city that was immensely effected 
by nineteenth century Reforms, including the tearing down of the city walls. After quashing the initial 
revolute that sparked in full force between 1925-27, French authorities began building wide thoroughfares, 
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ramping up the city’s industrial factories, opening new schools for its sizable Christian community, and 
connecting it to European centers. Aleppo’s noticeable economic expansion witnessed between the two 
wars, would bear fruits and become more tangible only a decade after the mandate ended. After Syria’s 
independence, Aleppo would retain this progressive trend, along with Damascus, that set these cities in 
directions that departs from the vastly agricultural industry that dominated in the rest of Syria. The home 
of the only air force flying school in Syria, Aleppo further increased in significance as the army began to 
play a consequential role in directing Syrian politics. British journalist, Patrick Seale, who gained 
unfettered access to Syrian state archives and befriended Syrian leadership and Asad himself, gave an 
informative description of the Syrian socioeconomic landscape shortly after the French mandate was 
swept away in 1946:  
“Syria was a predominantly agricultural country, its backbone being two million peasants out of a 
then population of about 3.5 million, inhabiting some 5,500 villages built of mud and mostly lacking piped 
water, sewerage, electricity, tarred roads or any other amenity of modern life. Because of overcrowding 
and poor sanitation the population was ravaged by disease… In 1951-3, 36 per cent of registered deaths 
occurred among children under five…Outside the two main cities of Damascus and Aleppo electricity 
was rare, serving fewer than a three-quarters of a million people in the whole country.”216  
Raised in Aleppo into a middle-class Christian family, Ṭarābīshī was poised to pick a career in 
trade or education but not in the army. Middle class families in Syria looked down at army service, 
condescendingly deeming it a low status job track reserved for people from rural areas. The divide between 
country and urban sensibilities was seen as clearly depicted as the split between the savage and the 
civilized. Seale and others217 have considered city dwellers’ attitude towards the army a “historical 
mistake”: “scorning the army as a profession, they allowed it to be captured by their class enemies who 
then went on to capture the state itself.”218 As a city dweller, Ṭarābīshī naturally shied away from the 
army. When the government called for volunteers in the early years of its independence, it was not 
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urbanites who responded, but masses of “country boys.” Alawites, for long despised and deride, were 
among the first to embrace this opportunity. “The army was an attractive alternative [for country boys] 
because…fees had abolished at the Military Academy at Homs which thus became the only institution to 
offer poor boys a start in life: the cadets were lodged, fed and even paid to be there.”219 The Syrian army, 
since its inception, became a welcoming institution for minorities, while being shunned by middle class 
urbanites. Ṭarābīshī grew up with a grudge against the army, which he referred to with contempt as qūwāt 
al-ʿaskar al-mutarayyif or “ruralized military force.”220  
Although Aleppo sported a bustling urban space, it nevertheless offered only an array of religious 
schools, with the exception of European schools. Ṭarābīshī attended a Christian school that instilled a 
sense of religious attachment in him. He spent his youth in Aleppo, where switching between a religious 
school and a practicing Christian household molded his early moralities and ethical inclinations. “I was 
born to a Christian family and in the first stage of my childhood I was excessively religious to the extent 
that invoked the irony of my younger brother.”221 The oldest child of eight siblings, he took the name of 
his grandfather George (Jūrj) to observe a customary practice, which still endures in many Arabic-
speaking societies. Later in his life, Ṭarābīshī would lament his name. In “Because of my Name”, an article 
he wrote a couple of years before he passed away, Ṭarābīshī lamented carrying the name Jūrj for its 
reference and connotation to Christianity. “Because of my name I failed to become an Arab hero.”222 
Among his siblings, who were all male, he was the only one to take a name that had a pure “sectarian and 
Christian ring” to it.223 This demurring about his Christian name reflects a deeper concern that preoccupied 
Ṭarābīshī in real life. He was a man who belonged to a Christian minority, which deemed itself different, 
Western sponsored, and by definition sectarian, and thus isolated from the rest of Syrian Sunni majority. 
At the same time, Ṭarābīshī claimed to embody Arab nationalism and advocated for Arab unity and 
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nationalism. The discrimination against Arab Christians may have niggled at his conscious but he never 
let that feeling overwhelm him. The paradox did not pass unnoticed by the overwhelming majority. Yet, 
the notion of al-Makhraj al-ʿalmani “The Secular Resolution” or the “Secular Exist” was a personal and 
intellectual battle to break through this paralyzing paradox as we will see next. 
EARLY SCHOOLING: 
“In the 1940s there was only one secondary school along the whole length of the coast, from the 
northern frontier of Lebanon to Alexandretta, serving Latakia, Tartus, Jableh, and the entire mountain 
hinterland.”224 Ever since its independence in 1946 until 1970 when Hafiz al-Assad wrested power, the 
Syrian government failed to gain popular legitimacy and stabilize its political system. The country’s 
educational system was in tatters. Three years into its independence Syria had descended into a political 
quagmire that stymied its efforts to put together a viable educational system. Three forces locked into a 
fierce rivalry over seizure of power: the old landowners who struggled for survival, the rising army 
officers, and the newly formed educated bourgeoisie who defined themselves against the wanton 
communists.225 The army was a new establishment that more than once had allied with the educated 
bourgeoisie to dislodge the notorious landowners and wealthy families from power. The first destabilizing 
year came in 1949 when Syria was rocked by three coups d'états in one year. The first was led by Hussny 
al-Zāʿīm who ousted Shukry al-Qawatly (1891-1967), wreaking havoc on a fragile and still vulnerable 
state. This was the first illegal usurpation of power in post-colonial Syria by a military officer, which 
heralded a series of military putsches to follow in the Arab world. Al- Zāʿīm (1897-1949) represented the 
rising clout of the young generation which challenged Qawatly the guardian of the deeply entrenched 
interests of the big families and landowners.226 In so doing al-Zāʿīm set in motion unprecedented Inqilab 
that would repeat and recreate itself in different forms in neighboring Arab states. Like other coups in the 
Middle East, it reflected the scramble for power between the haves and have-nots, the old generation 
against the emerging and radicalized generation. In Syria, al-Zāʿīm was initially propped up by young 
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Baʿthists, who hitherto had only fuzzy ideas about the ideology they promoted. Al-Zāʿīm, however, would 
not last more than few months in power as he lost his head at the hands of his angered Baʿthist allies. He 
was muscled out of power in a coup conducted by Sāmi al-Ḥinnāwi (1898-1950), a politician who also 
came from the officer ranks. Ḥinnāwi’s fate was no less tragic than his predecessor’s. He failed to meet 
the expectations of the diverse and conflicting groups of the old bourgeoisie, the military, and the educated 
classes which pulled away the political establishment in different directions. He was overthrown in yet 
another coup, this time engineered by Ādīb al-Shīshiklī, a Kurd from Hama. In the course of the first two 
decades after its independence, Syria would see a record number of 18 presidents.227 It was only with the 
arrival of Ḥafiẓ al-Asad that the scramble for power in Syria saw a cruel end.  
While Syria’s political scene was infamously unpredictable, the educational system fared no better. 
In 1943-1944 “less than a quarter of all Syrian children between the ages of six and twelve attended 
school.”228 In one village of Qurdahā in the northwest of Syria, the village where Asad was born, “a man 
would have to go round the whole neighborhood to find someone able to read a letter. The few people 
who could read were respected.”229 Syria had no unified curriculum either and suffered from a paucity of 
qualified and competent teachers. This gave an edge to a host of religious schools and ulama who held a 
larger sway over education. Unlike Lebanon, Syria had no more than one university- the University of 
Damascus established in 1923. Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria, had no institution of higher 
education until 1957, the year in which the University of Aleppo was inaugurated. A high school diploma 
(baccalaureate) was the highest degree awarded in Syrian colleges and it did endow some respectability 
and social status to its holders.230 Ṭarābīshī opened his eyes to the world precisely when this tumultuous 
political landscape and educational chaos raged on.    
                                                 
227 Bowen, Six Days, 13–15. 
228 Seale and McConville, Asad of Syria, 7. 
229 Seale and McConville, 14. 
230Syrian writer and ex-Ba’athist Muta’ Safadi conveys a bleak picture of the educational system in Syria after independence. 
He argues that very few intellectuals were in Syria at the mid century. Most of the founding father of the Ba’ath Party, he 
claims, were no more than high school teachers. see Ṣafadī, Ḥizb Al-Baʻth, Maʼsāt Al-Mawlid, Maʼsāt Al-Nihāyah. P. 79-87. 
Seale mentions that “in Zabadani, west of Damascus, only eight boys were admitted to secondary school in 1941 out of a 
population of some 40,000.” (P.25) In a footnote he continues “In 1946 there were only 8000 places in Syrian secondary 
schools; by 1953 this had risen to 50,000.” P. 479 footnote #2 
 95 
In the Christian schools a sort of identity was taking shape. Teachers were zealous to foster 
Christian identity in their pupils by emphasizing Christian morality and spiritual conceptions while 
watering down prevalent national feeling. The nationalist wave seemed to threaten the very bond that held 
Arab Christians together for centuries. It was in such a school that young Ṭarābīshī became aware to his 
Christian identity. One morning in a theology class stood a teacher who was also a priest in the Church of 
Aleppo, to teach a class on “sin” and the fate of those who meet their “death in sin”. The teacher/priest 
faced fourteen-year-old students who all came from Christian families. He began describing the “eternal 
punishments” God inflicts on people who commit “unpardonable sin.” To simplify the meaning of 
“perpetual punishment” the teacher asked his students to imagine a bird that touches the earth with its 
wings once in a millennium. He followed with a rhetorical question “how many millenniums would it take 
the bird to eliminate the earth?” The punchline was if you die in sin, you will be punished “eternally.”  
This little drama meant to shore up the fading Christian elements in students’ identity in an age of 
ascending national feeling that seemed at the time to render religious identity almost obsolete. The teacher 
wanted his students to acquiesce to God’s ordains, but his fear-provoking stories backfired. Hearing these 
dreadful descriptions of hell and God’s merciless punishment, Ṭarābīshī reportedly “trembled with fear” 
(aṣābatni raʿdah). “The fear of eternal punishment is a cruel thing to instill in a child” he writes. He then 
“exited school’s gates with his head down.” He could not afford lifting his head up to see his beloved 
Italian girl on her balcony as he made his way back “fearing that the mere desire to watch her could be a 
reason for unpardonable sin.”231  
Feeling that religion made impossible demands, Ṭarābīshī recorded this episode as one of the first 
distressing events that undermined his belief in God. “I reached home with semi-derelict reactions and 
became sick for two days. When I woke up my only reaction was no… it is impossible that the God the 
teacher talked about exists and is cruel to this extent. Ever since that day I turned away from 
Christianity”232 (kafaftu ān ākunu masīḥiyyan). Ṭarābīshī’s break with Christianity came as a spontaneous 
reaction to psychological stress and anxiety. It is hard to verify the accuracy of this story- but given that 
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other students in this generation experienced similar feeling it is not a far-fledged story. Ṭarābīshī 
disavowed religion at very young age but he invoked (or rather recreated) this experience later in his life 
when he found the ideas of French philosopher Marcel Gauchet palatable to his literary taste. A mere three 
years before his death, Ṭarābīshī argued that Gauchet was one of his favorite philosophers because his 
ideas resonated with his own experience in Syria. Gauchet, one should recall, maintains that Christianity 
is a unique religion in the sense that it provides the necessary conditions for the rise of secularism. 
Christianity, Gauchet writes, “proves to have been a religion for departing from religion.”233 Gauchet was 
only partially true in this observation since as Ṭarābīshī will prove in his later works, Islam also carries 
concealed “seeds of secularism” not unlike those of Christianity. Ṭarābīshī’s description of his departure 
journey from religion may have begun within the parameters of Christianity but it would not reach 
completion before his (traumatic) encounter with Islam. 
In 1954, three years after the agony that the religious teacher inflicted on him, Ṭarābīshī mentioned 
a “second incident” that left him disenchanted with religion. This was to happen in the newly introduced 
Islamic studies during his high school years. “Islamic classes were a new thing to the Syrian curriculum” 
writes Ṭarābīshī. “Islamic studies became mandatory only after the coup that took place in 1955 that 
toppled Shīskiklī.”234 Shīshiklī’s authoritarian rule was so intense and reprehensible that it drove otherwise 
antagonistic parties, including Communists, Baʿthists, and the Muslim Brotherhood to collaborate to bring 
him down. Indeed, it was under this totalitarian regime that the Baʿth saw its ranks swelling with the merge 
of Akram Hourani and other factions within the Baʿth. These parties joined forces and colluded to put an 
end to the draconian regime of Shīshiklī.235 The morning after Shīshiklī was forced out, Ṭarābīshī writes, 
the “Muslim Brotherhood refused to take any [political] part in the newly formed government” stipulating 
one caveat that changed the educational scene in Syria for years to come: For not partaking in the new 
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government offices they demanded to have Islamic studies introduced to high school and academic 
curricula. “Until 1955”236, writes Ṭarābīshī, “only primary and secondary schools taught religious 
studies.” Starting in the post-Shīshiklī era, “Religious studies became mandatory for all [Syrian] students.” 
Before that coup, “we used to learn national and moral studies” that now “turned to religious studies.”237 
Incorporating “religious studies” left Ṭarābīshī alarmed and petrified. For Ṭarābīshī it marked the 
beginning of the unravelling of Syria’s secular curriculum that had always been taken for granted. “I 
deliberately decided to take a class in Islamic, rather than Christian, studies to learn about the majority 
that I live within,” writes Ṭarābīshī on the experience that led him to depart religion entirely. During one 
Islamic class stood a serene teacher, round faced, with a shortly trimmed beard, and wrote slowly on the 
board, “Who he is not Muslim is an enemy of Islam.” Appalled and frightened, Ṭarābīshī stood out to his 
teacher identifying himself as Jurj and followed with a question “Would you consider me your enemy?” 
Ṭarābīshī never mentioned the name of the teacher, whom he would meet years later and recall the incident 
together. This disconcerting episode hacked Ṭarābīshī’s religiosity as he began to realize that an 
unbridgeable gulf began separating him from religion. Though he did not turn to secularism instantly, he 
understood that religion drives a wedge among the different sects and diverse minorities in Syria. Some 
of the Christian students, notices another Syrian scholar, left religious classes entirely while Muslim 
students attended, increasing the tensions between them.238 Ṭarābīshī carried these sentiments, fraught 
with distressing memories, with him all the way to Damascus to attend university.  
Political Predicament: In Damascus  
Ṭarābīshī’s dreadful experiences may not have registered in his memory for so long without the 
cultural and political temperament of Damascus. He moved to Damascus to pursue his studies at the 
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department of Arabic studies at Damascus University.239 In 1955-56, the year in which he arrived to the 
capital, he witnessed first-hand a chaotic Damascus that reflected the fierce fighting engulfing the nation. 
Damascus barely seemed governable as it was yet to come to terms with the new reality of independence. 
As one observer succinctly noticed “Syria is a country that never wanted to exist at all, at least within its 
present boundaries.”240 Twenty years of French rule in Syria had pitted urbanites against rurals, 
landowner’s elite against landless, the old and complacent against the new and radical generation. The 
French rule, another observer remarked, “undermined the old ways but failed to implant convincing new 
ones.”241 This partly accounts for the prolonged struggle to fix the broken system.  
At mid-century Damascus was brimming with national (and chauvinistic) ideas and it seemed 
poised to effect far-reaching changes. If Aleppo instilled in Ṭarābīshī the first signs of anti-religion, then 
Damascus trained him on nationalist sentiments. In the decade that preceded his arrival to Damascus, the 
city was roiled by many new migrants who flocked the town after the amputation of Alexandretta-Antioch 
from Syria in 1939. This wave of dislocated migrants flared up national sentiments that had never 
dissipated. One of those dislocated was Zakī al-Arsūzī, whose writings would vastly influence young 
Ṭarābīshī.  
In Damascus, as in Aleppo, the same patterns were at work but with higher velocity and intensity. 
Three semi-ideological forces grappled with each other for power: Baʿthists, Pan-Arabists (Anṭūn 
Saʿādah’s circle) and Communists (though the later party was fable in Aleppo.) All these groups were 
anxious about the future of Syria. All three pushed for Arab unity as a remedy to what they deemed Arab 
fragmentation and social ills. In the Syrian limbo of the midcentury, the Communists seemed to stand 
higher chances of gaining political ground particularly in the early 1950s. A number of events helped 
ensure the rise of the Communist power in Syria that appealed for newcomers like Ṭarābīshī. In 
neighboring Iraq, an opportunist politician, ʿAbed al-Karem Qāssim, seized power in a bloody coup that 
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put a definite end to the monarchy. Qāssim professed allegiance to no ideology other than his fierce 
opposition to Iraqi nationalists. To solidify his shaky status, Qāssim gave free rein to the communists who 
swarmed the Rasheed and al-Mutanabi streets to eliminate the vociferous and aggressive nationalist 
opposition. The Syrian communists took note of the drama unfolding in Iraq, which instilled a growing 
confidence in their cause. Moreover, the anticipated weapon deal with the USSR signed in 1957 with the 
Syrian government boosted Syrian communists, which blasted their adversaries by boasting deeds over 
words. Needless to say, Communism held some allure for deprived people and newcomers as it offered 
grand promises to demolish all social walls and differences that had stymied Syrian political progress 
since the nineteenth century.242 Ṭarābīshī found it just natural to follow this party of change before he 
changed his mind and joined the ranks of the Baʿth. The Baʿth were looking at Gamal Abed al-Nasser in 
Egypt who began restructuring Egypt in radical ways. For young Baʿthist, an alignment with Nasser could 
block the rise of Communism in Syria. Few things can capture the political disorientation in mid-century 
Syria as the events in the late 1950s. In 1958 Syria politicians, unable to settle on state policy handed over 
their country to Nasser. Unhappy, Nasser accepted the offer with reluctance stipulating one condition: the 
abolishment of all Syrian parties.  
 The inflow of people and ideas to the capital animated Damascus. Ṭarābīshī’s time in this city 
attests to a place that teemed with genuine ideas, innovation, and creativity. After spending a brief stint in 
the communist circles, Ṭarābīshī was displeased with their dogmatism and joined the Baʿth party. The 
lines separating the two parties were still vague as both parties lacked definite agendas and official 
programs with very few writings. Both drew from socialist and vague Marxist ideas floating around in the 
daily press. In one of his early books Ṭarābīshī writes “I do not know how we became socialists. All I know 
is that we found ourselves believing in socialism.”243 Indeed, Ṭarābīshī’s life offers a revisionist 
perspective on the narrative of the nahda literature as a moment in which the Arab world opened up to 
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Western ideas,244 embarked on publishing industry and engaged with European ideas.245 The way 
Ṭarābīshī’s generation was copping with Western ideas signals that though they were familiar with 
Western scholarship, they barely mastered them. 
The experience of Ṭarābīshī in Damascus, particularly his unmitigated confusion and fluctuating 
between parties and ideologies, testifies that many ideologies were not completely graspable, much less 
legible to his generation. More importantly, the picture that emerged from Ṭarābīshī’s life in Aleppo and 
Damascus not only impugned on the accepted narrative of the nahda, but also goad us to rethink the way 
in which post-colonial intellectuals dealt with the near absence of intellectual class, the feeble educational 
institutes,246 the melt down of publishing houses and journals,247 and most prominently the lack of cultural 
capacity to grapple with complicated Western ideas. In his writings, Ṭarābīshī convey this sense of lack 
of mastery with Western philosophies and the paucity of this Western literature in Arabic. He writes that 
he turned to socialism in his adulthood not due to any meticulous reading of socialist literature, but because 
“the pursuit of justice is always profound and sweeping among adults. This sense of justice alone 
propelled us to be socialists. In short, we were rebellious but not revolutionaries.”248  
Ṭarābīshī’s relocation to Damascus made it smoother for him to exit religion. Still it was not a 
clean break. He devoured nationalist literature of the Baʿth and quickly assumed its ideology as he shook 
off all remnants of religion. He read Zakī al-Arsuzi who praised Arabic and Arabs in history (he will be 
later called the philosopher of Arabic), Michel ʿAflaq and al-Bitar, and Antūn Saʿādah the genuine Pan-
Arabist who propagated the idea of Greater Syria that included Cyprus, for which he was executed in 
1949. This limited literature provided him with a valid an alternative of the religious text. It offered 
Ṭarābīshī and his generation anew opportunity to participate in the building of a fledging world of 
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literature. When he arrived in Damascus, a new world broke into his life. Tey, Ṭarābīshī perceived the 
Baʿth ideologies in religious terms. Damascus freed him from religious shackles, but instead bounded him 
to the Baʿth illiberal ideology. Though Damascus was full of life, it offered a poor job market, particularly 
to young graduates. 249 Ṭarābīshī carried on his studies and obtained a master’s degree in education in 
1963. He set out to be a teacher, but in a streak of misfortune, he was sent off to teach in a small village 
far from Damascus. He couldn’t settle to this job since he had already developed rebellious sentiments 
that stood in contradiction with the nature of a teaching career. Later he would claim that “I quit teaching 
because I was assigned to teach in a desolate and far off village away from my wife in Damascus.”250After 
unsuccessfully pleading with the education minister to teach in Damascus, Ṭarābīshī decided to quit his 
job. 
Under Hizb al-Baʿth 
The First World War terminated 400 years of Ottoman dominance over Syria (1516-1918.) In the 
wake of the Great War the Arab provinces were left to the vagaries of the two Western superpowers of 
the time: Great Britain and France. In 1916, in an infamous agreement known as Sykes-Picot, which every 
Syrian “schoolchild learned to detest and vilify,” these superpowers secretly arranged to carve up the 
Middle East between them. France agreed to take control of the northern part – today’s Syria and Lebanon- 
while conceding to Britain the areas that included Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. This haphazard 
breaking up of the Arab lands was more than the inhabitants of Greater Syria could swallow, sowing the 
first seeds of illiberal parties like the nationalist Baʿth party. Before World War I, Syrians were accustomed 
to traveling and trading freely all the way between Antioch in the north to Palestine in the south. When 
the mandate regimes restricted this free movement, they anticipated the first Syrian national feeling. In 
response, national councils emerged in Syria for the first time. Before the advent of modern political 
parties, these national councils were elected in July 1919, calling themselves the Syrian National 
                                                 
249 In Damascus, Tarabishi meets an outstanding student Henrate ʿAbud, who would accompany him as a wife and a 
translator partner. Henrate, who came from the famous ʿAbud family brought order and discipline into Tarabishi’s life. Most 
prominently, she transformed his literary taste in favor of writing on women. She became a well-known novelist and 
translator of classical modernity literature. They would have three daughters together. 
250 Interview, Paris 5/22/2014. 
 102 
Congress. This Congress pioneered the national movement in Syria that formed against foreign 
intervention. “They demanded sovereign status for united Syria-Palestine.”251 The French Mandate, 
dismissive of the Syrians’ demands, responded swiftly with the deposing of king (Amir) Faysal, who had 
established himself as the de facto ruler of Greater Syria during the last year of the Great War 1918. 
Faysal’s odds in ruling Syria were ill-fated from the beginning. He faced internal resistance from Homs 
which was dominated by Christians and other Damascene families who wanted ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jazāʾiri 
to rule them. To appeal to Christians in the city of Homs Faysal stated that “Al-Dīn lillah wal-Watan li-
ljamīʿ,”252 coining a phrase for the first time. Yet, his policy toward Syrians did not bode well. The most 
striking example being the establishment of the first school for girls in Syria. Unsatisfied with the special 
school that accepted only girls, some conservative Syrians took to streets and chanted al-Qabr walā al-
Madrasah “We rather build a cemetery than a [girls] school.”253   
The Baʿth party came into being in Syria at the twilight of World War II (1943-1947.) It was 
officially formed in 1946 though its ideological kernel reaches back to the post WWI. The Baʿth is made 
of four factions, three with the name al- Baʿth, that was first coined by Zaki al-Arsuzi’s journal al- Baʿth 
1940. The merge of these factions took place in Damascus between the representatives of these factions: 
Aflaq and Bitar in Damascus, Akram al-Hourani in Homs, Jalāl al-Sayyid in Der al-Zur, Wahib al-Ghanim 
in Latikiya, and Anton Makdisi from Aleppo. Each one of these factions’ leaders was sustained by a group 
of supporters.254  
From a historical perspective, the core ideas that informed the Baʿth party could not have been 
conceived in any other Arab state but Syria. The French mandate that carved up Syria into four 
administrative enclaves had anticipated its emergence. France, as the acting sovereign over Syria, not only 
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took huge mass of Syrian land and attached them to Mount Lebanon in 1920, where its Maronite protégés 
held sway since 1860, it also submitted large parts of the former province of Aleppo to Turkey. Seeking 
to sway Turkey on its side during WWII, France officially ceded Alexandretta-Antioch to Turkey in 1939 
in return for joining the War on its side. This surgical amputation of Syrian land had its two main cities 
(Damascus in the south, Aleppo in the north) wearing thin. It dealt a serious blow to the two major cities 
as they both lost direct access to the Mediterranean Sea (one was blocked by Lebanon the other by 
Alexandretta.) Concomitantly, as the British split up Palestine to facilitate a new “Homeland for the Jews,” 
the dreams of Greater Syria grew ever slimmer. This subtraction of land, one Levantine intellectual 
noticed, stirred “national feeling and opened Arabs eyes to the ghost that threatened to tear up and rip 
apart their land.”255 Thus, it is only natural that the true founder of the Baʿth, Zakī al-Arsūzī, came from 
the ceded enclave of Alexandretta-Antioch. Deeply angered by the colonial enterprise in Syria and other 
Arab provinces, al-Arsūzī extolled Arabs in history, vilified Turks, smeared colonialism, and called for a 
cultural renewal of Arab history or simply Baʿth. His nationalistic writings were so chauvinistic that recent 
Arab intellectual did not shy away from calling him “Arab racist at its worst.”256 Al-Arsūzī was deeply 
agitated by the seizure of land that upon his relocation to Damascus he wasted no time to launching his 
jounral al-Baʿth. For Al-Arsūzī and his generation, the colonial act of 1939 closed the final chapter on the 
dream of Greater Syria. Yet, to the consternation of Syrian nationalists, this was not the end but the 
beginning of a series of amputations that followed. “When the French finally withdrew in 1946, the 
country had shrunk to 185,190 square kilometers from the 300,000 square kilometers… The Syrians did 
not easily recover from the shock of these surgical operations, and the feeling that their country was 
made smaller, than meant to be, became a continued source of frustration.”257  
The Baʿth led scores of educated people astray. Though it started off deploying noble principles 
and articulating genuine public feelings, it had destructive ends. The Baʿth called for regrouping the now 
fragmented Arab peoples through bounding them into one single Arab nation. From its inception, the Baʿth 
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made fighting Western colonialism and feudal landlords its primary nemesis. Yet, it lacked an intellectual 
backbone as many of its foundational members attested. The overwhelming majority of its rank and file 
came directly from high schools, provinces, minorities, and most prominently Christians. Its main 
ideologues Michael ʿAflaq and Ṣalāh al-Bītār were just school teachers. For more than two decades, this 
party “lacked ideological writings” as ʿAflaq and al-Bītār’s “improvised talks” on nationalism and anti-
colonialism constituted its main sources of reference.258 Bītār quickly became known as the head of a 
party that pandered to the educated bourgeoisie. His criticism focused on the “prevailing order” of the old, 
aristocratic elite and landowners. Under his leadership, the Baʿth became the new challenger of the 
established system. 
It is highly intriguing that the ideology of one of the most influential parties in the Middle East 
was written by teachers and the bulk of its followers came from high schools. The party and its leaders, 
argues Ṣafadi, were moved by emotions rather than rational thinking and cold analysis of reality. 
Tragically, it figured prominently in creating the conditions that misled the Arab world to its humiliating 
defeat in 1967. The minority mentality making up this party stands as the prime culprit. Dominated by 
ʿAlawites, who have been looked down upon, and were conceived of as crude and under-educated, the 
party would take far-flung risks to gain legitimacy among the Sunni majority. A favorite strategy was to 
whip up hostilities against Israel, an easy way to prove loyalty to Arab cause. Israel knew that and for that 
very reason some of the Israeli army commanders, notably Yitzhak Rabin, loathed Syria the most among 
all his Arab adversaries. One journalist noted, “the easiest way for the Alawis to ingratiate themselves 
with Syria’s Sunni Muslims, who were the majority, was to work even harder to heat up their border with 
Israel.”259 With no regard for accountability, the Baʿth party dragged unprepared Arab states to one of its 
most searing defeats at the hand of Israel. Akram Hourani, a prominent leader in the Baʿth, constantly 
pestered Nasser with regard to the presence of the UN forces on the straits of Tiran. According to some 
accounts, Akram Hourani constantly pushed Nasser to evacuate the UN forces, which were stationed in 
the straits after the 1956 war to prevent another escalation between Egypt and Israel. Besmirching Nasser 
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through newspapers was a less likely instigator of the war and the defeat in 1967. Yet, if Akram Hourani’s 
cajoling is to be taken as not the most significant cause for the outbreak of the 1967 war, he certainly was 
a convenient enabler of it. He was a huckster who peddled magical thinking by assuring Syrian policy 
makers that they could take on Israel and gain victory. After the war, many received scorn and reproach 
for the defeat, while the Baʿth enjoyed full impunity. 
  When the Ba’th took power in the now infamous coup of March 1963, Ṭarābīshī “was 
mandated by the education ministry to work as the director of the Syrian Radio,” a position that he held 
for “several months.”260 In its first year in power, the Baʿth revealed its true militaristic nature.261 “Almost 
half of the members in leading positions of the Syrian Baʿth Party came from officer ranks.”262 The Baʿth 
inaugurated a new era in Syrian politics by cracking down on Pan-Arabists, executing political dissidents, 
and even persecuting Nasserists. In 1964, many young and educated Syrians left the party in the wake of 
the atrocities perpetrated across Syria. Ṭarābīshī conceived some of the harsh criticism for dragging his 
feet out of the party.263 He also found himself falling out of favor with the Baʿth by 1965. His critical 
stance of the Baʿth had him “sent to jail for four months.”264  
While in prison, Ṭarābīshī met other ex-Baʿthists. Most of them were Christian dissidents from 
Hurān, who had been in contact with Akram Hourani. His multiple conversations with his ex-Baʿthist 
cellmates, left him despondently convinced that these so-called radicals were actually reactionaries. In 
the course of one dispute over the phenomenon of honor killing of women for having sexual relationships 
out of wedlock, Ṭarābīshī was aghast to realize that he was the only one to emphatically denounce the 
antediluvian practice. He was asked whether or not he would have his “daughter (Maya) killed if she had 
an intimate relationship with someone who is not her husband?” The mere question shocked Ṭarābīshī. 
“Maya was just two years old,” he recalled, “and the mere idea of having her killed was unspeakably 
                                                 
260 Tarabishi, “Qisatti maʿ Al-ʿAfif Al-Akhdar.” 
261 In 1955, three leading parties in Syria were forcefully disbanded leaving the Baʿth to fill the vacuum. Al-Hizb al-Watani, 
Hizb al-Shab, and al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima’ī were eliminated under Syrian tyrant Shishikli.   Shuwayrī and Abū 
Fakhr, Sūrīyah Wa-ḥuṭām Al-Marākib Al-Mubaʻtharah, 2005, 170. 
262 Bowen, Six Days, 14. 
263 Ṣafadī, Ḥizb Al-Baʻth, Maʼsāt Al-Mawlid, Maʼsāt Al-Nihāyah. 
264 Tarabishi, “Six Stations in My Life (sitat Mahatat Fi Hayyati).” 
 106 
atrocious.”265 At that moment, Ṭarābīshī realized that a radical change in mentality ought to precede all 
changes in society.  
“Ever since [this argument] I learned that the issue is not between Muslim and non-Muslim, 
Christian and non-Christian…the problem has grown complicated. The issue comes down to the structure 
of mentality (bunyat al-ʿql) in the first place. Inside human brain, there are two stratums: one is on the 
surface which might be political, progressive, and socialist…the other stratum is beneath it, structural to 
the mind which is fatally regressive, whether the man is Christian or Muslim. Ever since that day I have 
a strong conviction that the attitude towards women in society determines the attitude to the world as 
such. Ever since that day my conviction was hardened more than any time before that we need to struggle 
in words to bring a change in mentalities, to alter the interior structure of mind, not only the political and 
ideological surface of the mind.”266    
Under the spell of Yassin al-Hafiz 
After parting ways with the Baʿth party in 1965, Ṭarābīshī joined a group of disparate young 
radicals animated by “Marxist consciousness.” A prominent figure in this group was Yāssīn al-Ḥāfiẓ, a 
genuine thinker and a sharp-minded commentator on Arab politics. Ḥāfiẓ is said to have been the first 
Marxist in Syria, who jotted down the first principles of the Baʿth in the late 1940s before ditching the 
party altogether.267 Born in 1930 in northeastern Syrian city of Deir al-Zur to a lower middle class family, 
Ḥāfiẓ would become one of the most eloquent nationalist speakers and a founding father of the short-lived 
party of The Arab Revolutionary Workers Party in 1965. Before his ignominious departure from the Baʿth 
embittered and disenchanted, he served as the party’s education attaché. Ḥāfiẓ is better known for 
propounding ideas of al-fawāt al-Tārīkhī “the historical anachronism,” al-Waʿi al-Muṭābik 
“corresponding awareness” and the popularizing of “Arab Marxism” instead of international Marxism. 
The terminology he coined, which he devised in his analysis of Arab societies, gained currency among 
the generation of the 1960s. In his fascinating autobiography, he wrote, “It is imperative that Arabs would 
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not be granted any moment of delusion, submission and surrender. We should make the present 
regression and oppression (al-taʾkhur wal-iṭṭihaḍ) more conspicuous by instilling an awareness of 
regression and oppression. Shame should be rendered more ghastly and horrid by spreading it out among 
people. We should teach people to panic from their reality to give them the temerity to fight back.” Amid 
Syrian intellectuals, Ḥāfiẓ is referred to as the teacher of a generation ‘Ustāth al-Jīl.’ He launched two 
short-lived publishing houses in Beirut but shut down thereafter. Yet, his ideas left a lasting mark on a 
great number of present-day intellectuals despite their misgivings on his Marxism: Waddah Shararah, 
Michael Klito, Hazim Saghiyya, Mutaʿ Safadi, and Yasin al-Haj Saleh who belonged to the younger 
generation. Sadiq Al-Azm is said to have taught his autobiography during his tenure at the American 
University of Beirut.268 In 1965, when Ṭarābīshī was released from jail, Ḥāfiẓ’s ideas were already firmly 
established.  
In his autobiography The Defeat and the Defeated Ideology, Ḥāfiẓ takes what he called Arab 
Marxism and applies its “tools” to criticize “traditional Arab societies.” This work, Ḥāfiẓ states in the 
introduction, “is a profound critique of the defeat [in 1967] by going, probably for the first time, from 
criticizing [Arab] politics to critiquing its society.”269 This transformation from criticizing politics, 
prevalent prior to 1967, to critiquing society marked the growth of a new awareness that was specific to 
the post-1967 generation.270 This was among the first points of entry into a cultural critique that would 
confer much distinction on the works produced by Ṭarābīshī.  
The decline of the traditional European empires during World War II, pressed Ḥāfiẓ to embrace 
the causes championed by Arab liberation movements. He meant to raise awareness of the “regression of 
Arab societies” as a way to break, what he metaphorically called, “Arab cultural and ideological 
involution.”271 The idea of “regression” was still in popular usage as an economic aphorism before it 
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would assume a cultural signification at Ḥāfiẓ hands. As an Arab Marxist, Ḥāfiẓ was incensed by the link 
“semi-Marxists” made between “backward and conservative politics, culture, and ideology”272 on the one 
side and a “backward economic structure of Arab countries” on the other. He chafed at so-called Marxists 
because of the “economical and industrial approaches” that seem to “prevail in the climate of ideas.”273  
In describing his progress towards political maturity, Ḥāfiẓ unapologetically thanks colonialism for paving 
the way for traditional and backward Arab societies to engage in politics without fear of punishment. 
Nowhere in his texts he denounces colonialism outright. Quite the opposite, he identified positive aspects 
in the odious French colonial project in Syria for politicizing Arab society: 
“The reality is that although the burden of French colonialism sparked my interest in politics, the 
colonial (liberal) French suppression did not reach a degree [of cruelty] that forced us to go back to a 
traditional-psychological temperament, where political tradition is absent and a temperament of 
escapism and aversion prevails. With colonialism, for the first time in modern Arab experiment, it was 
possible for Arab subjects to oppose existing authority without getting killed, or seized upon until 
succumbing on the one hand, and gaining some sort of passive and quiet solidarity from [the rest of] 
society on the other hand. One is ought to say that the colonial experiment set loose, with no intention, 
a process of politicizing Arab society, which had not known political tradition before. The removal of 
colonialism, which was followed by renewed Eastern despotism, marked the beginning of the reverse 
procedure of liquidating the remains of ‘the colonial democracy’ and removing politics from society or 
forcing people to steer clear of politics.”274      
In the national ethos of the late 1960s, this kind of honest testimony is unusual even if new tropes 
of critique emerged at that juncture. Ḥāfiẓ’s type of social-cultural critique of Arab society, which “reverts 
to eastern despotism” and “fledging democratic tradition fostered by the colonial experiment,” would later 
be taken up and fully developed by Ṭarābīshī. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Ṭarābīshī was 
profoundly influenced by the ideas of “cultural relapse” or the “reversion to medieval political thinking 
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and practice,” articulated by Ḥāfiẓ. This finds strong embodiment in the idea of nukus “regress, recoil, 
backsliding” and “regression” that Ṭarābīshī elaborates during his years in Paris.  
In late 1965 as Ṭarābīshī left the Baʿth party after the mayhems it inflected in different cities 
throughout Syria, he met Ḥāfiẓ and joined the Syrian Workers Party in 1965. For Ṭarābīshī, this was the 
first experiment in organizing politically. This experience will stand to him later on when he launches the 
Arab Institute for Modern Thought al-Mūaʼssasah al-ʿArabīyah lil-Taḥdīth al-Fikrī along with Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd in Beirut in 2004. However, Ḥāfiẓ was fading from memory as many Arab intellectuals 
began to show some signs of disillusionment with Marxism during the late 1970s. His attempts to slow 
down the process proved futile. The publishing house that he established to disseminate his revolutionary 
ideas lasted only three years, marking the passing of an intellectual brand. With his early death in 1978, 
at the age of 48, Arab Marxism was in a steep decline. It is in this year that Ṭarābīshī declared his “divorce” 
from the Marxist ideology. 
Translation 
In 1964, Ṭarābīshī made a general observation concerning the Arab intellectual scene, which to a 
certain extent, captured the essence of the historical moment of the time. “Until now,” he wrote “we have 
understood Marxism through whatever was written about it, not through Marx’s own [writings].”275 This 
statement not only set purpose of this generation clear, but also implied a break with previous generations. 
In the late 1950s, Arab intellectuals ushered in a new phase in translation of major Western intellectual 
projects. One scholar of the time remarked, that in Lebanon alone the number of translated books exceeded 
for the first time those that were authored by Arab scholars.276 The fact that translated literature overtook 
and outnumbered Arabic composed books had tremendous effects on the development of new literary 
tastes and styles of reasoning that Ṭarābīshī grew up embracing.277 Up until mid-twentieth century, very 
few western works were available to mass readers in Arabic translation despite the steep engagement with 
Western scholarship during the nineteenth-century. Yet, Arab intellectuals and readers alike were, in 
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general, aware of the extensive western intellectual scholarship and tradition, for many of them mastered 
more than one European language. Some journals kept the Arab reader abreast with the latest intellectual 
modes in Europe, while Western philosophers also came to the Arab world to teach. The emergence of 
Arabic journals in the nineteenth century (al-Muqtataf and al-Hillal in particular) had already created a 
space for Arabic readers to dabble in western philosophy and science. These journalistic overviews, 
however, could not achieve more than what good journalism could offer in the form of presenting outlines 
and summaries of mainstream Western ideas. One example is the translated excerpts of Darwin’s works 
published in these journals in the 1870s, which had stirred a furious debate at the American University in 
Beirut. The translation of Darwin’s entire work, however, had to wait until 1917.278 Although these scanty 
translations were necessarily patchy and brief, they nevertheless created social and intellectual 
commotions.  
By mid-twentieth century however, intellectual dynamics had drastically changed. Two 
groundbreaking literary endeavors set to begin. The first was the establishment of al-Adab journal in 
Beirut in 1953 (that expanded into a publishing house in 1956). Second was the founding of Dar al-Taliʿah 
in 1959. Both al-Adab and al-Taliʿah embarked on unprecedented undertaking that systematically set to 
translate works of western intellectuals and philosophers. Unlike the characteristic cherry picking of 
earlier translation projects, 279 these publishing houses went as far as rendering a great portion of 
Existential philosophical and literary corpus into Arabic. The founder of the publication house of Al-
Adab, Suhayl Idrīs, underscored the significance of the project in an article entitled “Our Literature and 
Translation.” In this article, Idrīs took issue with the quality of previous translations, the content of the 
books selected, and the necessity of translation as a medium through which to catch up with the West. 
Idrīs assailed translations done in Egypt, branding Egyptians major translators Ahmad Hassan al-Zayyāt 
and Lutfi al-Manflūtti’s selections as “unfaithful translations” Tarjammāt al-Khiyyānah. He also brushed 
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aside literal word-for-word translations as worthless. Instead, he identified two objectives behind the 
process of translation: “first, reliability in rendering the foreign text, and second, adapting Arabic and 
[Arab] reason to new styles of expression and thought.”280 Idrīs expressed a noticeable disdain to 
translations that “do not shed new light…on the path to freedom.” Included in his list of useless 
translations were those of “Hugo and Shakespeare.” He nonetheless highlighted the necessity of 
translating works that engage relevant and ontological issues. “In reality, foreign works that address issues 
reflecting Arab concerns in this historical moment- for instance fighting colonialism in all of its forms, 
denouncing cruelty and aggression, advocating for freedom and justice, struggling to liberate society 
from the shackles that impede creative possibilities, and manifestly expressing different shades of anxiety 
that stormed the subject in his pursuit of a meaningful existence- these foreign works that deal with this 
kind of issues, which every single Arab encounters today, are the most fruitful and valuable works.”281   
Ṭarābīshī entered the field of translation in the early 1960s at the time when the number of Arab 
universities in the Middle East began to surge, reaching 23 in number by 1969.282 No doubt, Ṭarābīshī 
was an able translator. However, it was due to the environment in which he worked, that helped him 
pursue his career as a translator and later as an intellectual. At the turn of the 1960s, Ṭarābīshī graduated 
from Damascus University to find a conducive field that assisted him to cultivate his skills. The timing 
could not have been more apt. He rode the translation tide that swept across the Middle East. He took the 
pulse and was quick to respond to it. Existentialism was all the rage and he was the right man in the right 
place.283  
I resigned from teaching and from media and decided to live off a translating [career]. I remember 
translating Simon de Buovour in 1000 pages “Intellectuals” for 2000 Lebanese Lira. Obviously, the value 
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of Lira was not that of today’s. It was like $800 or $900 in today’s currency value. At that time, I could 
live in Syria on $100 a month. Thus, I decided to live off translation, no matter the income. I quitted all of 
my previous jobs and dedicated my time to translation. Of course, not all my translations were good.”284 
Translation was an indispensable part of Ṭarābīshī’s intellectual evolution. Unlike writing, 
translation served as a source of income for new graduates. Suhayl Idrīs commented on his financial 
concerns that was met by translation: “many asked me about the reason behind the paucity of my writings 
or even its absence in recent years. I respond that among other reasons, I needed to provide for my 
family…I resorted to other activities to make ends meet. Among these activities was translating jobs or 
academic work (writing the dictionary.)”285  
Some scholars estimated that Ṭarābīshī translated more than 100 European classic works.286 The 
translation of these books, far from making him rich, only provided him with a meagre sum to live a decent 
life. After 1970, the number of Arab students, the main consumers of Ṭarābīshī’s translations, rose tenfold. 
For instance, in Saudi Arabia alone, which had zero student enrollment in 1957, boasted 7000 registered 
students in 1970. In 2010, it hit one million enrolled undergraduate and graduate students.287 All these 
students around the Arab world read these European works in Arabic through al-Ādāb and al-Taliʿah 
publishing houses with which Ṭarābīshī worked.  
As a student, Ṭarābīshī recalls, he was bombarded with Existential literature throughout his 
studies. He notes, “My first dream in the realm of culture was to translate the original text that contained 
the idea of iltizam-commitment [to Arabic], so that this idea comes out of its cloudiness and puts down 
roots [in Arabic literature]. As a freshman or sophomore at Damascus University, I started translating the 
complete text of Sartre’s “What’s Literature.” This was the first book Ṭarābīshī had ever translated at the 
age of 21. He continues, “Since the idea of iltizam prevailed in Arab cultural climate, it was not hard for 
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me to find a publisher. It was Zūher Ba ʿalbaki, the owner of al-maktab al-tijāri li-Nashir, who paid me a 
symbolic amount of money so that I gave up the rights of its publication.”288  
The translation of Mā al-Adāb was not free of pitfalls however. After a brief excitement, Ṭarābīshī 
realized that some mistakes had found their way into his translation. Luckily, the first edition run out 
sooner than he had expected. Ṭarābīshī’s success surpassed his wildest dream. His translations of Sartre 
brought him great popularity and more opportunities in the nascent job market as it started rolling in. An 
offer came his way from Beirut, the cultural hub of the Arab world in midcentury. Ṭarābīshī also realized 
that in order to pursue an intellectual career, he had to follow in the footsteps of his Syrian colleagues who 
left Damascus to Beirut among them Gada al-Saman, Yassin al-Hafiz, Nizar Qabbani, Adonis, Sadiq al-
Azm, Burhan Galun and many others. Beirut of the mid twentieth century bode well to dissident and 
defying voices. It also undertook an economical boost.  
IN LEBANON  
Beirut of the 1960s offered a vibrant social life with cinema, theater, and intellectual salons being 
the beating heart of the city. Cafes were marked by publishers; streets named after writers, and entire 
boulevards were dedicated to book stores. Following its independence, Lebanon turned into an economic 
center in the Arab world as petro-dollars from the Gulf States poured in. Pioneering the drive to 
modernization, Beirut was the second city in the Middle East to electrify residences. “In 1912, light came 
to Egypt. Two years later it kindled excitement and bedazzled people by modernity in Beirut 1914.”289 
These electricity projects reduced the burden of “unpaid labor on women, by making household work less 
time consuming, thereby freeing up time for paid work outside the home.”290 For a good reason women 
in Beirut and Cairo were the first in the Arab world to establish journals and to hold intellectual salons.  
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What set Beirut apart was its expressive and educated middle class. Thanks to an open-door policy, 
it drew writers from mostly agrarian cities into a pluralistic and diverse population. Banished and outcast 
intellectuals from Iraq, Arabia, Tunisia, and Sudan all found refuge in Beirut. Its coastline transformed 
into a vast trading center, sustaining its middle class and intellectual spirit. Trade with other centers of 
commerce in the Mediterranean formed its backbone. According to Fawaz Trablisi, Beirut was, probably, 
the only Arab country that benefited from the creation of Israel in 1948. Before 1948, the rivalry with the 
port of Haifa threatening to undermine Beirut’s prosperous business as Haifa’s port was substantially 
expanding. Beiruti’s political and financial elites expressed concerns towards the rapidly developing 
Jewish port in Haifa that might steal business from Beirut. The 1948 war and the armistices that followed, 
however, put an end to that threat. Arabs of the east blocked trading with and from Haifa port while 
increasing their exports and imports dependency on Lebanon. After World War II, the Lebanese markets 
showed a spike in their economic sphere. Some of this money sustained the effervescence intellectual 
activity.291  
Many Syrian writers, poets, and journalists with diverse intellectual records flocked to Beirut in 
search of more opportunities. Even singers and actors lavished in the liberal mood Beirut afforded and 
protected. Meanwhile Palestinians exiles established a vast network of intellectual activity in Beirut. The 
writers Nabīl Sulaymān from Aleppo and Abu ʿAli Yāssīn from Damascus moved to Beirut in spring of 
1979 to avoid a “tight job market” in Syria. In Beirut, the two began “timidly seeking for jobs in one of 
the multiple cultural institutions that Beirut featured.” When the “vague answers came in” they concluded 
that “every cultural institution belonged to or was [tied to] a different Palestinian revolutionary group.” 
To find work, they had to “concede affiliation and dependence [to Palestinian factions]”292 In reality, not 
all the cultural institutions in Beirut were under Palestinian financial payroll the way these two Syrian 
intellectuals convey. New literary journals emerged as a generation of young and passionate scholars came 
of age.  
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A prominent writer who played a significant role in shaping the literary scene of Beirut in the 
1960s-1980s, and the intellectual trajectory of young Ṭarābīshī was Suhayl Idrīs. In Beirut, Idrīs filled the 
role that Yāssīn al-Ḥāfiẓ had had towards Ṭarābīshī back in Damascus. Born in 1925, Idrīs attended a 
religious school but carried on his education in the Sorbonne, between 1948-1952.293 During his four years 
in Paris Idrīs reached out to many Arab writers to prepare the ground for the creation of his journal Al-
Ādāb, which he later turned to an exuberant publishing house in 1956. As he made it clear from his 
exchanging letters with the Egyptian novelist, Anoūr al-Maʿdawi, upon his return to Beirut, Idrīs quickly 
established Al-Ādāb magazine in 1953. He received aid from veteran publishers in Beirut, namely Bahīj 
ʿUthman and Munir Baʿalbaki who owned Dar Al-ʿIlm Lilmalayyin (est. in 1945.) Both of these publishers 
would also publish articles in his new journal to endow it with some prestige. ʿUthman, in particular, was 
an expert on Arab books so his writings in Al-Ādāb concentrated on survays of translations and new books 
in Arabic. 
Idrīs excelled in fostering a broad network of scholars. His connections and acquaintances spanned 
a great spectrum of scholars.294 Not only did he exchange letters with writers in Cairo,295 the epicenter of 
Arab letters, he also accepted entries from semi-peripheral places like Morocco. In particular, promising 
writers, poets, and journalists had exchanged with Idrīs and published in Al-Ādāb. Between 1956 to 1992, 
the years in which he was the chief editor of Al-Ādāb, he extended the reach of his journal to Bagdad, 
Arabia and further east. Bagdad at 1960s was a significant “center for the book market” for many Lebanese 
publishing houses. “Close to 1000-1500 copies of every book published by Dar al-Taliʿah would be sent 
to Iraq”296 writes Ṭarābīshī. Numerous Baghdadi poets published in Idrīs’ journal: Al-Bayati (b. 1926) 
Nazik al-Malaʾika (b. 1923) and, in particular, Badr Shakir al-Sayyab (b.1926). Al-Sayyab wrote to Idrīs 
that “Iraqi radical writers and readers were more interested in new progressive values in economics, 
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politics, and culture than in the values of the past”297 capturing the spirit of the 1960s. In 1955, Idrīs 
founded the “Independent Pen Association” with Raʾif Khouri and Husayn Muruwwah. The following 
year Suhayl Idrīs married ʿAida Matarji and, in the same year, founded the Dar Al-Adab publishing house 
in collaboration with the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani. The latter, however, opted out in the early 1960s as 
he preferred to follow a diplomatic career with the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1967, Qabbani 
would resume his literary career, which placed him at such heights to be coveted by many.  
Ṭarābīshī would have most of his Existential translations of Albert Camus, Sartre and de Bouvour 
published in this publishing house. Initially, his relations with Suhayl Idrīs was merely economic until 
Ṭarābīshī embraced existentialism more thoroughly, a shared interest that brought them closer to each 
other. Idrīs’ writings were influenced by existentialism but fused the two intellectual currents of 
nationalism and modernity, two topics that informed Ṭarābīshī.298 In 1968, Idrīs founded the Lebanese 
Writers’ Union with a number of nationalist scholars like Constantine Zurayk, Joseph Mughayzel, and the 
Syrian poet Adonis. He served as its secretary-general for three consecutive terms, and again in 1989 and 
in 1991. It was through Suhayl Idrīs and his broad network that young Ṭarābīshī entered the field of Arab 
letters in Beirut. As a translator and lexicographer, Idrīs was keen to render into Arabic much needed 
French literature on existentialism. During his sojourn in Paris, from 1948 to 1952, he witnessed firsthand 
the strength and profundity of the French intellectual idiom and discourse on existentialism. He realized 
that in order to bring this philosophy to mass Arab readers he needed to apprentice excellent and promising 
young people with a flair for intellectual engagement.  
Ṭarābīshī settled in Al-Jadidah neighborhood (in East Beirut), not far away from Dār al-Taliʿah. 
Idrīs reached out to Ṭarābīshī and asked him to translate some works by Jean Paul Satre. Ṭarābīshī 
acknowledges his close relations with Idrīs. “My connections to Dār al-Ādāb, its journal, and its owner 
began to grow stronger. I had achieved to its account the translation of Simon de Bouvour’s novel 
“intellectuals”, which was, as far as I’m concerned, one of the linchpins in iltizam literature.”299 In Fact, 
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Suhayl Idrīs wrote his French-Arabic dictionary, al-Manhal, to facilitate the introduction of Existentialism 
to Arabic logo-sphere. It was of immense help to Ṭarābīshī who used it as a reference for years in his 
translations from French to Arabic.  
The prime days of Beirut would not last long however. In 1975, the whole structure in which an 
intellectual vibrancy flourished began to crumble under the weight of a savage civil war that wrecked the 
foundations of its educated class. This war spooked writers from wondering around, meet each other, and 
exchange ideas in cafes and book stores. In the thick of the Lebanese civil war, as one of Ṭarābīshī’s 
acquaintances stated, “Ṭarābīshī rarely took the risk to drive to his workplace in Dār al-Taliʿah.”300 This 
war signaled the end of Ṭarābīshī’s hope for an Arab world where people from different ethnicities and 
religious backgrounds would live in harmony or together side by side. Ṭarābīshī would not leave Beirut 
until 1984, eight years into the war.  In late 1983, however, the situation in Beirut becomes unbearable for 
Ṭarābīshī. On October 23, 1983, the French and the U.S. headquarters of the Multi-National force was 
bombed. With 241 American troops and 40 French dead, the civil war took yet another dangerous turn. In 
February of the following year, the so-called Lebanese Army melted away due to numerous defections 
from among the ranks of the Muslim and Druze military personnel. One month later, in March 1984 - U.S. 
Marines withdrew from Lebanon, leaving a scorched land with little hope of salvation. The war atrocities 
left no sense of security for Ṭarābīshī, a no security heaven, who fled to Paris to save his life. Beside al-
Manhal of Idrīs, he took with him another book, The Formation of Arab Thought by the Moroccan writer 
Mohammad ʿAbid Al-Jabiri. This was the last book Ṭarābīshī reviewed for publication before leaving his 
lifetime job at Dār al-Taliʿah. He recommended it strongly to Bashir al-Daʿuk, the owner and founder of 
this publication, before his departure to Paris.301  
Conclusion 
Post-colonial Syria, where Ṭarābīshī grew up, pitted the emergent politics of the young generation 
against those of the ancien regime. Three channels facilitated the rise of young men like Ṭarābīshī, who 
favored Arab unity as an option in the way to prevail politically: the army, ideologically driven parties, 
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and education. Ṭarābīshī’s life offers a perfect example of how men and women climbed the social ladder 
through education. Most of the existing literature on Syria offers numerous exemplary stories in which 
individuals break with traditions and rose to leading positions through either an ideologically driven 
party302 or the newly established military institution.303 Very few works, however, account for the third 
channel, namely the revolution in Syria’s educational landscape, which like the army and political parties, 
helped mold new identities and sensibilities that were incongruent with old traditions. Ṭarābīshī’s life and 
intellectual journey from Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut saw a young and an ordinary middle class guy 
whose ideas reached every corner of the Middle East. 
Ṭarābīshī’s experience throughout these year converges with the broader experience of a broader 
generation of the Arab Left. Ever since his religious classes, Ṭarābīshī fostered a deep dissatisfaction with 
religion and traditions. This education left a lifelong taste and commitments that informed his visions in 
the future. His education in religious school, the tragic encounter with his theology teacher, the constant 
displacements, and his translations of new Western ideologies shaped his long-running aesthetics and 
outlooks. Though in the subsequent years Ṭarābīshī would harshly judge this “ideological episode,” of his 
life and turn to the study new subjects, Ṭarābīshī’s main premises and principles took shape in this time 
of his development. His revolutionary sentiment, the antipathy toward traditional authorities, and the 
discontent with compromised regimes, topics that informed the climate of ideas during the first three 
decades after independence run deep into Ṭarābīshī’s thought and writings.  
His vision and politics all pointed to a scholar with unmistakable admiration to Western thought. 
Educated by many scholars, many of whom are exposed and aware of European intellectual traditions, 
Ṭarābīshī was weaned on a view that thought ill of traditional Arab society and conceived Western 
modernity as the only path for renewal and progress. His radicalism was reflected in his writings on Arab 
women, ideology, and social classes. He employed Marxist idiom, with its rigid categories and 
classification, to discredit the old guard, traditional parties, and conservatives. Though his progressive 
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position walked him out of the religious domain, Ṭarābīshī rarely thought of religion or the past as viable 
sources of knowledge. In the contrary, like many of his generation of post-colonial writers, Ṭarābīshī 
thought that progress means following European model.  
In the next three decades of his life however, Ṭarābīshī would engage in the Ṭurāth, giving a critical 
example to one of the most significant turnabout that happened to progressive and revolutionary Arab 
intellectuals. Ṭarābīshī’s turn to study a topic that he thought to be beneath him, upends longstanding 
conventions in the field of Arab thought and stir much confusion among observers. The next chapter 
discusses the emerge of the Ṭurāth as a central site of intellectual discourse, a new field of study that is 
not limited to the recreation of the past, but also, and in crucial ways, the articulation of a new vision of 
the meaning of post-colonial condition. 
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CHAPTER IV: FROM THAWRAH TO TURĀTH: THE REVIVAL OF THE 
19TH CENTURY LIBERAL THOUGHT 
Of all his writings, in no place do Jūrj Ṭarābīshī’s character and vulnerabilities become so visible 
as in his writing on the Turāth. Ṭarābīshī’s frank confessions reinforce the impression that when he writes 
on the Turāth, he also writes on himself and the experience of his revolutionary generation. Saturating his 
later writings on the Turāth with reflections and retrospections on past moments in Arab thought bestow 
on these writings an undiminished historical sense. “I’m not a historian, I’m only a cultural critic,” he 
emphatically responded when asked how he defines himself.304 Yet, the sporadic comments and thoughts 
on his career trajectory provide historians of Arab thought with a unique perspective on the way Arab 
Leftists view and re-appreciate their own failures and setbacks.  
In the late 1990s, as he dove into the sea of the Turāth, Ṭarābīshī conceded that most of his previous 
“wagers were all but misguiding.” His previous bets on nationalist, existentialist, and Marxism were 
ineffective, he professed.305 These ideologies, it dawned on him belatedly, have steered him and many 
likeminded members of the Arab Left away from dealing with people’s biases, assumptions, religious 
prejudices and sectarianism. Disenchanted with his former ideologies, Ṭarābīshī argues that true 
intellectuals fail to fulfill their duty when they avoid the inevitable clash with “the masses,” namely, 
people’s believes, its culture and sensitivities. For Ṭarābīshī, there is no use in third world intellectuals 
who fall short of dislocating entrenched cultural attitudes, suspecting public morality and unsettling 
conventional social norms. Rather than caving in to an obsolete value system and age-long traditions, 
Ṭarābīshī now called into question the added value Arab intellectuals place on their heritage, asking what 
emotional and cultural possibilities are facilitated by the new focus on the Turāth.  
Ṭarābīshī had always been baffled by the magnificent treasures of the Turāth, the creative poetry, 
genuine philosophy, daring music, abstract art, Islamic astronomy, “Arab humanism,” and even the 
diverse modes of sexuality. Yet Arab intellectuals’ enrapture with this compendium of texts and models 
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of beings has equally unsettled him. The growing mania for the Turāth, which he called “collective 
neurosis,” meant for Ṭarābīshī that the relatively progressive Arab intelligentsia had begun looking past 
Europe and modernity, while turning to the Arab-Islamic past for original and authentic solutions to 
modern-day challenges that face Arab societies. As far as he is concerned, this intellectualism around the 
Turāth has far-reaching consequences with regard the path Arab nations would take, next generations’ 
training and school curricula. As a scholar who spent the best part of his intellectual career translating 
Western ideas and theories into Arabic, Ṭarābīshī felt betrayed and left behind in the wake of new 
intellectual trends in the Arab world. Nothing in his translations of the most progressive ideas in Europe 
anticipated the new trends in Arab thought. Nothing in his writings of the 1960s seemed now to resonate 
in the new age of Arab authenticity. As his hopes of turning the Middle East around by exposing its people 
to new ideas proved ineffective and vacuous, everything was stripped away from Ṭarābīshī except the 
weapon of critique (Silāḥ al-Naqd). Calling for self-reflection and insisting on the advantageous value of 
critique, he writes that “critique is the supreme mode of thought.”306  
In the years after fleeing Beirut in 1984, Ṭarābīshī focused his intellectual analysis on one major 
problematic (problématique Ishkāliyya) from which other secondary themes emerged. This problematic 
revolved around the history of knowledge in Arab and Islamic societies. Conceding that different people 
organize their knowledge differently, Ṭarābīshī was interested in exploring the ways knowledge is 
articulated in different times within the historical experience of the Arab people.307 Initially he was 
intrigued by the question of when do people revise their values and morals that for long held them together. 
For this question, he offered the classical answer: people’s perceptions and their collective consciousness 
are subjected to change by “external shocks” (like the shock Napoleon inflicted on the Arab world when 
he invaded Egypt in three days in 1798.) People also test their assumptions when hit by unexpected trauma 
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(like the defeat in 1967 when Israel blew away three Arab armies in six days.)308 Ṭarābīshī also was 
inclined to inquire how modern Arab people shifted from one mode of knowledge production to another. 
One example that Ṭarābīshī reiterated often in his interviews as well as in his recent writing addresses the 
question of how to explain the dramatic change in the main frame of reference in the contemporary Arab 
world. How did European cultural references lose their resonance in favor of Turāthic cultural references? 
During the years 1940-1970, Ṭarābīshī argued, Arab thought developed along the progressive versus 
backwardness (al-takkadumiyyah v. al-Ragʿīyyah.) This formula was the “unifying theme” around which 
Arab political discourse took its shape. After the 1970s, however, Arab political discourse featured a 
different formula that foregrounded  believer versus unbeliever (muʾmin v. kāfir). Contending that the turn 
to theological vocabulary is a natural outgrowth of the massive turn to the Turāth, Ṭarābīshī’s thoughts 
focused on the different ways to counter this intellectual wave. Remarkably, one of the main strategies he 
came up with was to readopt the nahḍa, the nineteenth century Arab awakening, which he previously 
rejected. Insisting that authorizing the nahḍa over the Turāth, he endowed the Arab notion of the nahḍa 
with the prescriptive capacity to counter the backslide towards the Turāth. In one of his interviews he 
maintained that “Our hope [today] hinges upon the renewal of the nahḍa.” For Ṭarābīshī, the nahḍa 
provides the right antidote to the current erosion of Arab rationalism. “The renewal of the nahḍa means 
to yield before reason again [by] making reason the supreme authority over religion.”309 
 What was so unique in the nahḍa that Ṭarābīshī valorized it? What are the ways in which the 
nahḍa affords to counteract the argument to the return to the Turāth? Ṭarābīshī was not alone in calling 
for a new engagement with the nahḍa in the late 1990s. In fact, scores of Arab secular critics resorted to 
the nahḍa to address the cultural challenges of the post-colonial condition. Sadiq Jalāl al-Azm reiterated 
many times that his critique of theology takes its cue and inspiration from the pioneers of the nahḍa.310 In 
Tunisia, many secular critics had recently dug into nahḍa literature to retrieve forgotten nahḍawi 
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figures.311 The turn to the nahḍa during the last decade of the twentieth century raises the following 
question: why did secular intellectuals resort to embracing the nahḍa after having been dismissive of it in 
earlier years? How should one explain this shift in their attitudes? Why were these secular critics calling 
to go beyond the nahḍa during the 1960s while in the late 1990s they saw it as starting point or a new 
beginning? Why did the nahḍa change from being almost a relic of a “forgotten era” to a new and 
compelling frame of reference?  
The renewed attention to the nahḍa had been extensive, far beyond the narrow academic circles 
and pedantic scholars’ debates. The conversation on the nahḍa echoed in public spaces. Only a few months 
before his tragic assassination in 2005, Lebanese journalist Samir Kassir had dedicated a book in which 
he commended the nahḍa and called for espousing its (optimist) spirit. Decrying the neglect of the nahḍa 
among younger Arab generations, Kassir proposed a return to the nahḍa as a way to counter the mounting 
challenges of the post-colonial state (what he calls “Arab malaise”.) The nahḍa not only provides a healthy 
corrective path to the ubiquitous pessimism that pervades Arab intellectual circles, it reflects, for Kassir, 
the first attempt in Arab thought to desacralize the past and de-pathologize its beginning. Now disregarded 
and unremembered, Kassir bemoaned, very few continue to appreciate this era: “the nahḍa is forgotten, 
except perhaps by an elite that is still attached to the spirit of the Enlightenment. Yet it would be impossible 
to exaggerate the benefits of restoring this era to its proper place in Arab history. It may perhaps not reveal 
tailor-made formulas for putting an end to the malaise, but at least it would allow one to reinterpret this 
malaise as a moment in history.”312 Kassir never lived to see how his book was received. His eulogists, 
however, took note of his insistence on the value of the nahḍa.  
Looking into the life career of Ṭarābīshī, whose early reservations and misgivings gave way to an 
unstinting approval of the nahḍa, this chapter reconstructs the historical and cultural conditions that led a 
generation of Arab Left intellectuals to re-adopt the nahḍa at the end of their careers. Starting off with the 
radical displacements the defeat in 1967 incurred, the historical analysis presented here demonstrates how 
the first writings after the defeat held the transient promise to surpass the framework of the nahḍa, only 
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to be muted by the Arab regimes’ unduly anxiety over the growing power of the Left. The first angry 
responses by Arab secular critics to the defeat unleashed adverse effects that instead of empowering the 
Arab Left had debilitated them, leading to the Silent Decade of the 1970s, when the intellectual climate 
was cleared for the rise of the Turāth framework. Yet, as the Turāth came to dominate Arab thought during 
the last two decades of the century, the fate of the Arab Left was not sealed. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
they would rebrand themselves around an anti-Turāth agenda. No other Arab intellectual captures these 
vicissitudes in Arab thought like Jūrj Ṭarābīshī, whose writings and career personified the transitions and 
shifts in the modes of post-colonial Arab thought. 
A Divided Decade 
In late 1983, Ṭarābīshī tendered his resignation letter to Bashir al-Daouk, notifying him of his 
plans to quit the editorial board of Dār al-Ṭaliʿah with which he worked for the last twelve years. 
Ṭarābīshī’s resignation implied that both the Arab Left and its institutions had fallen on hard times as the 
civil war in Beirut devastated the old and pluralist Beirut. In deep despair over the relentless sectarian war, 
Ṭarābīshī began groping for an escape from the smoking city of Beirut after having seen his own library 
set on fire.313 Ironically, the publisher Daouk received Ṭarābīshī’s resignation letter from Paris as he 
preceded Ṭarābīshī in fleeing Beirut, signaling the lowest point the previously glorious Arab Left had 
reached. With their exile to Paris, Dār al-Ṭaliʿah, a major mouthpiece that gave Arab Left a voice in the 
tumultuous ideological debates of the 1960s and galvanized them into a coherent group, saw its end 
approach. 
The Arab Left had been in a steep decline since the beginning of 1970s as many of the formerly 
keen Arab Marxists began renouncing Marxism. Ṭarābīshī attributed the inherent weaknesses of the Arab 
Left to their excessive focus on politics at the expense of culture. While many Arab intellectuals craved 
political change, he said, they only begrudgingly accepted the concomitant cultural changes. In the current 
Arab literature, there is a growing consensus that Arab Leftist ideologies began losing their previous luster 
for two reasons: first, they failed to unchain Arab people from their primordial loyalties. Second, they 
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propounded progressive ideas in a crude manner that drove many away from these ideas, making it harder 
for them to readily embrace Western ideas. Namely, the Arab Left was unduly radical in the late 1960s 
and tried to foist ideas upon their traditional community that spooked people away, rather than allaying 
their daily anxieties. Moreover, the Arab Left of the 1960’s antagonized wary Arab regimes that suffered 
from an extreme shortage of self-confidence as military coups were part of the political norm. These Arab 
regimes, taking extra measures to eliminate enemies, were in no position to tolerate the critical Arab Left. 
The trajectory of the secular idea, for example, encapsulates the tragedy of Arab Left’s callous record in 
this regard. In a letter an old Arab Leftist, Ṭarābīshī suggested an explanation for why the Arab Left was 
weakened and suspended during the decade of the 1970s. He pointed out to his friend the backlash that 
Azm’s work on Critique of Theology generated.314 
To better appreciate why Ṭarābīshī ended up taking the nahḍa path, one should historically 
reconstruct the moment of decline within the Arab Left. For Ṭarābīshī’s recourse to advocate the nahḍa 
hinges on the decline of the Arab Left. During the 1970s, a backlash against the radical Left hit the core 
of their ideas and ideologies hard. Their works, inscribed within the political rage and under the long 
shadow of the defeat, were culturally insensitive to public emotions. The works that the radical Leftist 
Ṣādik Jalāl al-ʿAẓm released unleashed a series of outrageous reactions. In Critique of Theological 
Thought (1969), ʿAẓm elevated religion to a “category of thought” that feeds metaphysical thinking in 
contemporary Arab thought. Though dozens of Marxists and militant authors had alluded to the adverse 
role religion plays in society, it was not before Critique of Theological Thought that religion was explicitly 
subjected to an honest and explicit critique and charged with obstructing progress in Arab societies.315 
Unveiling the pernicious effects religion (Islam and Christianity) inflicts on Arab society, ʿAẓm insisted 
that in light of the absence of a rigorously binding materialistic and scientific method in Arab societies, 
“religious knowledge” destined to fill the void. ʿAẓm was the first to publicly condemn “religion” as “the 
imaginative substitute to science.”316  
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ʿAẓm’s radical ideas were among the first bold responses to the cultural outrage stirred by the 
defeat in 1967.317 This endeavor to undermine the structure of feeling and “religious orthodoxy,” as secular 
critics in the Arab world like to say, was applauded by many for setting in motion a new style of writing 
uncommon to previous generations.318 Many historians described ʿ Aẓm’s radical ideas as launching a new 
era in Arab thought.319 Yet others began talking of the emergence of Arb cultural critics.320 True, these 
works gave some identity and coherence to an otherwise amorphous Arab Left. Adamant to associate 
himself with the “progressive parties” of the Left, Ṭarābīshī uncritically subscribed to this anti-religious 
notion, which he later regretted. 
While many western observers commended ʿAẓm’s audacity and boldness for the initial inroads 
in the quite conformist Arab intellectual thought, they rarely, if ever, attended to the politics his books 
generated. The minor changes ʿAẓm’s works made (in questioning faith in particular) were soon reversed 
in the ensuing years, as Ṭarābīshī confided to his readers in the letter. “The public hysteria these books 
provoked” led many Arab regimes to enact and endorse “a new set of strict policies on the publication of 
books on Arab Leftist thought,”321 which markedly enfeebled the quality of their translations and dulled 
their critical drive. This moratorium on free thinking suspended the secular thrust that ʿAẓm had launched 
for another decade. In retrospect, ʿAẓm’s attempt to make Islam a problem, namely to reconfigure the 
cultural view of Islam as a liability rather than an asset, proved premature and unrealistic, concludes 
Ṭarābīshī.   
With the palpable retreat of the ideologies of the Arab Left, the intellectual climate was cleared 
for the partisan of the Turāth to pitch in. Meanwhile, many readers could not hide their frustration with 
Arab Leftist writings that not only grew more ideological, but also engaged in dry topics that seemed far 
removed from the challenges of daily life and economic hardship. Many among the ranks of the Arab Left 
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began writing to their Western Leftists colleagues, finding more common ground in Third World literature 
than addressing Arab affairs. Ignoring daily and Arab cultural problems whited the appeal of authenticity. 
At once works that incorporated familiar cultural references like the Turāth literature was almost 
irresistible among ordinary Arab readers, especially under the climate of the defeat that arose following 
the devastating 1967 war. A new set of cultural and literary tastes began emerging in this decade. Though 
the deviation from the literary norms was slow, the accumulated effects of these changes gave way to a 
dramatic shift by the beginning of the 1980s. The Arab Left had not only seen its ranks shrink, but also 
the numbers of its publication slashed from 2000 copies per publication to only 1000. In the late 1970s, 
notice Bū ʿAlī Yāssin, an avid Arab Leftist, most of the publishing houses of the Arab Left began losing 
their readership.322 More and more readers felt alienated by the writing on the Vietnamese guerilla war, 
Soviet labor Unions, social classes and Marxist theories. The writing on more authentic issue like the 
Turāth grew more appealing the more the works of the Arab Left estranged their readership. The Turāth 
was also increasingly seen as a secure heaven during times of accelerated change, with the unprecedented 
movement of populations from the country to towns intensified.    
Minor changes in literary tastes triggered by restrictive laws on free thinking took their toll on the 
Arab Left. Though Arab regimes has successfully muted the roaring Arab Left, dispersing their major 
thinkers around the world, these intellectuals were able to regroup themselves in diaspora during the last 
decade of the century. The first step they took to unmute the moratorium Arab regimes forced on them 
was to ask uneasy questions about the Turāth.   
Embracing the Turāth 
Very few events in contemporary Arab thought, so vital to the understanding of the continuities 
and shifts within the Arab intellectual community, has been as baffling as the re-appearance of the Turāth 
among the Arab Left. In fact, among those who try to unpack the topic, the return of the Turāth meant to 
reaffirm yet again the ubiquitous rise of Islam. The reduction of the Turāth to Islam has been devastating. 
This conceptualization has precluded further explorations of the different modes in Arab thought and 
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foreclosed alternative ways to narrativize the current debates now taking place in the Arab world. It is 
remarkable that the effort to evoke the distant past in the West was seen as an expression of a cultural 
movement known as Romanticism, while the same act has been called Islam, confusing religion with the 
past, history, and culture. Naming practices had always plagued the field of Middle Eastern studies.   
In the late 1980s, when Ṭarābīshī made his “turn” and delved into writing on the Turāth, leaving 
behind a corpus of writing on Sartre, Hegel, Freud and Marx, many have wondered at his seemingly 
incongruent move. How could Ṭarābīshī, whose writings were essential to the dissemination of Western 
thinking in the Arab world, give up on his original intention and turn to work on the Turāth? Did he cave 
in to the cultural trends around him? One Arab commentator incredulously remarks, “No one could believe 
that the Syrian writer and literary critic, who demonstrated early on [in his career] a mature sense of 
criticism and ingenuity in his theses and developed a new analysis with distinctive tastes, would turn his 
back- without a return- on all of this literature and delve headlong into the taxonomies and references of 
the Arab and Islamic Turāth.”323   
What seems to have puzzled many as out of step is Ṭarābīshī’s “metamorphosis” from a 
revolutionary writer to a commentator on the Turāth, not to boast about it but to dislocate its meaning. As 
shown in the previous chapter, Ṭarābīshī was a genuine nationalist, existentialist, Marxist and worked 
with the al-Adāb publishing house to bring Existential literature to Arabic. He then translated classical 
western philosophical works from Hegel to Marcuse through Simone De Beauvior and Camus while 
working with Dār al-Ṭaliʿah. It struck many as an inconsistent move to engage with the Turāth, particularly 
after the astonishing headway he had made with western theories. In an interview with al-Hayyat 
newspaper in 2006, Ṭarābīshī conceded to his readers this: 
“I belong to a revolutionary generation, who followed two generations of the nahḍa, where we 
lived in a complete break with the Turāth. Our mental structure [thihniya] and thought were all geared 
toward modern Western ideologies, which [we] turned into sacred books whether [these works were] 
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Marxist, nationalist, Socialist, or Unionist. We lived an absolute break (kaṭīʿa kamila) with the Turāth and 
viewed it [with disdain] as no more than yellow [cheap and unworthy] books.”324 
 
Ṭarābīshī’s mention of the idea of a “complete break” twice in this testimony suggests that the 
change in cultural tastes and intellectual debates are dramatic. The previous consensus about the Turāth 
as a static, moribund tradition, from which all intellectuals had to struggle to free themselves began to 
crumble at the beginning of 1970s. This obsolete attitude began to give way to a new and revised position 
as the idea of Thawra began to fade away and the idea of Turāth loomed larger. Ṭarābīshī continued that 
“all the defeats and the disillusionments” with the revolutionary regimes have obligated him to revise his 
“attitude towards the cultural Turāth.”325 In 1998, in yet another interview, Ṭarābīshī recognized the 
indispensability of confronting the Turāth. The need to encounter the Turāth, Ṭarābīshī maintained, arises 
from a widespread realization among writers and scholars that “no revolution, nor any change would 
enable us to enter the modern age (dukhūl al-ʿaṣr) without inexorably relating it to the critique of the 
Turāth.”326 Meaning, as long as Arab intellectuals are not done with the Turāth, it is unlikely that any 
serious change would see the light. 
Ṭarābīshī’s turn toward investigating the Turāth marked not only a watershed in his personal life, 
but also a significant conjuncture in the annals of contemporary Arab thought. The Iʿādat Iktishāf al-
Turāth or “the rediscovery of the Turāth,” naturally offers a name to a new era in Arab thought. Coming 
to discover the Turāth in Paris, Ṭarābīshī wrote in 2006 that “I found the Turāth an alternative to the watan 
[homeland] I left behind.” Yet, it is remarkable that Ṭarābīshī conceived the Turāth as an unmistakable 
threat, which might unravel all the intellectual effort put forth by generations of Arab intellectuals since 
the nahḍa. His embrace of the Turāth was only the first step in his intent to dismantle, disrupt and 
disqualify it as a model for living in the modern Arab world. 
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A new approach to the Turāth 
Historicizing the Turāth by revealing the social, cultural and political conditions that played into 
its framing and formulation became a common pursuit among post-1970 Arab Left writers. Widespread 
among this generation, this historicization nonetheless set their reading of the Turāth apart from past 
generations. Exposing the human conditions and cultural milieu in which the Turāth took shape was one 
of the culturally riskiest paths Arab intellectuals were willing to take. Historicizing meant stripping the 
Turāth of the sacred aura it enjoyed. When Sudanese writer Muhammad Mahmud Tāhā took the first step 
toward historicizing the Turāth, he paid with his life. Tāhā is probably the first and only victim worldwide 
to pay with his life for the sake of historicism. For many Arab scholars like Tāhā however, historicizing 
the Turāth meant the exclusion of God from the making of history or the Turāth as it is conceived by 
contemporary Arabs. Though at the mid-century it was only Arab Marxists who called to demystify Arab 
history from God’s intervention, by the late 1990s this method grew common and soon became the new 
norm. In the process Tāhā is rarely remembered. 
When late comers like Ṭarābīshī entered the field of Turāth, scholars like Hassan Hanafī, Arkoun, 
Jābirī, Laroui, Naṣr Abu Zayd, and Tāhā Abed al-Raḥman had made extraordinary explorations of the 
field by ways of historicizing the Turāth, defining its meaning and scope. These scholars were not only 
proposing a new reading of the Arab Turāth, but also forging a new relation with the Arab past that they 
called Turāth. If the Arab past was recreated during the late nineteenth-century with Orientalism, as 
Massad and others aptly demonstrated, this past was remade yet again during the post-colonial era. The 
genuine writings on the Turāth created new categories, narratives, and visualizations of the past that 
engendered a new conceptualization of the Arab past unknown to past generations of Arabs. Although 
these six names were the forerunners in manufacturing a new conceptualization of Arab Turāth 
unthinkable before the 1970s, they were not alone in this effort. This period saw the arrival of scholars 
whose writings problematized the common Qurʾānic interpretations, calling into question the way God’s 
word translated into human language, the reception of the message, and the manner in which the first 
community of believers had swayed God’s word from its original meaning to fit their cultural conditions. 
Infatuated with this group, Western historiography has in recent years made serious efforts to bring these 
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voices to English and other western languages. Within this western historiography, however, there is a 
clear confusion around the question of naming this group; some have called them moderate Islam327, others 
Liberal Islam328, yet others modern Islamic thought.329 Some have gone as far as calling them secular 
Islam.330 Despite the differences in names, many agreed that this group insisted on a different 
interpretation of the Islamic corpus and the time period in which the Islamic corpus took its final form, 
calling into question the narrative that endowed the Turāth with an aura of sacredness. Given this crowded 
field of innovative works, what was left for Ṭarābīshī and his secular critics to contribute? 
The quest to historicize the formative period of Islam (between the 610- 1200 CE) offered a 
fleeting promise to cut the Turāth to its natural size. The idea that historicizing could remove all the myths 
attached to the Turāth over the course of fourteen hundred years resonated with many Arab intellectuals. 
Many believed that the Turāth will set to recede and shrink in front of that rigorous method of history. 
This intellectual method was taken up by moderate Islamists, who also fought to wrest the true meaning 
of Islam from the hands of extremists. This is the ultimate goal moderate Islamists like Syrian Mohammad 
Shaḥrur, Tunisian Muhammad Talabi, Moroccan feminist Fatma Marnissi, Egyptian Fahmi Hewaidy, and 
even Pakistani Fazlurahman and Iranian Soroush set to achieve. What is common to this group, the new 
speakers of Islam,331 is the desire to free Arab and Islamic history from the grip of religious predestination.  
But the promise to understand the Turāth in its contextual setting paradoxically did not lead to the 
weakening of its epistemological authority. Instead, many intellectuals ended up asserting its relevance 
and suitability to current-modern- times. In fact, it became an alternative to European modernity as 
Ṭarābīshī callously demonstrates. Some have argued that certain aspects of the Turāth are rational and 
therefore still valid and could be aptly utilized and appropriated in modern times. This assertion to renew 
the Turāth resonated in the famous writings of Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi who maintained that 
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by leaning more heavily on the Islamic past and the Turāth, new opportunities can open up to confront the 
challenges that bog down Arab societies.332  
The conclusion that moderate Islamists reached increasingly unsettled Ṭarābīshī and many secular 
critics of his circle of the Arab Rationalist Association. The application of historical methods to the Turāth 
guaranteed no way out of past frameworks, but increased the appetite for re-appropriating the Turāth yet 
again. If western observers and writers have applauded and heralded these works as the new form of 
liberal, moderate and modern Islam, Ṭarābīshī and many secular critics were apprehended by this type of 
writings. While starting from progressive positions, Ṭarābīshī argued, these writers ended up taking the 
same positions conservative Islamists took. Rather than curtailing the arguments extreme Islamic 
movement, Ṭarābīshī charged, these “moderate Islamists” reinforced the Turāth framework, bringing to 
the debate a disguised “return” to past epistemologies. For Ṭarābīshī, it seemed impossible that one could 
rely completely on past frameworks and still be modern. Alas, since historicizing the Turāth did not lead 
to its logical end but viewed the Turāth as a past with a compelling authority, it was not sufficient to rise 
to the challenge. If historicizing in the West led inevitably to an epistemological break with the past, in 
the Arabic-speaking world it revived the appeal of relying on the past. The paradox, for Ṭarābīshī and his 
colleagues, was not only that historicizing the past functioned in different ways in the West and the Arab 
world. The absurdity is that the same Arab Marxists who fought to introduce historicity during the late 
1950-60s are now fighting against it, in a collective effort to repeal it. The entire project of historicizing 
was now the subject of criticism for Ṭarābīshī and his colleagues.  
Divided Intellectual Community 
Ṭarābīshī’s first response to the intense debate on the Turāth came as late as 1993, in the form of 
a short book with the inflammatory title The Massacre of the Turāth.333 In this book Ṭarābīshī created a 
new taxonomy of four categories in contemporary Arab thoughts on the Turāth, signaling an evident 
departure in his thoughts and concerns. The old Ṭarābīshī is hardly recognizable in this text. Unlike his 
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previous writings, this work is relatively free of western theories or Marxian jargon. The main concern is 
not to endorse European ideas, but to stave off the drift toward the Turāth. Ever since Ṭarābīshī published 
this work, he did not translate a single western work into Arabic, suggesting that his priorities and main 
concerns had fundamentally changed.  
In Paris, Ṭarābīshī worked under the guidance of French-Algerian writer Mohammad Arkoun, who 
accepted him as a doctoral student. Though Ṭarābīshī never submitted his finished dissertation, which was 
published into a book in Arabic, Arkoun’s ideas swayed him away from his previous ideological thinking, 
which perceived the Turāth as a dangerous place that he had to avoid. Instead, Arkoun encouraged him to 
rethink his rigid attitude toward Arab Turāth, cajoling him to view the Turāth as more than Islam or fiqh, 
the way Islamists in the Middle East viewed it. Arkoun started his career as a historian and was immensely 
influenced by the Annals School as a student in the late 1960s. The new emphases on social daily practices 
that downplayed the previous centrality of official narrative and political history appealed to Arkoun. 
Eager to apply the Annals’ approach to non-European spaces, Arkoun was the first native Middle Eastern 
scholar who sought to write a new history of Arab and Islamic history using the Annals School’s apolitical 
history. In his quest to undermine what he called the “official closed corpus” in the Arab and Islamic 
historical experience, Arkoun focused on “fringe movements” in Islam to open new horizons for modern-
day Muslims to follow.334 Arkoun’s reading of medievalist Islamic philosophers and his reconstruction of 
a forgotten “humanistic tradition in Islam,” prodded many of his Arab students to follow his path by 
offering an against-the-grain reading of the Turāth. The new exploration of the Turāth, informed by 
Arkoun’s concepts, trickled down to Ṭarābīshī. Thus he began investigating the formative period of Islam 
by laying bare the ways in which social classes, political feuds, and economic and tribal rivalries played 
into the forging of the first interpretations of the holy book. Moving away from the mechanical reading of 
Islamic history, Arkoun taught his students to emphasize contingency in history to examine the manners 
in which the set of Islamic beliefs came together.335 
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Taking his cue from Arkoun, Ṭarābīshī could no longer afford flouting the heated intellectual 
debates around the Turāth. By emphasizing the evils of the Turāth, Ṭarābīshī directed the best part of his 
first work to critiquing contemporary intellectuals who produced a skewed interpretation of the Turāth. 
Ṭarābīshī conceived the cultural turn toward the Turāth with apprehension, using the metaphor Irtidād- 
backsliding, stepping backward toward past times- to describe the new intellectual trend. Though he never 
fell short of providing historical evidence of the adverse effect of the Turāth on the lives of modern Arab 
citizens, in The Massacre of the Turāth he convincingly shows the ways in which Arab intellectuals failed 
to stand up to their initial- more advanced- positions.  
“Even if the subject of judhūr (roots, ancestors, or heritage) is a common theme among many 
nations, it has a particular bearing to contemporary Arab world,” Ṭarābīshī writes in the opening of his 
book. Since the defeat in 1967, Arab intellectuals have taken refuge in the Turāth and along the way have 
turned it into their main ideology, argued Ṭarābīshī. “Educated Arabs lost their control over reality, so 
they looked for a discourse through which to control…and they found the discourse of the Turāth.” 
Ṭarābīshī contends that Arab intellectuals have projected their preconceptions and biases onto the Turāth 
and, as a result, have offered ideological readings of the Turāth –with little regard to historical truths. 
Ṭarābīshī deployed two ideas in his analysis of the current readings of the Turāth: izāḥah (dislocation) 
and istibdāl (transference). Whether contemporary Arab readers unconsciously fell prey to psychological 
transference or dislocation, they have made the Turāth into an “absolute ideology” that naturally bred only 
“absolute truths.”336   
Ṭarābīshī criticizes four streams of thought in contemporary Arab thought (Marxist school, 
nationalist school, Islamic Left school, and the Epistemological school). Addressing each school of 
thought, he proposes an analysis that runs deep into the mental mechanism that guides these readings, 
raising questions on the assumptions that guide their thinking and the frameworks that sustain their 
analysis. To provide an example of his analysis of the Marxist school, Ṭarābīshī argues that Arab Marxists 
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were inherently eclectic and unsystematic in their reading of the Turāth. They are not interested in 
understanding the historical truth of the Turāth but in choosing the elements that fit into their preconceived 
‘ideological’ visions. The problem with this instrumental reading of the Turāth, Ṭarābīshī asserts, is that 
this selective use of the Turāth is contrary to their claim of an “objective and scientific reading of the 
past.”  
“Arab Marxists, whose enemies had always dismissed them as Turāth-nihilists, responded by 
reviving the Turāth following Lenin: insisting that the Turāth is not a homogenous unity that is either 
taken or thrown away. The Turāth is a conflicting field…one part of which can be taken to confront the 
other part.”337   
This bifurcation of the Turāth seemed to have not bothered Arab Marxists, Ṭarābīshī concludes. 
This fragmentation of the Turāth impedes any attempt to go beyond the Turāth. 
Ṭarābīshī resorts again to a thesis he developed in 1989 that defines the contemporary Arab age as 
an era inhabited by a Narcissistic wound,338 an idea he attributed to the psychological blow of the defeat 
in 1967. The cultural defeat in 1967 “left open a bleeding narcissistic wound”339 that set in motion a 
cultural trend of looking back to find better models for present-day ills. He refers to this trend derisively 
as a “cultural recoil,” or nukūṣ, at the end of which Arabs were led to re-adopt medieval norms, values, 
and codes. This glide toward the “imagined medieval past,” or the revival of the Turāth, is what Ṭarābīshī 
accounts for in his dissertation Arab Intellectuals and The Turāth. This book unfolds as a gentle parable 
of how an entire world goes astray because of a defeat. Reading Ṭarābīshī’s psychoanalysis of Arab 
intellectuals is to be immersed in an experience of plunge, the experience of fall. In this dense work, 
crammed with psychoanalytical jargon, Ṭarābīshī offers an example of how readily human beings fall 
prey to their own language and their hypothesis. Ṭarābīshī leans heavily on Freud’s notion of “collective 
neuroses” to elaborate on the trends that led up to the reawakening of the medieval past. Ṭarābīshī shows 
how a great swathe of Arab intelligentsia were taken by that imagined “glorious past”. This happened not 
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by an accident. As far as Ṭarābīshī is concerned, Arab intellectuals are inflected by a “collective neuroses” 
(ʿusāb jamaʿī)– namely man's inability to free himself from the past’s grip and from history’s burden. 
Ṭarābīshī vividly shows that the complex of the “collective neurosis” was embodied by the fixation on the 
Turāth in order to encounter the “narcissistic wounds” the present inflicts on Arabic-speakers. This wound 
resists healing and recovery because Arab intelligentsia continues to compare current modern era with a 
presumably ‘glorious past’.   
Ṭarābīshī argues that Egyptian writer Mohammad ʿAmārah, has idealized the Turāth as rational, 
humanistic, consensual among contemporary Arab peoples and applicable to present day life. This 
romanticizing of the Turāth, which Ṭarābīshī refers to as a psychological projection, not only makes of 
the Turāth what it is not, but also deepens the narcissistic wound. Rather than alleviating the pains of the 
present, the comparison between the glorious past and debased present accelerates the feeling of 
impotence and disability, writes Ṭarābīshī.340 This, Ṭarābīshī continues, only perpetuates the unmitigated 
sense of “a feeling of inferiority,” and explains why Arab intellectuals are returning to the Turāth. But in 
their return to the Turāth they do not make up for their dejected and incomprehensible realities but indeed 
amplify their low self-esteem. 
The main idea that seems to have concerned Ṭarābīshī is what he called the “fragmentation 
(tamzīq) of the Turāth.” In all of his critical accounts of these schools and individual scholars, Ṭarābīshī 
concludes that Arab scholars have failed to grasp the Turāth on its own terms and still less within its 
holistic historical meaning. They borrowed certain aspects and neglected others in their reading of the 
Turāth. With this conclusion, Ṭarābīshī demonstrates the long way Arab intellectuals had gone through: 
from revolutionary stage to a traditional time.  
Secularizing the Turāth 
One of the questions that has bedeviled many of Ṭarābīshī’s followers was his article on secularism 
in Islam. In an article entitled “the Secular Seeds in Islam,”341 Ṭarābīshī expressed his revolt against Arab 
and non-Arab scholars, naming, among others, Bernard Lewis, who had falsely argued that Islam has 
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never differentiated between the spiritual and temporal domains. Countering this ill-conceived idea, 
Ṭarābīshī suggested that by looking at daily historical experience, “Islam does not completely diverge 
from Christianity in separating between the here and now and the hereafter.”342 Bringing together 
moderate Islamists who categorically denounced secularism with western scholars who denied secularism 
as an available condition within the Islamic historical space, Ṭarābīshī’s article debunks all the erroneous 
readings of Islamic experience as practiced throughout history. “Whenever the dialectics of the sacred and 
profane played out under Islam, the second prevailed,” asserted Ṭarābīshī. “The state masked itself in 
Islam while its true face was invariably Jāhilī [un-Islamic].”343  
No other Arab scholar went as far as Ṭarābīshī to entrench (Taʾṣīl) the secular notion in Islamic 
historical experience. “Ṭarābīshī wished his project not only to stave off a fading idea [secularism], but 
primarily to establish a forgotten genealogy [of the secular] in past Arab-Islamic historical experience.”344 
Namely, Ṭarābīshī was the first to exhume the word “ʿālmaniyya,” i.e. secularism in Arabic, from a book 
written in the tenth century, which he’d encountered by accident. Miṣbaḥ al ʿaql (Reason’s Light) was 
written by a Christian Arab author in Egypt named Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ al-Maṣrrī. The discovery of this word 
overwhelmed Ṭarābīshī: “my focus was to explore the [roots of the] word secularism [to give evidence 
that] it was not imported from the West as we have been charged. Others have charged secularism [of 
being] a western word. Secularism is an essential part of our heritage as it existed in the core of the Turāth. 
Here is the place to point out that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ al-Maṣrrī of the fourth century [tenth century AD] used 
this word without expounding on it in his Miṣbaḥ al ʿaql, which means that it was a familiar [concept]. 
Secularism, for Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ al- Maṣrrī, meant ‘he who is not a priest,’ namely whoever is not a 
religious man."345  
For Ṭarābīshī, this was a conclusive verdict that Arabic employed the secular idea even before this 
idea emerged in the West. With this revelation, Ṭarābīshī argued, Arab thought was poised to break 
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through the misguided and false duality of Turāth versus contemporaneity. For this unveiling of the secular 
idea undercuts the claim of those conservatives (the guardians of Turāth) who renounced secularism as a 
foreign idea that has failed to adapt to the Arab soil or that Arab historical experience is not conducive to 
secularism. Unearthing the idea of secularism in the Arab land, Ṭarābīshī concluded, should help to 
“lubricate its assimilation,” transforming it from a malicious term to a palatable notion easy to embrace.  
Establishing a forgotten historical genealogy of secularism in the Turāth entails sorting out the 
constellation of social agents, historical processes, and cultural trends that played into deifying the Turāth. 
To untangle this history, he continued writing on the way Arab and Islamic Turāth was constructed and 
narrated. Three concluding theses merit some further exploration to capture Ṭarābīshī’s thinking: first, his 
revision of the idea of miracles in Islamic history. Second, constructing the ways in which Muslim scholars 
(ulama) had elevated the Hadith (Mohammad deeds) to equal the Qurʾān. Third, demonstrating the ways 
in which the demand for democracy in the contemporary Arab world has been used to cancel out the 
demand for secularism by modern Arab writers. The rest of this chapter address these issues separately.  
Miracles in Islam: Critiquing Moderate Islam  
In a time that he felt most isolated from the Arab world, Ṭarābīshī was carried away by the Turāth. 
His fascination with the Turāth literature was insatiable. He dedicated little time to contemporary politics 
and had very little to say about the current tumultuous events unfolding in the Middle East. One of his 
critics wondered “how could Ṭarābīshī write 3000 pages against medieval Sunni Islam and no more than 
two pages on the 250,000 Syrian mortalities?”346 Ṭarābīshī’s critics made little effort to hide their sheer 
contempt toward Arab intellectuals who clustered around him for steering clear of politics. Yāssin Ḥāj 
Ṣāliḥ, one of the prominent detractors of Ṭarābīshī, hacked him for being loyal to the regime in Syria, 
accusing intellectuals like Ṭarābīshī of afflicting Arab Left in Syria with its weakness scourge.347 Al-
Sayyid wrote, “I have known no other intellectuals who let their people down as much as Arab 
intellectuals.”348 
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Indeed, Ṭarābīshī had never stood out as a political analyst anyway. One of his close friends, a 
member of the Arab Rationalist Association contrasted Ṭarābīshī’s “political mediocrity” with his aptitude 
in “textual analysis.”349 In fact, Ṭarābīshī went out of his way to evade criticizing Asad’s regimes before 
and after 2011. For Ṭarābīshī, however, the entire intellectual endeavor in which he had been engaged is 
not free from political repercussions. For Ṭarābīshī the existential threat to current Arab order comes not 
from the Baʿthist regime but Islamism. In this way, Ṭarābīshī relocated the challenge of political Islam to 
texts, sorting out their political capacity, while endowing his textual analysis with cultural and political 
consequences. Changes in the conceptualization of these texts, Ṭarābīshī wished to prove, would generate 
a ripple effect in the political sphere. With this assumption, he addressed Mohammad’s status in the 
Islamic imagination. In Miracle and the Eclipse of Reason in Islam, Ṭarābīshī argued that among all 
religions’ founders, Mohammad stood out in owning up to no miracle but the writing of the Qurʾān. 
Remarkably, Ṭarābīshī argued, the Holy Book denies Mohammad the status of a prophet (nabī) while 
insisted on calling him messenger (rasūl). Mohammad was sent with the clear mission to spread the word 
of God, the lawgiver. “Shorn off any capacity to issue laws,” Mohammad’s image in the Qurʾān was 
reinforced time and again as “no more than a messenger,” depriving him of any authority to legislate, still 
less to express any opinion or command related to the hereafter. In a manner distinctive only to classical 
orientalists and atypical of his writing from the 1970’s, Ṭarābīshī provided numerous verses from the 
Qurʾān in which God addresses Mohammad as his messenger, not only divested of any power to express 
his opinion but also chastised for uttering “decrees” and “verdicts” out of his mind. Overwhelming his 
reader with citations of numerous Qurʾānic verses, Ṭarābīshī not only enshrines the entire discussion with 
evidence that speaks voluminously to Muslims, but he also leaves the reader humbled and disenchanted 
with the “truncated standing of Mohammad.” All the holiness that once shrouded Mohammad slipped 
away as his human condition burst forth.   
After establishing that Mohammad was not a prophet in the Holy Book but a mere messenger, 
Ṭarābīshī finds an unbridgeable disparity between this Qurʾānic portrayal and the ever-growing Hadith 
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literature that refers to Mohammad as “the last prophet.” The Hadith, a collection of Mohammad’s sayings 
and deeds, not only explicitly contradicts the spirit of the Holy Book, but also confers on Mohammad the 
legal authority and political clout that the Qurʾān explicitly denies him. By revealing that the Hadith is at 
odd with the Qurʾān, rather than completing it, Ṭarābīshī provided a unique occasion to inveigh the 
authenticity of the Hadith, facilitating the first point of entry for secularizing the sacred texts.350  
This method that sought to bring to fore the contradictions and disparities between the Qurʾān and 
the Sunna, was and remained the most effective strategy embraced by the Arab Rationalist Association 
(see chapter 5) to make inroads for rational and secular thinking in contemporary Arab thought. Effecting 
small shocks in the mythical “belief system,” overwhelming devout Muslims with more nuanced and 
subtle understandings of Islamic belief, and digging up the earthly aspects in Mohammad’s ordinary life, 
were among the “rationalist strategies” to secularize the Turāth. Secularism, as far as Ṭarābīshī is 
concerned, is a new understanding of the past to set free Arab subjects of the traumatic grasp of the 1967. 
Secularism is to go beyond the mainstream: to defy, to embarrass, to criticize, and to shock the Arab 
subject so that he could re-order his relation with the Turāth. Secularism is not a revolution; it is a 
transgression, a way of seeing the world through a demythologized lens.  
Qurʾan versus Hadith 
Ṭarābīshī further defies the way the Turāth was commonly conceived in his most recent work 
From Islam of the Qurʾān to the Islam of the Hadith. In this book Ṭarābīshī tells how the Sunna literature 
that began to develop around the figure of Mohammad hijacked the Qurʾān and tweaked its meaning from 
its original aim. In over 600 pages, which Ṭarābīshī viewed as the peak of his entire productive career, he 
accounts for a lengthy but steady process in which ensuing generations of Muslims ʿulama eroded the edge 
the Qurʾān had over the Hadith, reaching the 13th century when many Muslims began subscribing equal 
value to the Hadith compendium as that of the Qurʾān. It is a florid narrative of how the downgrading of 
the Qurʾān took place through the deification of the Hadith. Intertwined with this effort is the way in which 
the Hadith literature was relocated from the temporal to the sacred domain. Once consecrated, the Hadith 
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was given equal status with the Qurʾān. It was al-Shafiʿī, the pre-eminent jurist of the ninth century, with 
whom this process reached its zenith. Al-Shafiʿī, Ṭarābīshī demonstrates, oversaw this pairing between 
the Qurʾān and the Hadith.  
In From Islam of the Qurʾān to Islam of the Hadith Ṭarābīshī focuses his criticism on moderate 
Islamists rather than extreme Islamic movements. The tendency to subject moderate Islam to scathing 
criticism emanates from Ṭarābīshī’s belief that Islamists’ sway on politics and culture cannot be 
diminished or dismissed, since their piety branches out into politics. The old divergence between Qurʾān 
and Hadith are being erased so that religious people intervene in politics, argues Ṭarābīshī. To understand 
the bind in which Islamists have placed Arab societies, it is useful to start with the specific fears that they 
are exploiting. Islamists, particularly in the wake of the 1967 war, rebooted the Islamic discourse anew to 
serve particular needs. They uttered the same old quips with a radicalized tinge to pose themselves the 
only authentic alternative. According to Ṭarābīshī, Islamists have transformed Islam through a widespread 
publication network, funding, and an attentive audience, giving rise to a new and unfamiliar mode of 
Islamic religiosity, unlike the classical Islam in whose name they stock (political) claims. For example, 
Ṭarābīshī writes that starting in the late 1970s, Islamists changed the tone and the underlying message of 
their Daʿūa (calling or proselytizing) movement. While before the 1970s, Ṭarābīshī argues, the focus was 
on the rhetorical miracle of the Qurʾān, after the 1980s the emphasis underscored “the scientific miracle 
of the Qurʾān.” Why did Islamists begin to valorize the scientific elements in the Qurʾān while watering 
down their previous focus on miracles?  To meet the new public demand on science Ṭarābīshī answers. 
As a British observer maintained, “Since the 1980s, the ‘scientific miracle’ has become a major tool for 
Islamic proselytizing and appears to have met with considerable success. It has given Muslims a renewed 
sense of pride in their religion.”351 Even Arab universities began looking at the Qurʾān as a scientific text 
that also prophesies research breakthroughs.352 The hunt for scientific foreknowledge in the Qurʾān 
                                                 
351 Brian Whitaker, Arabs Without God, 1 edition (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 62. 
352 In Arabs Without God, British journalist Brian Whitakers writes “The origin of Qurʾanic science can be traced back to a 
French doctor, Maurice Bucaille, who served as family physician to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s. 
Bucaille’s book The Bible, The Qurʾan and Science argued “that while the Bible contains many scientific errors, the Qurʾan 
was remarkably prescient: references to the Big Bang, Black holes and space travel can all be found in its verses. See: 
Whitaker, 62. 
 142 
unsettles Ṭarābīshī, and he posts some serious questions regarding Arabs’ fetishism of their past, Turāth, 
and the Qurʾān. For Ṭarābīshī, living in Paris, this inflated sense of pride in the Turāth irrevocably points 
to a newfound trend of Arab irrationalism.   
Ṭarābīshī is mostly bold on moderate Islamists because they are all parlaying to masses based on 
memory rather than on history. They seem to hold onto beliefs that are very much at odds not only with 
historical context, but also in variance with modernity, whose basic cultural models do not support their 
eagerness to adhere to the Turāth. Even when Islamists compulsively bring in medieval Islam, Ṭarābīshī 
argues, to graft it in modern life, they trim it from its pluralistic component. To counteract these arguments 
of moderate Islam, which he considers both ahistorical and dangerous, Ṭarābīshī brings in the nahḍa and 
its scholars who called for a different approach to the Turāth. Why nahḍa now? 
For late twentieth-century Arab Leftists like Ṭarābīshī, who learned about the post-colonial 
condition the hard way, the nahḍa marked a new beginning, a period in which Arabs confronted their 
Turāth for the first time and reevaluated their concepts of traditions. In one of the most compelling 
accounts of the nahḍawi figures, Ṭarābīshī showed how the conception of time was re-assessed during the 
nahḍa. Under the conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, moderate Islamists realized 
that “time has truly changed, and the circumstances of the twentieth century are unlike those of the 
beginning of Islam.”353 As one historian put it, the concept of a new beginning, which Ṭarābīshī associated 
with the nahḍa, meant “inaugurating something that never existed before. It meant not completing the past 
but initiating something wholly separate and distinct from it, and hence privileging (at least implicitly) the 
present over the past, and the immediate over the transmitted.”354 For Ṭarābīshī, the nahḍa stands for the 
concept of a new beginning. Its main figures wrestled with the unfolding realities, not by seeking recourse 
in the past, but by developing a new perspective on the Turāth.355 Yet, during the twentieth century, 
Ṭarābīshī argues, reality is disregarded by psot-colonial writers. Unlike nahḍawis, who struggled to 
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“cultivate the new in order to authorize the present in an entirely different way than it had been authorized 
in the past,”356 post-colonial Arab intellectuals, haunted by the trauma of the defeat, firmly adhered to 
restoring a long-gone Turāth. In particular, Ṭarābīshī questions the assumptions, biases, and frames that 
define the way of the current Islāhi (reform) Islam movements. For these moderate Islamists, Ṭarābīshī 
argues, the question is not whether or not times have changed, but whether “this change is deep enough 
to entail the replacement of the Shariʿa.”357 This gap between nahḍawi and current Islamic scholars 
illustrates the change among moderate Islamists. While nahḍawis acknowledged the deep changes that 
forced fundamental adaptations to their understanding of the sacred texts, “the community of current 
Muslim jurists claimed that the modification of the manifested decrees in the Qurʾān and Hadiths are 
illegal except with necessity;” Here, Ṭarābīshī is quick to ask “does this necessity exist?” Ṭarābīshī argues 
that present moderate Islamists are in the grasp of the “certainties of the text”. The fact that they no longer 
acknowledge the “necessity” to make amendments in the Shariʿa text, marks a regression and a backsliding 
to an unwanted past. This means that they are denying reality and are less moderate than they appear to 
be.358  
Democracy and Secularism 
Ṭarābīshī’s new understanding that by making small shocks in belief systems, writers could afford 
to bring about change to society began taking precedence over his older strategy. Previously, Ṭarābīshī 
thought that it is enough to expose readers to newly translated western ideas to bring about change. This 
is the same assumption that guided him in his writing on democracy in the Arab world. Arab intellectuals’ 
unwavering calls for, and insistence on, democracy provided Ṭarābīshī with the occasion to criticize them 
for calling for democracy in politics but rejecting it in other aspects of life, not least of all in religious 
affairs, sexuality, and free thinking. “Do we accept an Arab Luther?” Ṭarābīshī asked Arab intellectuals 
who ascribed to Arab regimes all the ills in Arab societies while vindicating Arab cultural system, its 
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 144 
values and morals. One of the most cited lines Ṭarābīshī ever inscribed was “while contemporary Arab 
peoples are craving democracy in politics, they reject it in religion.”359 For Ṭarābīshī, the appeal of and 
the consensus around the “democratic demand” al-Maṭlab al-Dīmocrraṭṭī among Arab intellectuals had 
to stir suspicion. The unifying demand of moderate Islamists, socialists, post-Marxists, and nationalists to 
introduce democracy apprehended Ṭarābīshī. Though he hailed “democracy as the best political order and 
the most rational” that the “human mind could have ever reached,” he had some misgivings toward the 
democratic model that is cut off from the concomitant “culture of democracy.”360 
Ṭarābīshī argued that the current insistence on democracy cloaked an aversion towards secularism. 
For Ṭarābīshī, secularism is part and parcel of what he calls the “culture of democracy.” The two cannot 
be separated except arbitrarily and capriciously. Therefore, Arab intellectuals’ demand for democracy 
underscores mechanical democracy (or procedural democracy) while explicitly rejecting the culture of 
democracy. Chafing against this reduced sense of democracy, he writes:  
"Democracy is a plant in need of great care, attention and protection so that it can develop one day 
from a small shrub to a fruitful tree. Today's biggest illusion is the notion that we can hold an election and 
that's all. This idea is rather discouraging, as the idea of Arab Unity or Arab socialism previously proved 
to be. There is no magic solution. All solutions must be historical; history does not advance in leaps but 
rather slowly. If that progress piles up, it could accumulate into a revolution, but not in one night. Thus, 
I'm democrat but a delayed one, I call myself a ‘democratic project’, I'm not a democrat because 
democracy is not a ready-made fruit in Arab societies."361 
The Tide toward the Nahda  
By remorselessly advocating for a culture of democracy over mechanical democracy, Ṭarābīshī 
risks being charged with a culturist approach. Indeed, his countryman Burhān Ghalyūn, a political scientist 
at the Sorbonne University in Paris, was among the first to argue that Ṭarābīshī attributed the challenges 
and problems currently facing Arab societies into cultural characteristics rather than political 
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conditions.362 For Ṭarābīshī, as for most of his associates in the Arab Rationalist Association, however, 
the consistent instability of Arab states stems from historical data, namely, a recorded textuality and 
collective memory that forbids Arab populations from assimilating and adopting modern capacities 
smoothly. To counter the “culturalist” allegation, Ṭarābīshī embraces the culturist attitude that prevailed 
in the writing of the nahḍa period. For Ṭarābīshī the principal mindset that defined the nahḍa was most 
obvious in its intellectuals’ propensity to accept the other (West), their eagerness to revise their history, 
and their aptitude to acknowledge that something was wrong. This willingness and capacity to open up to 
new models can be found in one of the reformers of the late nineteenth-century who believed that “There 
is no second civilization, civilization means European civilization.”363  Reviving the cultural discourse, 
therefore, was not alien to Arab intellectuals.  
Ṭarābīshī’s attitude towards nineteenth-century nahḍa was ambiguous until the beginning of the 
1980s, and contained a defensive streak. Earlier nahḍawi reformists, he claimed, took an earnest look at 
the sacred text and tried to reconcile it with modernity. They inherently viewed Islam as amenable to 
modernity. A reconciliation between the two was possible. Current Islamic figures, however, are unlike 
the nahḍawi reformers. They reject modernity in the name of Islam.  
In 1980, he wrote that though Arab feminists of the nahḍa, such as Qāssim Amīn, Jamīl Bayhum 
and others, supported more rights to women, they eventually fall short of providing a more compelling 
ground for their arguments. Nineteenth century “Arab feminists evaded critiquing religion,” he 
complained, since they “searched in religion itself” for verses that “support their arguments to legitimize 
women rights.”364 Ṭarābīshī’s criticism of the nahḍa pioneers was not restricted to issue of women’s 
rights, however. He rails against their constrained epistemological scope. He writes that the pioneers of 
the nahḍa did not differentiate between social and natural conditions. For the most part, they took what is 
socially constructed as natural and vice versa. They considered the subordinate status of women as natural, 
God-given order or simply a natural way of life. Citing Jamīl Bayyham, Ṭarābīshī explains that for these 
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scholars, “what generated from social conditions was attributed to natural order.” They failed to see that 
“the gap between men and women was engraved in society, rather than in nature, but it was viewed as if 
this gap were inscribed in nature not society, to justify its continuity in the name of natural instinct.”365 
Muḥammad Jamīl Bayhum, one of the advocates of women’s rights in the nahḍa,366 writes that “social 
orders are the result of laws of nature… any attempt that aims at disrupting it by replacing the social order, 
according to individuals’ desire, is damaging and considered against natural laws.”367 
This essential shortsightedness of the nahḍawi scholars is forgiven, given the intellectual space 
and time of these writings. The nineteenth-century took what is social to be natural, a view which wasn’t 
particular to the Arab intellectuals. As Joan Scott has shown recently, the idea of nature was essential in 
nineteenth-century thought regarding to “women, cultural hierarchies, and social ordering. In the discourse 
of secularism, the existence of separate spheres for women and men was no longer attributed to God, it 
was taken as a natural fact. The insistence on nature’s mandate was a distinctive aspect of nineteenth-
century secularism. Human biology was the ultimate source of the unequal and distinctive roles for women 
and men.”368 
Bayhum, who failed to see women as independent subjects, was credited by Ṭarābīshī for his 
eagerness to learn from the West. In the first line of the introduction of Women in Modernity, published 
in 1927, Bayhum writes: “The East today exists in a learning and developing [stage], and his teacher is 
the West.”369 Commenting on this idea, Ṭarābīshī explains, “Contrary to subsequent generations of the 
post-colonial era, who desired to assert their identity not through taking from the West but against it, 
“Jamīl Bayyham did not feel uncomfortable asserting the imperative and indispensability of teaching the 
East at the hands of the West.”370 If until 1980 Ṭarābīshī related to the nahḍa cautiously, in the subsequent 
years he embraced its spirit against a growing public demand to go against the West and modernity in the 
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name of cultural authenticity and the Turāth. Taking his cues from nahḍawais, who demonstrated a 
rational mind unencumbered by the dead hand of the Turāth, Ṭarābīshī wondered how the Turāth at the 
end of the twentieth-century became increasingly prescriptive, when the hold of Turāth had lost its 
cohesive force in previous generations. For Ṭarābīshī, the nahḍa- providing a new beginning- was the 
only antidote to the recent Turāth fetishism in the Arab world.  
Conclusion: 
This chapter demonstrates that Arab Left intellectuals (re)turned to study the Turāth in the same 
way that other nations’ intellectuals turned to the study of their own pasts. In the context of the Middle 
East, however, this turn was misconceived and narrated as a return to Islam. Though the return of the 
Turāth consisted, among other things, a new discovery of Islam, it was by no means reducible to Islam 
only. The intellectual career of Ṭarābīshī complicates this assumption, while elaborating on the ways in 
which the Arab Left regrouped in the late 1990s around anti-Turāth agenda, calling into question another 
assumption in current historiography, according to which the Arab Left has vanished into thin air.  
This chapter accounted for the undoing of the revolutionary Ṭarābīshī and the emergence of the 
neo- nahḍawi Ṭarābīshī in his place. Nothing captures Ṭarābīshī’s passage from utopia to dystopia as the 
transition from thawrah to nahḍa and his urge to renew the positions and cultural attitudes valorized by 
nineteenth century intellectuals. By asking why retrieving the spirit of the nahḍa in the late 20th became 
an urgent imperative for Ṭarābīshī, this chapter offers a historical explanation for this shift: it resulted 
from the dispersion of the Arab Left during the 1970s, encouraged by post-colonial state’s policies, the 
ensuing emergence of Turāth, and the realization of many Arab Leftists of the undead past that continue 
to shape ideas and mindsets in current political and intellectual debates. This chapter goes beyond 
Ṭarābīshī’s engagement with Leftist frameworks (most prominently Marxism and socialism, pan-
Arabism) that opened new possibilities before Arab intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead it 
emphasizes the ways in which Ṭarābīshī ended up owning up to the nahḍa frameworks after years of 
overlooking it. If there is a new Ṭarābīshī that looms large in these years, it was one who emphasized the 
power of culture in shaping people’s desires, behaviors, and morals. The Ṭarābīshī of the 1960s-70s, who 
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thought of Arab society only through economics and class-analysis, completely excluding the power of 
culture. His later return to the nahḍa reflects and legitimizes this cultural turn in his writings. 
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CHAPTER V: LAFIF LAKHDAR: REORIENTING THE TURĀTH 
This chapter explores the life and thought of Lafif Lakhdar, a Tunisian writer and polymath with 
a wide range of knowledge, insight and enthusiasm in humanities. Lakhdar’s life is rife with ironies. He 
was the first to promulgate the notion “culture of life,” a currently prevalent term he coined in 1990, with 
the aim of setting secular thinkers aside from Islamist parties, which he dubbed the disseminators of a 
“culture of death.” Yet, a man so keen on promoting the value of life, who resisted the rituals of death and 
destruction, ended his own on a calm day in June 2013 in the city of Paris. A controversial writer who 
developed many enemies as well as scores of followers, Lakhdar was found dead on a curb in one of Paris 
allays. His friends’ pleas could not prevent him from committing suicide. A week before taking the “bitter 
bill” he called an old friend, Syrian Marxist Ṣādiq Jalāl al-ʿAẓm to say farewell. In their telephone call, 
al-ʿAẓm recalled that Lakhdar said these words “next Wednesday I will end my life.” al-ʿAẓm, failing to 
dissuade his old friend from his decision, attested that “very few words had shivered my bones as 
Lakhdar’s.”371    
This chapter narrates the story of a child who was born into a hovel in rural Tunisia; a child who 
was destined to become an awe-inspiring intellectual of high caliber. Lakhdar started as a Marxist 
enthusiast, he traversed the path of many Arab Left intellectuals in the 1960s, yet he was among the first 
to break with Marxism. Aside from recounting Lakhdar’s stormy life, a life replete with radical turnabouts, 
this chapter makes a foray into the philosophy this astonishingly self-made scholar undertook to 
disseminate. Lakhdar was far more than a distinguished writer; his thought embodied the rational that 
guided a small stream of secular Arab Leftists who emerged to the surface only during the 1990s, to 
combat what they conceived as Turāthism (traditionalism). Nonetheless, Lakhdar’s thorough analysis of 
the sorely needed reforms in the Arab world confer on his project a brutal realism that other intellectuals 
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could only wish to replicate. What made Lakhdar’s so unique? What were his propositions for renewing 
Arab culture? How were his visionary ideas received in his home country and elsewhere in the Middle 
East? Why did the young Marxist end up preaching for secularism? How did he deal with the Turāth? 
Lafif Lakhdar led a life marked by extreme poverty, a life defined by ethical lapses that forever 
seared his mind. At early age, he recognized the yawning disparity between grand narratives and real life 
practices. The unbridgeable gap between high morals and Islamic ethics on the one hand and the 
exigencies of daily life (and the necessities) of human needs on the other, shaped Lakhdar’s personality 
and thinking. Economic hardships and social deprivation forced him to deviate from the cultural script, 
let alone breaching many religious codes and Islamic strictures. Living a life of need and deficiency 
instilled in him a predisposition to transgression and trespassing to survive and make living. This constant 
want led him to question the many social convention, tacit rules, and morals that constrained other 
intellectuals coming from middle class and upper middle class. Lakhdar, as we will explore throughout, 
set himself to destroy the unspoken consensus and “cultural script” that straddle contemporary Arabic 
speakers: the burden of history, veneration of the dead, worshipping ancestors. Lakhdar recognizes that 
even though Arab societies witnessed fundamental changes since the 1960s, there is an entrenched cultural 
mood that interested in resisting change.  
Lakhdar admired nineteenth-century literature for its profound, straightforward, and educational 
capacities. Like eminent late-nahḍa scholars Salama Musa and Taha Hussain, whose books he read avidly 
but secretly, his writings ring with educational messages. Believing that each one hides his “own story,” 
Lakdar discloses his own to help others follow on his path. Fraught with extraordinary turns, Lakhdar’s 
life not only ended with a suicide, but it features a strange array of paradoxical pursuits. Spending his 
adulthood without working, Lakhdar was caught in bestiality (sexual intercourse with animals), kicked 
out of the most prestigious intellectual salons in Beirut, advised Algeria’s first prime minister. For 
Lakhdar, what people repress and hide define their behavior and thinking more than what they reveal and 
make public. What applies to individuals, he argued, equally applies to cultures and Islamic culture in 
particular: what remains unthinkable in Arab and Islamic Turāth delimits the way it is memorized, 
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practiced and lived.372 For Lakdar exposing the untold and repressed stories that current Islamic 
interpretations systematically marginalize invalidates the much of the knowledge in contemporary Arab 
societies regarding the Turāth. Lakhdar, for instance, asks why very few readers know that Egyptian 
eminent writer Tawfik al-Hakim was a queer and peot Al-Ma’ari was a guy? Who would these two best-
sellers who have been received? Lakhdar was not interested in sexuality as a theme, but rather to raise 
questions on the ways cultural hierarchies, boundaries, and frameworks in Arab societies had hardened 
and taken for granted.  
Lakhdar was not searching for truth in history writings. He rather was invested in interrogations 
of knowledge production. More Knowledge is not about finding truth, given that truth is relational, 
proportional, and contextual, but knowledge comes into being when the unsayable rendered sayable, when 
the unthinkable becomes thinkable and accessible. Every story is a valid story so long as it delivered well 
and speaks to people’s rational instincts. In other words, to serve the purpose of knowledge one has not 
only to think through what is available- the thinkable- but through a serious engagement with the 
unthinkable. As we will see below, when Lakhdar writes Mohammad’s biography, he essentially writes 
the overlooked history of Mohammad as growing up child in Mecca.     
It is with this conviction that he ties Islamic narratives with the formation of the self, or the 
formation of subjectivity. Lakhdar concedes that the way Islamic narratives are being told in contemporary 
Arab societies had a variety of deleterious effects that among other things encumber Arab and Islamic 
citizens, pressing them into positions and frameworks that make it impossible to integrate in politics of 
modernity. Rather than conceiving Islamic subjectivity as an “alternative model of subjectivity,” Lakhdar 
addresses it as a problem that demands unpacking. For Lakhdar, conservative social mores, traditionalist 
reading of sacred texts, and un-nuanced understanding of the sacred within the Arab Turāth, are all 
looming factors that threaten the entire edifice of a liberal democratic tradition that began to take hold in 
Arab societies during the late 19th century. It is not Islam as such that is threatening; it is the presumptions, 
commitments, and affective attachments that the current adherence to “Islamic orthodoxy” that enable and 
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sustain a “perplex citizen,” which straddle Muslim subjects with an undiminished “sense of guilt,” and  
determines his view of politics as necessarily antagonistic to Islam. 373 Lakhdar believes that there are 
invisible links between Islamic teachings and strictures and the unbearable guilt feeling, which is crucial 
for ordering religion in society. In what follows, I elaborate on Lakhdar’s intellectual biography before 
exploring the logic behind his last resort to write Mohammad’s biography through which his stand toward 
the Turāth is articulated. 
Biography 
 Lafif Lakhdar’s life gave salience to the inexorable link between poverty and moral lapses. It 
features how morals are malleable, subjected to human needs. Lakhdar spent the majority of his life in 
Paris on the margins. His life was a tale of constant struggle after making a living. Still, he produced a 
half dozen books, numerous reviews and translations, and his articles were published in liberal website 
like Elaph, Al-Hiwar al-Mutamadin and al-Awan. Though his output is not vast, his writing animated 
regular debates featured on these highly liberal Arabic websites which competed over publishing his 
articles. “[D]ozens of other reform-oriented sites,” attested a foreign observer of Arab intellectual debates, 
“republished his articles,” that expanded the reach and scope of his ideas. 374  
Lafif Lakhdar was born in a desolate slum town near Makthar in northeastern Tunisia in 1934.375 
Situated on a plateau at 900 meters above sea level, Makthar affords its inhabitants a gripping pastoral 
view with a vast grassland. Based on the remains of an old Roman town, it is surrounded by debilitating 
Roman walls and pagan ritual sites that endowed the slum with an imposing historical aura. The Romans, 
it is commonly said, established towns and cities about every twenty miles, a day's march for the Roman 
legions. Makthar was such a station for them. The ruins of these Roman communities are still visible 
throughout the area, decayed and forlorn reminders of better times. 
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Lakhdar’s family was never to leave Makthar’s environs. His father, a mild and inoffensive man, 
led a dutiful and blameless farming life. His mother, a God-fearing woman, was more energetic when 
compared with his father’s insipid and anemic personality. “A rough and somewhat of a shifty woman” 
Lakhdar described her in his article “My relations to my Mother is the Key to my Personality.” Beside the 
house chores, she ventured from time to time to help in outdoor farming obligations depending on rain 
and season. More than anything the family’s devotion to a long, undisrupted tradition of farming marked 
its lifestyle. Makthar and its vicinities, like the rest of rural Tunisia, was culturally cut off from the 
metropolitan centers of the big, coastline cities at the first half of the twentieth-century. This disparity 
between the Franco-phonic coastline and the rather traditional hinterland reaches back to the days of the 
French colon in Tunisia. Rather than “modernizing” rural towns by eliminating the social and cultural 
differences between central cities and far off towns, French policies in North Africa sowed a tradition that 
reinforced this disparity. By encouraging peasants to cultivate their farms, French policy in Tunisia “bind 
fellahin and their families even more closely to farms” without freeing them to “pursue other, often more 
lucrative enterprises.”376  
Following the prescriptions the colon drew for them, Lakhdar family threw its lot on handwork 
and rustic life. Like many other fallahin in Makthar, the Lakhdars delicately took care of their livestock. 
With the advent of the French to Tunisia their dependency on and fidelity to this farming system was 
amplified for it now perceived as the glue that held them together in times of blight, famine, and 
deprivation. It was this farming system that helped them survive the years of WWII, which Tunisians like 
many North Africans, found themselves embroiled in as the European war spilled over to the southern rim 
of the Mediterranean. When Lafif Lakhdar was born inside a slum, his father was a peasant who worked 
deferentially for an (Arab!) landowner, but died at a very early age due to poor sanitary conditions when 
Lafif, the older among seven siblings, was 13-years-old.377 His father’s passing left an enduring mark on 
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the young Lafif. Being an orphan, he wrote in late 2011, turned him particularly “susceptible to all sorts  
of taunts and derisions” in rural Tunisia that did not accept fatherless boys. These “mockeries” haunted 
young Lakhdar while shaping his lifelong taste for rural people. Nonetheless, this experience also 
benefited him in “delving into prophet Mohammad’s complex personality that had also been shaped by 
orphanage experience.”378  
Lakhdar’s childhood was not only shaped by his town’s pattern of destitution and poverty. He was 
a “distressed orphan,” he reminisces in 2004, “in [constant] rush to find an [alternative] father to identify 
with.”379 At a very young age he found in his teacher at the Kutab, Shaikh ʿAshur, a source of solace and 
inspiration to compensate for his father’s loss. Shaikh ʿAshur would be the first teacher whose ideas 
impacted Lakhdar’s instincts. Hailed from a highly cherished ʿulama family, steeped in religious studies, 
Sheikh Fāḍel bin ʿAshur (1909-1970) was a bold reformist, a staunch supporter of pluralistic reading of 
the Quran, and a vehement critic of conservative Islamic practices in Tunisia. His was one of the clear 
voices at the mid twentieth century to call for Maqasid reading of the Quran- a reading that emphasized 
the purposes (Maqsad means purpose/intention) and spirit of the Quran over its literary reading.380 ʿ Ashur 
made his progressive ideas public in his Literature and Intellectual Movement in Tunisia. A historical 
work that furnished a vigorous survey of the variety of Islamic modes in Tunisia, while carving a great 
portion of the book to extol Tunisian Islamic reformers in the 19th century- a movement directed by Khair 
al-Dinn, one of the early Tunisian Muslim thinkers to increasingly become concerned with the decline of 
the Islamic community and the means to regenerate it. Khair al-Dinn’s writings and endeavors as an 
education minister in the late 19th century placed the groundwork for Islamic reforms in his small 
country.381 ʿ Ashur’s work, however, not only took inspiration from Khair al-Dinn’s, but strived to evaluate 
the works and lives of Islamic scholars who sustained and reinforced Khair al-Dinn’s project to reform 
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institutions in Tunisia. Though ʿAshur was a progeny of a highly regarded ulama family that ardently 
embraced Maqasid and liberal reading of the Quran, he nonetheless believed in co-mingling politics and 
Islam (state and religion) to induce societal change. Lakhdar cites one case that embodied this merging 
that he was not approved of. 
In 1961, premier Habib Bourgibah put ʿAshur into task when he imprudently asked Shaiekh ʿAshur 
to issue a fatwa that authorizes the break of the fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. Fasting seemed 
to the unencumbered, progressive president to inflict devastating impacts on domestic production that 
caused a tremendous disservice to the nascent Tunisian economy. ʿAshur was a true reformist but not a 
revolutionist. He was the chief mufti of Tunisia and the Dean of L’universite Zitouna, the primary religious 
school in Tunisia. Yet, no matter how reform oriented he was, he rebuffed the idea as ludicrous and refused 
to follow through Bourgibah’s radical and far reaching reforms. Though he failed Bourgibah’s sturdy test, 
ʿAshur nonetheless remained a reformer, with a solid understanding of the indispensable need of adapting 
Quranic ideas for the wellbeing of Tunisians.  
Studying under ʿAshur, young Lafif Lakhdar was qualified to see the nuances within Islam at early 
age, witnessing the cultural war within Islam, and absorb the Maqasid Islam in its name his teacher waged 
a war against other modes of Islamic practices. His pliable mind effortlessly assimilated Islam in its most 
liberal mode- an Islam that largely differs from the customary Islam (Islam taqlidi) that he inherited from 
his parent and grandparents. 382 Though Lakhdar could not grasp the intricacies of Quranic exegesis at 
this stage, he was able to weigh the stakes of Islam in politics from his teacher, whose engagement in 
lengthy debates with other Islamists informed him. Remarkably, Lakhdar embraced the view that his 
teacher instilled in him: the need of new Islamic teaching to boost Tunisia’s new generation on the road 
to renewal and change. ʿAshur’s notable impact on young Lakhdar was immense. Studying under a 
distinctively enlightened scholar of Islam opened new avenues for young Lakhdar to follow through. With 
ʿAshur’s teachings and instructions, Lakhdar was willing and able to accept different 
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interpretation/reading of the Quran, that seem incongruent with the prevailing religiosity in the rest of the 
Middle East. Yet, the cracks ʿAshur’s teachings induced on young Lakhdar would lead to sheer splits in 
his orientation, an unintended outcome that ʿAshur certainly would not welcome.  
What started as a relatively liberal Islam with ʿAshur to serve the public good of Tunisians, became 
a complete anti-theology with Lakhdar. In 2011, Lakhdar revisited his experience in the first seminars 
with ʿAshur describing the scene, “ʿAshur came to teach the higher education circle at 10am [in Zitouna] 
that’s when I crept out of my classroom to attend his Ḥalaqah (circle), indifferent to the zero that I would 
receive.” 383 When ʿAshur noticed young Lakhdar’s interest with this teaching, he was “quick to take me 
under his wings.” Though Lakhdar did not instantly turn a secular scholar, the road for his “problematic 
secularism” was charted as we will see below. 
Lakhdar grew up exquisitely compliant to the diversity of ideas in Tunisia as he was exposed early 
on to different modes of religiosity in Islam. He absent-mindedly broke many Islamic rules that amount 
to taboos in other places in the Middle East. Should one attribute Lakhdar’s disposition toward secularism 
to his early education and his exposition to a relatively tolerant Islam? Even though Ibn ‘Ashur’s pluralistic 
Islam exerted a vast influence on Lakhdar’s early childhood, Islam was not the only factor in the making 
of a vanguard of secularism in the Arab world. To fully grasp what he means by ʿAlamniyya, that rarely 
figured in his early writings of the 1960-70s, one should turn to interrogate the cultural and social 
constellation that completed his transition from one end of the spectrum to the other. Years of 
dispossession and deprivation had dared Lakhdar to be transgressive, goaded him to trample cultural 
taboos, thrusted him to take excessive measures.  
Distraught and vulnerable, Lakhdar was doomed to live in a traditional society that prizes family 
and despises broken families, which usually meant incurring debts and paucity. Countryside life in Tunisia 
stacked many physical and psychological inhibits before young Lakhdar, who instantly turned to be the 
man in his family with the death of his father. It also was a major factor in shaping his relationship with 
his mother. His mother could not re-marry after the passing of her husband, for in rural Tunisia under 
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French colonial rule, “it was a custom not to remarry when you have a grown-up child.”384 Lakhdar 
invariably felt guilty for depriving his mother of the pleasure of remarrying. His writings that aimed at 
“freeing Arab societies from its burdening guilt” probably originate in this experience. This guilt petrified 
adolescent Lakhdar and unnecessarily plagued his relationships with his mother. 
The years that followed his father's death were particularly harsh on Lakhdar and his generation. 
Not only that he lost his childhood innocence at a very young age, but also the deteriorating conditions of 
post-war Tunisia took staggering tolls on Lakhdar’s family. Post WWII Tunisia experienced an economic 
crisis in agriculture as “many colonial farms” as historian Zussman argued on her book on rural Tunisia, 
were “abandoned for five years, during which time crops perished, animals died, and equipment 
disappeared.”385 In his recollections Lakhdar writes that he survived the hardship of the Second World 
War just barely; five of his brothers could not survive and died very young. Bashīr, his only remaining 
brother and the only survivor of Tunisian WWII ordeal, grew up to be a lawyer. Death and loss figured 
frequently in Lakhdar’s writings, underwriting his thought on mourning, the past, and memory. The sight 
of death was a mainstay in his life that triggered him to attempt suicide “20 times in his life.” 
Schooling Career  
Growing up in a hamlet of only a few tents, Lakhdar was not destined to attend school. The village 
of farmworkers has its own slow rhythm of life and offered all sort of farmhand works but not education. 
There was no tradition of learning in his family or his village. Schooling, however, was not alien to the 
village dwellers; learning the Quran in the Kutab was a daily practice not only to well to do families. No 
modern school was available in Makthar but the Kutab filled the gap. It was by mere accident that Lakhdar 
joined school. In one of the wintery days of the early 1940’s when he was 10 years-old, he escorted the 
son of his father’s landowner to school. The school director had him enrolled to classes only to save the 
deprived child the climatic weather. Indeed, Makhtar has unpredictable weather. Dry in the summer, it 
has a continental climate with significant annual variation in temperature: cold winters and warm summers 
and occasional snowfall during the first months of the year. It turned out that this capricious weather 
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played well into Lakhdar’s hands. Against all odds he ended up enrolling into his village’s school that he 
was not destined to go to and instantly proved a distinguished and gifted boy. His family welcomed this 
admission and excellence with extraordinary excitement. Ironically, his family’s jubilation was not due to 
their son’s success and the promise of breaking away with the entrenched poverty of his village. Rather, 
Lakhdar parents’ euphoria actually rested on religious grounds. In their small world, the parents 
envisioned their “literate” son to learn how to recite the Quran on their grave upon their death. Literacy 
in rural Tunisia meant for the most part knowing the Quran by memory. General knowledge of the Quran 
begot its holders a social esteem and a high status. Dignitaries did not necessarily grasp the intricacies of 
the Quran but knew how to recite it by heart.386  
The Tunisian educational system at the first half of the twentieth century offered different 
schooling opportunities. For Lakhdar and his ilk, however, only two ways of Islamic instruction were 
available and within reach. The French school system, as well as the newly established Alliance school 
for Jewish students, remained beyond Lakhdar’s pale. It was either the Zitouna or the more progressive 
Sadiq school that were within reach for Lakhdar, so he was predestinated to attend one of them. He ended 
up enrolling into Zitouna for it was a boarding school with a free tuition. However, he was fortunate to 
attend a reformed Zitouna, a privilege his previous generation could not have entertained.  
A constellation of incidents at the beginning of the 20th century led to a series of reforms that 
shacked the fundamental tenets of this institute. In 1898 Mohammad BouʾAtru, grandfather of Al-Tahir 
Bin ʿAshūr, decreed a committee to put together a plan to reform the instruction at Zitouna. Beside 
Jurisprudence and religion, grammar and linguistics, Hadith and Kalam, this institute expanded to include 
modern topics. So it was. The institute embarked on teaching history, geography, arithmetic and geometry, 
expanding far away from the core “religious” topics. These were eventful years in Zitouna. Mohammad 
ʿAbduh, an awe-inspiring scholar of Islam from Egypt, visited Tunis in 1903 to encourage and support 
these reforms that stirred controversy in Tunisia at the time. Despite the morale boost that ʿAdbuh’s visit 
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brought to the reform movement, these reforms were chiefly sustained and upheld by new class of 
progressive scholars: the Sadiqs. This was the nickname of students who graduated from the Sadiq School, 
which was established by Khair Al-Dinn in 1874. These students would join Zitouna and tilt the balance 
towards reform-oriented teachers (before it turned back against them after independence.) By the time 
these reforms took effect, Lakhdar’s cohort was the first to reap its fruits. It is by mere accident that he 
was able to evade the most rigorous Islamic teaching and take advantage of the more open Islamic 
tradition, which was valorized by the Sadiqs and the ʿAshūr family.  
Within the Sadiq school the ʿAshūr family dominated. Upholding Khair al-Dinn directives and 
legacy, they took their school as a stage to disseminate Islamic teachings that incorporated Western ideas. 
Taking their model and inspiration from the contemporary French school system in Tunisia, they 
challenged the superiority of the traditional Zitouna School, which callously steered away from French 
model and called for a strict interpretation of the Quran. Many graduates from the openly reform minded 
Sadiq School would penetrate the Zitouna School at the late 1930s, moderating its animosity and acrimony 
to different readings of Islamic texts. Lakhdar’s generation was the first to favorably benefit from this 
temporary fusion between the reform-oriented Sadiq teachers and the conservative-bent Zitouna institute. 
Nowhere, however, Zitouna was to be seen as a liberal institute for Islamic teaching. Despite the merge 
of the Sadiq students in Zitouna, the new Sadiq teachers would soon be squeezed out and remain a 
marginal factiona within this obsolete institute.  
Yet, despite the drastic changes in Zitouna’s curricula, Lakhdar describes a fairly gloomy 
experience in this institution in its high years. He attended this school thanks to a financial help of his 
uncle soon after completing the Kutab.387 He was not a suitable fit for this school/mosque of which 
renowned medieval philosopher Ibn Khaldun graduated. More than 1300 years old, the oldest madrassa 
in the Islamic and Arab world, the Zitouna nonetheless kept focusing primarily on Arabic and Islamic 
studies after the reforms. Lakhdar owes his oceanic knowledge of theology and Arabic, two topics he 
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profusely wrote about, to these years at Zitouna. It is plausible to argue that Lakhdar’s painful experience 
in Zitouna was prescribed even before he embarked on his studies at this institute. Two years before 
enrolling in Zitouna, he stumbled on Taha Hussain’s Al-Ayyam, the first autobiography in Arabic that 
reverberated around the Arab world for years. It is not the nostalgia that caught Lakhdar’s attention upon 
reading Al-Ayyam as the dreadful experience Hussain endured in Al-Azhar. Hussain retells his longing and 
dreams as a child to attend Al-Azhar only to turn against its directives and philosophy as a student. Lakhdar 
was seized by Al-Ayyam’s spirit, who was 18-years-old when he read this gripping autobiography. He 
soon “took the pledge to become a writer like Hussain” whose travels to Paris presented him with a 
preliminary blueprint of a life well worth imitating. Like Hussain’s experience in Al-Azhar, Lakhdar 
vividly recounts being alienated and secluded in the Zitouna institution that loathed and detested Egyptian 
writers he clandestinely endeared. Students at Zitouna, Lakhdar recalls, were “alarmingly reprimanded to 
steer clean from Egyptian writers”388 for these Egyptian writers were commonly accused of questioning 
Islamic faith by undermining the authority of medieval scholars such as Bukhari, the author of one of the 
Sihah Hadiths compilations. Lakhdar retells an illuminating episode in which he was caught reading a 
book by Salama Musa on Darwin theory. Surreptitiously, he also managed to put his hands on Egyptian 
writer al-ʿAqād’s controversial work “Allah,” (God) which validates his initial “doubts about religions.”389 
In this book, al-ʿAqād tells the story of the creation and the later emergence of the divine doctrine. Al-
ʿAqād unveils the intermingled story of man and God. It is a story of how man took gods to be God, a 
story about man’s long path from polytheism to monotheism. Reading this Egyptian literature forever 
recast the child from Makthar, sanctioning his unsubstantiated suspicions about God’s revealing truths.   
With his reading of Egyptian literature, the contrast between Lakhdar and his milieu grew palpable. 
He resentfully reiterates his exclusion while being labeled “Muʿtazili”, which, he says, was synonymous 
to zindiq (undercover renegade.) This experience would not ever leave him, but increasingly impress upon 
his personality. “The house, the school, and the wrenching poverty all contrived to destroy my self-
confidence.” He asserts, “I was fortunate that the Tunisian National Library, not far away from the school, 
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gave me the opportunity to build my self-confidence step by step.”390 Taha Hussain, Salama Musa, and 
al-Aqād, the three nahḍawi scholars whose scholarship restructured modern Arab literary imaginations, 
held a grip on young Lakhdar in navigating his life. 
Surviving unsympathetic high school, Lakhdar’s feelings of un-belonging grew stronger by each 
passing day. He, nonetheless, would pursue his higher education in Law school in the capital, Tunis. It is 
here, at this multicultural city with its francophone-oriented culture, that he wears off his rural 
provincialism and open up to the world. Francophobic culture saturated Tunis, the capital, and remained 
as such years after the departure of the colon in March 1956. It is not clear how he managed to get into 
the capital and attend this school. One can certainly argue that he followed his reading as guidance to his 
life, dismissing real life hardships. His harping on “the long-lasting impact of reading experiences at the 
National Library” must not be brushed away. Lakhdar envisioned a different future than the one his 
background proscribed to him. This vision, formed in his youth, was shaped by Taha Hussain’s 
autobiography, but also by a pressing feeling that he belonged to a different setting. The label Muʿtazili 
meant for him more than swimming against the stream. He was a complete outsider, an exile in his 
hometown, the true outcast. As he retells these sporadic incident, the meaning of secularism, articulated 
against everything traditional, repressive, and even poverty, unfolds. 
Political Engagement in Tunis 
Though Lakhdar chose to study Law, he had a tepid passion about it when compared to his 
insatiable appetite for Arabic poetry and humanities. As soon as he graduated in 1957, his career as an 
attorney came to an abrupt, and quite dramatic end. One of the first contentious cases in Tunisian court 
history came his way. A certain Sāleḥ Najār, a defector of the main Dustor party, roiled Tunisian politics 
at its first decade when he was falsely accused of attempting a political murder of premier Habib 
Bourguibah (1956-1987), Tunisia’s first president.391 The defection and rancor within the Dustor party 
shaped Tunisian politics in its first decade. Lakhdar was student affiliated with the Dustor party of 
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Bourguibah, when the main party was split into two parties on the eve of the independence. The hard wing 
of the Dustor party, led by Sāleḥ Bin Yousuf and Sāleḥ Najār, refused to accept French authorities bid for 
Tunisian independence as the French protectorate approached its end. Bourguibah, on the other hand, 
headed the moderate wing, which was poised to compromise with the French on the nature and size of the 
new independent state and therefore agreed to accommodate French bid for independence. 
The rupture within the Dustor party, the main national party that guided the nation to its 
independence since 1934, into two rivalries was an event that molded Bourguibah’s personality and 
approach. Bourgibah’s one-handed diktats and repressive policies were haunted by this historic breakup 
of the party that at one point seemed to shatter the very existence of the country. Always cautious and 
wary, president Bourguibah saw danger lurking to his new regime from those who deserted his party and 
took refuge, and encouragement, from Nasser of Egypt. Sāleḥ Najār and Bin Yusuf, harangued 
Bourguibah from Egypt. Nasser used them as political venues to express his discontented with Tunisian’s 
leader who was deeply suspicious of pan-Arabism and doggedly refused to align himself with Nasser. 
Bourguibah’s disagreement with Nasser put him on a collision course with many Arab countries. 
Lakhdar, only 20-years-old, was a fresh lawyer when he took to defend Najār and his three 
conspirators for their failed attempt on Bourguibah’s life. As a new lawyer, Lakhdar solemnly believed 
that his defendants were victims to what he called later an “enlightened despot.” The idea of “enlightened 
despot” reflects how Lakhdar and his generation felt toward their president. Bourgibah was a very 
fascinating but capricious man. He “sought reconciliation and partnership with Europe”392 but he never 
backed down on his righteous place in Tunisian politics. As one of the leading figures of the Dustor Party, 
and the founding father of Tunisia, Bourguibah thought of himself as the legitimate president of this small 
country.393  
Standing up against Tunisian authorities proved detrimental to the young and novice lawyer. 
Lakhdar’s defendants were soon executed (except Najār who flee to Egypt) and the authorities imposed 
on Lakhdar an open-ended house arrest for his “forged evidence” of potential murderers of the president. 
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Lakhdar, apparently, did not grasp what is at stake for premier Bourguibah. However, Lakhdar managed 
to flee the country in a matter of three years. In 1961, with the help of a group of Algerian Marxists close 
to Ben Bella, a well-known fighter against French colonialism in Algeria and the first prime minister, 
Lakhdar left Tunisia initially to Algeria and then to Paris. In one of the last articles published a few months 
before committing a convulsing suicide in his Parisian apartment, Lafif Lakhdar wrote that his self-
imposed exile in Paris on 1 October 1961 as his true birthdate. 
First Journey to Europe: Intellectual formation  
Before leaving Tunisia fleeing the restrictive house arrest, to which he would return only briefly 
20 years later in 1981, Lakhdar could not evade the heat of politics that ripped through Tunisia. In his 
childhood, Lakhdar’s political orientations were shaped by the controversies around the reforms in 
Zitouna. In his youth, however, Lakhdar’s politics were formed around Tunisian independence. Soon after 
its independence declaration, Tunisia’s legendary president passed the Personal Affairs Law (Qanun al-
Ahwal Al-Shakshiyya) in 1956, that in more than one way set Tunisia apart from the rest of the Arab world. 
While the majority of Arab states heavily borrowed their constitutions from a variety of Western models, 
they were reluctant and wary of effecting any change in the family laws. John Esposito, a veteran historian 
of the Arab world, pointed out that “while most Muslim governments replaced Islamic law with legal 
systems inspired by western secular codes, Muslim family law (marriage, divorce, and inheritance) 
remained in force.”394 Tunisia was different. The Personal Affairs Law (PAL) passed by Bourguibah was 
unique since it enshrined women’s rights in the constitution by explicitly setting limits on girls’ marriage 
age at 17 and men at 20. It was the first, and the most profound, law that amended old-dated family laws 
that prevailed in the Middle East.395 The Sheikhs of Zitouna met the PAL with fierce rejection not on the 
grounds that it outlaws polygamy, nor for the fact that this new law gives full rights for Tunisian women 
to balk at arranged marriages, disobey forced marriages, and dispute divorce. For many Sheikhs, however, 
curtailing men’s pejoratives are not much of concern as the consequences these reforms made possible. 
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The PAL not only set in motion new politics, but also remade history and the way it is remembered and 
practiced. According to Saba Mahmood, who conceder this law as a new invention of the nineteenth-
century, though the law is Islamic, it nonetheless was an European creation. Mahmood argues that “while 
the colonizers imposed their own forms of commercial, criminal, and procedural codes in the colonies, 
the family laws they devised were understood to emanate from the religious and customary laws of the 
native peoples. Given that religion was understood to embody the “true spirit” of the colonized people 
(recall the Orientalist construction of “the East” as essentially religious and spiritual), it is not surprising 
that family law came to be grounded in the religious traditions of the communities that the colonial powers 
ruled over for 150 years. Notably, just as family law was invented from fragments of various juridical and 
customary traditions, so was the univocality and unanimity of the religious traditions to which the newly 
formulated family law was supposed to correspond.”396 While Bourguibah and his affiliates thought that 
they were defending progressive morals and remaking the new Arab man, they also thought that anyone 
who disputes the rational of the PAL is illiterate, conservatives, and patriarchal. The categories that the 
new law engendered or reinforced (progressive verses backward, reformer verses conservative, modern 
verses traditional) influenced Lakhdar’s vocabulary and outlook.   
During these years, Lakhdar found himself fencing off any critique against the law; he was 
completely engrossed by Bourguibah’s politics of modernity, progressivism, and crude secularism. He 
would campaign and lobby the PAL in villages and country towns around Tunisia with other students who 
were part of the Dustor Party’s student charter. Repeating the same ideas taunted by Bourguibah, Lakhdar 
grew accustomed to a new political dictionary. This encounter with the “traditional” and “conservative” 
movement reasserted to Lakhdar that Bourguibah’s ideas of progress rang true. This encounter was not 
neutral however. It framed young Lakhdar’s early ideas while helping in forming his visions. Though not 
confrontational at this point of his intellectual evolution, Lakhdar had certainly marked the direction and 
outlines his forthcoming thinking towards his secularism.  
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The introduction of PAL touched off a trench war between modernists and conservatives, between 
Francophone Tunisian elite in the capital and the rest. Though the disparity between rural and urban 
Tunisia is not new, with the new politics of Bourguibah’s modernity, this split was increasingly politicized 
and weaponized. Lakhdar, aware of the advantages of the law, supported it passionately. Suddenly, and 
against all odds, the inhabitant of Makthar found himself aligned with the Tunisian elite against his 
countrymen. That new affiliation and alignment affected his political outlook and shaped his intellectual 
position. Lakhdar turned from a villager to a true urbanite, from a rural child to a cosmopolitan. When he 
fled Tunisia in 1961, Lakhdar was already deeply politicized. 
His first foray to Paris did not last more than a few months however. Lakhdar would leave Paris 
for East Europe, passing through East Germany to get to Czechoslovakia where he lived and experienced 
firsthand the life under socialism. His short stint in Eastern Europe would disappoint him, impress on him 
an undeniable doubt about socialism. Though Lakhdar remained a staunch Socialist at this point in his 
life, some qualms began chipping away at his earlier believes in Socialism and Marxism. What he saw in 
East Europe was dystopic, a less than worthy model to imitate. Soon, with the news of the looming 
independence of Algeria in 1962, he would leave Europe for a longer stay in the Middle East, where he 
developed as a writer. 
Exploring the Middle East 
It is puzzling how Lakhdar managed to reach out to so many influential personalities. With the 
long anticipated independence of Algeria in 1962, Lakhdar was lured to leave East Europe and headed 
back to the newly independent country to live the socialism experiment. In Algiers, he succeeded in 
establishing a close and sustained relationship with Algeria’s first President Ahmad Ben Bella through his 
resistance group that fought France. This is the same group of revolutionaries that helped Lakhdar flee the 
house arrest after his case with Najār failed. Lakhdar’s sympathy towards Algeria’s fight against the 
French colon was shaped his Marxist ideas. As he attested Marxism had infiltrated his mind not for 
ideological as much as practical reasons: “hopeless poverty inflected me with narcissistic wounds that 
formulated my political conviction since childhood…so I was not driven [to Marxism] by deep theoretical 
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conventions but only by class instincts.”397 But why did he turn to Marxism? One could argue that Marx 
writings had their moment in the Middle East at the time. Marxism enhanced Lakhdar’s capacity to express 
his thought and enabled him to articulate and rework his ideas on poverty. “I projected my resentment 
towards the rich who wounded my narcissism, namely humiliated me as a child and adolescent, on the 
rich whom I finally found a miracle term to call: bourgeoisie.”398 Marxism opened a new horizon for 
Lakhdar and his generation and had a revolutionary affect on the Arabic speaking world; not only 
facilitating a new way to decipher an old, complex societal hierarchy, but also hammering out a new 
language that allowed intellectuals to better voice their concerns about long-standing injustices and 
inequality in Arab societies. Marxism was a vocabulary as much as a revolution. Words like class, 
anachronism, proletariat were buzzwords as Lakhdar was growing up out of his village provincialism. 
Upon reading the Capital, for example, Lakhdar wrote in 1965 in Arab Studies that it relocated him to “a 
different mental continent.” Such was the extent to which Marxism echoed and resonated among 
Lakhdar’s generation. 
In Algeria, Ben Bella put him in touch with the editors of “Al-Thūra wal-ʿAmal” an unassailable 
Marxist journal, where he initiated a career in writing. Regrettably, Ben Bella was overthrown after merely 
two and a half years in power in a bloodless military coup led by army strongman and his close friend 
Houari Boumadianne in 1965. Lakhdar was shoved out of this new post-colonial state that was 
preoccupied with healing its wounds from the 130 years of French colonization. His close friendship with 
Ben Bellah, now under house arrest, lasted longer however. Ben Bella was released to Paris upon the 
passing of Boumadianne in 1980, where he crossed paths with Lakhdar. It is highly probable that 
throughout the 1980s Ben Bella financed and bankrolled Lakhdar’s work.399 Ben Bella led a fairly 
comfortable life despite his exile. His popularity among Arab leaders with a national bent; his experiments 
at land reforms and past heroic fighting against colonial France gained him public appeal in the Arab 
world. Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussain, infused him with money from which Lakhdar benefited.400  
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Lakhdar spent twelve years in the Mashriq as soon as he left Algeria. It was in Beirut where he 
associated and immersed himself with the nascent Palestinian resistance factions, which both earned him 
precious familiarity with the main scholarly journals in the Arab world and offered him extensive 
visibility. Before setting sail to Beirut, Lakhdar was not ideological yet. In Beirut, however, his radicalism 
and ideology hardened. Beirut was a true home for Lakhdar, a safe heaven for scores of exiled and 
displaced writers, poets, and authors like him. Lakhdar continued his writing, now tinged with Marxist 
tone, on the failed resistance of the Palestinian parties. In 1971 he published his first book From Parisian 
Commune to Amman Massacre, a work that compared the failures of the two defeated movements: The 
Parisian Commune that was crushed and shattered in the 1870s and the Palestinian resistance in Black 
October 1970. His comrade, Ṣādiq al-ʿAẓm, a firm and unapologetic Marxist, provided him with a decent 
shelter and access to the main journals and intellectual community. Lakhdar’s first writings also met 
ʿAẓm’s foremost interests: criticizing the resistance and its strategies. It was here that he translated the 
Marxist Manifesto in 1968.Yet Beirut cultural war took a staggering toll and left him indignant and deeply 
enraged.  
Lakhdar’s initial frustration stemed from his unamiable debates with hardheaded socialists and 
dedicated Arab Marxists, who commonly called Arab Leninists. In the years before and after the 1967 
war, the Arab cultural landscape was exploding with intellectual debates on Marxism and Existentialism 
many of which spilled over into daily debates in cafes and public squares. The numerous political and 
academic journals that appeared at this time bear witness to this cultural effervescence. In this climate, all 
ideas were up for debates except doubting or calling into question Marxism. To criticize Marxism in those 
years amounted to a sheer political suicide, a sheer intellectual madness. This was precisely the path 
Lakhdar took when he made public his qualms and misgivings about Marxism after his visit to East 
Europe. He was instantly accused of treason. Treason is the word his close friend and one of the main 
comrades of Marxism in those years, Yassin Al-Hafiz, used to describe Lakhdar. The latter accused him 
of espionage. Mohammad Yazīd, Algeria’s ambassador in Beirut, claimed that he knew the bank account 
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number the CIA had opened to channel money to Lakhdar.401 Lakhdar’s main blasphemy, it turned out, 
was that he assaulted Marxism and its application in the Arab world. But what Lakhdar’s question reveals 
is that Arab Marxism was not a mere ideology- it was a consecrated identity.  
“Marx was a dreamer” Lakhdar would write in the late 1990s, recalling the events of late 1960s’, 
that left him hermit and recluse. “One ought not forget that Marx idealism/utopianism came to him through 
his reading of sacred books that enforced the idea of Mahdi.”402 Repudiating Marxism, however, meant 
losing the entitlement to prestigious intellectual clubs, journals, intellectual salons and publications. 
Lakhdar, the rising intellectual from North Africa, the new scout in the highly ideological intellectual 
scene in Beirut, fell out of grace abruptly. This is how a promising, daring, and genuine intellectual was 
blocked and marginalized. Before even starting his career, Lakhdar’s innovation was stifled. His articles 
were rejected and many publishers would shun publishing his works. Jūrj Ṭarābishī, the editor of the 
journal Arabic Studies (Dirasat ʿArabiyya) during the 1970s, was one of these publishers who declined 
Lakhdar’s articles. Lakhdar would vanish thereafter. Beirut offered a bubbly intellectual scene but was 
intolerant towards, always unforgivable, of difference. Lakhdar feeling squeezed out of the main stage of 
the intellectual debates, left to Paris, holding grudge against editors like Ṭarābishī, probably the most 
influential figure among Arab intellectuals, for purposely marginalizing him and rejecting his articles. 
A late-comer to Marxist philosophy, Lakhdar was among the first to revoke it. He took on himself 
the Marxist mantle because it resonated with his life condition in Tunisia and Algeria. In Beirut, however, 
Marxism looked to him extremely theoretical. Isolated, disgruntled, and aloof, Lakhdar had a deep belief 
that no one could understand and appreciate his intellectual positions. He failed to convince his Arab 
comrades of what he had seen in East Europe. The countless shortcomings of the Socialist model he 
observed first hand, which featured squalid conditions, crowded living, and abject poverty, continued to 
inspire countless Arab intellectuals, to his dismay. Through his exchanges with Eastern Europeans, 
Lakhdar understood that Marxism makes a huge disservice to these peoples, perpetuate social disparities, 
and even outmaneuver lower classes. As far as Lakhdar is concerned many Arab intellectuals overlooked 
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or were simply unaware of this socialist excessiveness. His suspicions grew stronger since that visit. 
Lakhdar has never overcome that first-hand impression, it was an experience which was etched his psych 
permanently. In his writings, however, he directed his criticism against Arab Leninists and Arab socialism 
and less to Marxism as an ideology.403 This was the ground on which he decided to leave to Paris. 
Truth Between Lakhdar and Ghannushi 
Paris was no strage city for Lakhdar. A vast network of Arab intellectual activities flourished in 
Paris with Lakhdar’s arrival in 1979. Hundreds of Lebanese writers fleeing the civil war in Lebanon took 
refuge in the city of lights. An extensive Arabic publishing houses flourished in Paris, with intellectual 
circles, journals, and even Arab news all endowed Paris with a home feeling for Lakhdar. In fact, it was 
in Paris that his connection to his original country emerged. From the northen rim of the Meditterranean, 
Lakhdar began writing a weekly column, publishing his first works on the Turāth. His initial debates with 
Arab Marxists gave way to high interest in commenteries on Tunisian politics and culture.  
In March 2005, a book on the life of prophet Mohammad, entitled The Unknown in the Prophet’s 
Life (al-Majhūl min Ḥayat al-Rasūl) was published, stirring a startling controversy in Tunisia. The book 
posted very serious questions around Mohammad’s ‘virile’ behavior and doubted his genealogy- 
(questioning whether or not his mother Amina was truly pregnant with him when her husband passed 
away while probing the identity of Mohammad’s true father). The book was signed under the pseudonym 
Al-Maqrizi, the name of a medieval historian who lived in Egypt between 1364-1442. The preface, 
however, was signed by the name Nāhid. The concealments and enigma around the identity of the author 
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fueled public and intellectual debates that incidentally embroiled Lakhdar.404 Why were the fingers 
pointed at Lakhdar? 
Rāshid Ghannoushi, the leader of the chief Islamic party in Tunisia (Ennahda), published a 
scathing denunciation of the book while insinuating that Lakhdar, or one of his coterie, was the author of 
the book. 405 This statement rose the stakes of this otherwise insignificant book and immediately emotions 
ran high among Arab intellectuals. In a world torn between Islamic fatwas and authoritarian regimes, this 
declaration was “construed as a fatwa condemning Akhdar [Lakhdar] to death” states the Haaretz 
newspaper.406 One more secular writer was marked. That condemnation/fatwa sent waves of dread and 
mortification among Arab intellectuals like Lakhdar. Physical violence against secular intellectuals had 
been regular and had grown steadily ever since the 1980s. In Cairo militants used guns and explosions to 
scare off tourists and impose their culture on society. In 1992 they murdered Egyptian writer Faraj 
Fudah.407 In Khartoum, militants publicly executed Mohammad Mahmood Taha for his critical writings 
and unrestrained pronouncements against Islam. On June 22, 1993, Algerian Mohammed Boukhobza, a 
professor of sociology, had his throat slit in his home by five fundamentalists who tied up his daughter 
and forced her to watch. Alarmed and petrified, Arab intellectuals rushed to support Lakhdar’s free speech 
regardless of what the book called for. Although Lakhdar had denied writing the book, the accusations 
forced him to respond and soon he got embroiled in a debate that he did not want. 
The memory of the despicable murder of anti-theological writers fed fear and panic among 
Lakhdar and progressive intellectuals. Yet, while these incidents rarely led to murdering Arab intellectuals 
(except in few and extraordinary cases) they nonetheless framed Arab intellectuals on the Left as 
secularists, a term that took on a new meaning. Though secularism was available condition before these 
accusations and incidents, these incidents re-enacted and reaffirm the secular identity. These intellectuals 
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also played their role to reinforce a narrative of duality in the contemporary Arab world where they 
conceived of themselves fighting uncompromised Islamists, conservatives, and fundamentalists on the 
other side of the intellectual spectrum. This newfound duality branded them mistakenly secular scholars 
intent on smearing Islam, desacralizing Mohammad and questioning his prophecy. In other words, 
secularism took its new meaning less from Europe, but through the immediacy of the growing violence 
against Arab intellectuals on the Left. The violence here worked to secure these intellectuals as secularists, 
reframing them from the previously known Arab Left to secularism.  
The executions, slaying and slaughtering of irreligious intellectuals was still fresh memory among 
Arab intellectuals. While these events are tragic, they also created new identities. It is within this 
understanding that within two months of the condemnation of Lakhdar that more than 600 intellectuals 
and academics denounced incitements against writers for expressing their ideas and signed a petition. The 
Arab organization for the Protection of Freedom of Expression and the Press organized a petition against 
‘obscurantist religious extremism,’ which called for the protection of Lakhdar’s life and freedom. I want 
to argue here that what this petition was doing is much more than protecting Lakhdar’s right to write 
freely. In fact, this petition was naming things, securing the current narrative and reinforcing arbitrary 
dualities. It also remade Lakhdar’s secular identity, previously vague and ambiguous. It drew capricious 
boundaries and institutionalized the dualities between the two factions. Lakhdar’s name, suffering for long 
time from obscurity and marginalization, resurrected and grew stronger as a rising secular thinker. As far 
as Lakhdar is concerned, it was Ghannoushi, whose portrait the Western media championed as a rational 
and moderate Islamist and reformer,408 who stood behind that incitement. Lakhdar’s secular thinking had 
never been as crystal clear as when it was compared with his countryman- Ghannoushi.  In his mind 
Ghannoushi envisioned moderate Islam as the only path through which Arab world problems are resolved. 
Lakhdar maintained that moderate Islam is the source of all problems in the Middle East. Two men, two 
perspectives.  
Lakhdar Work on Turāth 
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Ghannoushi’s accusations based on a substantial evidence. Three years after that notorious book 
on the life of Mohammad, Lakhdar published one of his most original writings which, indeed, was on the 
life of Muhammad. In From Mohammad al-Iman to Historic Mohammad, (Min Mohammad al-Īmān ila 
Mohammad al-Tarīkh) Lakhdar cites many of the Hadiths that also figure in The Unknown from the 
Prophet Life. One should bear in mind that Ghannoushi claimed that both the writing style and reasoning 
of the disowned biography of Mohammad clearly suggests that Lakhdar was behind the work, if not as an 
author, then certainly as an advisor. Ghannoushi might have been right given the historical record Lakhdar 
had. During the 1960s, Lakhdar published more than a dozen works under fake names like Hamdan Al-
Kamati, Abou Munis, and Muntasir ʿAlaykum.  
What was in this work that broke the cultural taboo? Lakhdar contemptuously brushed the book 
aside as Christian propaganda (the book was published in a Christian website Kalemah.) The book tells 
the unknown story of Mohammad’s life through his wives’ perspective. The prophet emerged as salacious, 
sexually driven, and even savagely licentious. More distressing to its Arab readers is the image that 
Mohammad bends diverse ‘Quranic verses’ to satiate his human needs. Unfettered by any moral and 
ethical inhibition, Mohammad perceived himself as sultan more than a spiritual, peace seeking leader. 
Though this is not a far cry from Lakhdar’s work on Mohammad childhood, that explores the lasting 
effects of several incidents on the formation of the prophet’s personality.  
In Min Mohammad al-Īmān ila Mohammad al-Tarīkh, Lakhdar’s last work addresses 
contemporary understanding of Mohammad’s image as a vehicle to redress the Turāth. Lakhdar 
reconstructs Mohammad’s human condition by deconstructing the sacred status around him. Only by 
historically reconstructing the circumstances that shaped Mohammad and his first circle, Lakhdar 
maintained, writers can show ordinary Muslims the way out of their current predicament, a way that can 
reconcile their Islamic beliefs with modernity.   
To destabilize prevalent cultural attitudes regarding Mohammad in the Turāth, and to bring about 
a paradigm shift, Lakhdar saw fit to embark on the staggering pursuit of reconstructing the world of the 
prophet Mohammad. At first, the exploration of a staunch Arab Leftist of Mohammad’s life seemed to 
reinforce the thesis that many Arab Leftists turned to Islam. Yet, Lakhdar waded into the subtle theme of 
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Mohammad’s childhood, a period that is infamously vague and particularly ambiguous. In light of the 
paucity of details about Mohammad’s childhood, Lakhdar premised his work on the hypothesis that the 
“Quran is no more than Mohammad’s autobiography.” This hypothesis must not be rejected right away 
given that all the available facts about the true, historic Mohammad in his childhood, barely reach “one 
and half pages” and the rest are “myths.”409 
“It is impossible to penetrate the jungle of Muhammad’s psychological personality except through 
the 6236 verses of the Quran.” (p.15) The entire Quran (6236 verses) not only reflects the life of 
Mohammad, but in many ways reveals the “unconscious of Muhammad, with all its ambiguities, 
confusions, and sentimental contradictions.” Mohammad led an inherently unstable and tumultuous life 
and that is conveyed in the Quran, writes Lakhdar. Even without resorting to the sira literature, which is 
bent on fabricating a flawless prophet, one could learn about the personality of Mohammad through the 
Quran, Mohammad “turns from one end to the opposite other, from fatalism to a free choice, from a 
wonton conscious in Mecca, to his absent conscious in Medina.” For Lakhdar, Mohammad had two 
distinguished personalities, “a prophet and poet in Mecca” and “legislator and warrior in Medina.” (p.15) 
The preliminary idea that the Quran is ultimately Mohammad’s autobiography that exposes his 
“unconsciousness and contradictions” is supported by a new definition of the underlying idea of prophecy 
(nibuwah). “The scientific conceptualization of prophecy is that it is a raving affect, namely, ravings and 
hallucinations that come out of human brain that requires treatment.” (p.11) Shedding the myths that 
accrued around Mohammad throughout fourteen hundred years is an essential step in the long journey of 
“cultural re-foundation” that enable Muslims to “live their times.” For Lakhdar this is the rational Islam 
that will be the “wellspring for next generations’ historical knowledge and the history that constitute its 
collective consciousness.” (p.19) 
The child Mohammad was not born a schizophrenic but he became one, contends Lakhdar, in one 
of his many provocative statements. Born to a merely twenty-year-old mother who lost her husband during 
pregnancy, Mohammad grew up at the hands of a “broken-down” Amina who “lost her nerves” watching 
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her husband die in front of her eyes. She was in a deep state of mourning as Mohammad came to this 
world, jolted and distressed from grief and dejection. The “presumption that Mohammad’s mother was a 
pessimist is consequently not a far-fetched idea” argues Lakhdar. Amina was soon to send Mohammad 
off, first, to a nearby wet nurse, Thuwaībah, who was a recently liberated slave of Mohammad’s despised 
uncle Abou Lahab. Later on, however, enfant Mohammad was delivered to a famous wet nurse Halimah 
al-Saʿdiyyah and “probably to many others.” The persistent instability that Mohammad experienced in his 
infancy had detrimental repercussions on his adulthood, Lakhdar asserts. “It left him neurotic”- one’s 
aversion to take risks and his compulsive search for safety lead him to put himself in the riskiest and most 
dangerous situation. Mohammad ended up choosing known dangers over unknown ones.  
Stories from pre-Islamic times made it highly probable that Amina, Mohammad’s mother, 
experienced a particularly prolonged period of sorrow and suffering, like many female poets made it clear 
at time of grief, “there is little doubt that her mourning [over her husband’s death] seeped into 
Mohammad’s lobes of brain as she was pregnant with him.” It is not unlikely that “the psychological 
pressures, anxiety, phobias, obsessions, tragedies, and repeated shocks and traumas that Amina endured 
during pregnancy shaped the new born Mohammad.” Lakhdar cites newly published French psychological 
research to affirm “the impact of the personal psychology of pregnant women on her fetus is a biological 
fact that science has ascertained. This impact prepared the new born Mohammad to have a depressed and 
schizophrenic personality.” (p. 38-39.)   
Mohammad’s schizophrenic personality was reinforced by the proportionally high regularity of 
separating traumas he had to endure, as he was just few weeks old. Why is parting ways with mothers 
constitutes an everlasting trauma? asks Lakhdar. “Because the infant imagines himself in the very first 
months as a biological extension of his mother. Therefore he cries in protest when she ceases nursing him. 
In their first year, infants develop acute awareness of their parent’s affection and love…in this way infants 
develop a strong feeling that they are beloved and taken care of, and they are worth in the eyes of both 
their parents. This satisfactory environment that supports a sense of security and compassion enables 
infants to integrate into this world and in this phase their psychological personality takes shape- through 
assimilating and adopting positions, feelings, and vocal symbols that come from their mothers.” (p.39) In 
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the absence of his father, and in the light of sending him to probably “apathetic and indifferent wet nurses,” 
Mohammad grew up in a “fake familial milieu.” Scores of stories, though unreliable, in the sira literature 
ascertain that Mohammad was petulant and aggressive in his childhood. “In reality, the emotional 
repression that Mohammad endured, and the violent traumas that he went through as fetus and infant 
prepared him to be bellicose: aggressive towards himself and towards others.” (p.41) 
The miracles that the sira literature ascribe to Mohammad’s birth and the “light” that came out of 
Amina as she delivered him, or the easy pregnancy that she had, are all but the “unconscious spices 
necessary for the making of a hero, the fateful man. This attempt is no more than a conscious attempt to 
silent the unsaid: the truth that Amina disliked her son Mohammad.” (p.42-43) 
Mohammad was born guilt ridden, affirms Lakhdar. This overwhelming sense of guilt led to his 
constant depression and frustration. “The seeds of his depressed personality were sown in him with his 
journey from the first three phases [of his development]: as a fetus inside a grieving mother’s womb, as 
infant with a callous wet nurse that ‘tore’ him apart from his [biological] mother, and as a child where he 
witnessed the tragedy of the death of his mother. He was only six years old when his mother died in front 
of his eyes on their way between Mecca and Medina.” (p.43)  
“Those ‘catastrophic effects’ of the bodily separation from mothers at a very young age, left their 
marks on Mohammad’s personality, and dictated his behavior for the rest of his life. Mohammad’s raving 
jealousy to possess so many wives, for instance, while forbidding them from marrying others after his 
death, is rooted in the severe trauma of early separation from his mother.” Wives unconsciously recall 
mothers’ image, Lakhdar adds. “Is it possible that the prophet of Islam compensated, unconsciously, his 
failure to be close to his mother, by possessing so many wives?” wonders Lakhdar. (p. 44) 
Absence of parental compassion in infancy “obstructs maturity” and hinders a healthy process of 
“independence of the character.” Mohammad endured a particularly “harsh Oedipal phase in his childhood 
since he had more than one “father” who took care of him, and his [necessary] clashes with them instill 
an uncompromising “superego”, namely severe and emasculating moral conscious- and one of its solemn 
consequences where delirious feeling of overwhelming guilt.” (p.45) 
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Lakhdar concluded that for a good reason the sira literature couldn’t suppress the fact that 
Mohammad was easily irritated, aggressive and oftentimes daydreamer. “This sequence of shocks and 
traumas shaped Mohammad’s mentality and personality, revolted him and prepared him for psychological 
disorders, from breakdown depressions to schizophrenia through compulsive obsessive neurosis, that 
personified in the severe and extensive rituals that he forced on himself and his followers (ummah.)” 
Lakhdar continues, “it is not unlikely that this excruciating psychological anguish [that Mohammad 
endured] finds its echoes and imaginations of painful agony of the fire of Hell.” (p.45) Lakhdar dedicates 
the rest of the book to affirming this hypothesis by broaching different aspects of raving and hallucinating 
personalities.  
Lakhdar serialized all his works online (on the website Al-Awan and Al-Hiwar al-Mutamadin) to 
ensure their reach and maximize their circulation among the new generation who will be dedicated to 
online sources. What he set himself to do was unlike others. Most of reformists’ and liberal Islamists’ 
efforts were designed to tamp down fundamentalist passion for the sake of a sustainable, incremental 
progress. Lakhdar wanted something else that leads to a total disengagement from Islamic sacred texts. 
He believed that reforming Islam “requires no text”; by that he meant that the prescriptions and references 
that the Quran and the Hadith provide are invalid or at least insufficient since they only offer limited 
repertoire for (today’s) reforms.  
Lakhdar devoted a huge portion of his philosophy to leaders. Except for his very first Marxist 
writings, he invariably wrote for decision makers, policy officials and elites in general as well as to 
students. In the opening of his work Why Reforming Islam he writes: 
“For readers and policy makers. At the beginning of the twentieth century the choice was either 
reform or revolution. At the beginning of the twenty first century the choices became either Islah or 
fawdah (reform or chaos) the way Somalia is. Europe had made the choice of reforms and undermined the 
way for chaos.”410 
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Lakhdar was rattled by Arab leaders’ weariness and dispassion to bring about the necessary 
reforms to fend off chaos. Except for Bourgibah, who was inspired by Ataturk’s example, Lakhdar was 
desensitized about the mechanisms behind Arab leaders and their delirious decision-making. Bullied by 
ignorant populations, Lakhdar explained, Arab leaders resort to “delirious reactions” that derive from 
“lack of courage and prudence.” The inner Marx slumbering in his soul stirred when asked about the 
priorities of the Arab world. “Ignorance had never helped anybody yet,” reiterating Marx, “how can one 
explain the frivolity of Saddam Hussain’s decision to invade Kuwait? Saddam took his inspiration from a 
dream he had to occupy Kuwait.” The same logic applies to Nassir’s “tragic decision to ask the UN forces 
to evacuate the Canal area in 1967, which triggered the war.” The same happened to “Hassan Nassrallah 
when he decided to kidnap three Israeli soldiers.” Lakhdar concludes from these examples and many other 
episodes that bad decision-making is “made possible not only by whims but also by raving.”411 
Arab leaders are viewed as coward, hesitant, and anemic. Unfettered by death threats, Lakhdar 
nudged them to throw away the obsolete policy of containment toward the Muslim Brotherhood and 
instead adopt a more vigorous policy of disengagement. Saving Muslims from the Islam of Medina saves 
lives, Lakhdar advised. It is only by embedding the Islam of Mecca in schools curricula that Arab leaders 
can root a “culture of life.” The Islam of Medina should be shelved in Arab nations' archives. The division 
between the Islam of Madina and the Islam of Mecca, Mohammad of Madina and Mohammad of Mecca, 
confused many observers of Islamic world but for Lakhdar the distinctiveness remains necessary and 
dispensable. “Hegel (1770-1831) hesitated as to how he should classify Islam in the spectrum of ancient 
and modern religions. The reason for his hesitation was that he found in spiritual, non-violent, Meccan 
Islam a reason to classify it as a modern religion. But he also found in legalistic, jihadist, Madinan Islam 
a reason to categorize it as an ancient religion. However, due to his limited knowledge of the violent legal 
category of al-walā’ wal-barā’ (‘Loyalty and Repudiation’), and being carried away by his philosophical 
assumption that those who come later in time must be more modern than those who come earlier, he shed 
his hesitation and said: “Let us classify it as a modern religion like Christianity.”412 Arab leaders treat 
                                                 
411 al-ʻAfīf al-Akhḍar. 
412 Ibid. 
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social and economical life as battlefield, armor themselves up and wall themselves off to new information 
and data.413 
Conclusion 
The life and intellectual arc of Lakhdar repudiates many conventions about Arab intellectual 
history. First, the instinctive inclination to think of Arab thought as originating in the Arab land, at the 
core of the Middle East, is outdated. The case of Lakhdar, whose main output was generated in Paris, 
stands as a rebuttal to this perception. Second, the connection between religion and poverty is not 
inevitable; the socialist convention is that deprived and disadvantaged individuals embrace religion for 
the sake of protection and as a source of solace is not always and invariable valid argument. Lakhdar’s 
life defies this rule and offers a clear example that poverty would also lead to un-theological lifestyle. 
Lastly, secular thought and secularism were developed not necessarily against Islam but in the immediate 
context of the post-colonial condition. Lakhdar secularism emerged as a new agenda against his own past, 
poverty, tradition, and rural circumstances. Though known for his secularism, Lakhdar failed to pin down 
a clear definition of what he meant by the secular. In his writings, however, Lakhdar articulated the secular 
negatively, namely, what it is not. Secularism, as embodied in his life, stands against rural traditions, 
leaders irrationalism, and public conservatism.    
Though revolutionary, Lakhdar remained within the framework of his generation. He proposed 
new ways to treat the sacred by sorting out the rational from the irrational, truth from myths in Islamic 
Turāth. As we will see next, despite his courageous call to do away with some of the most problematic 
Quranic verses, his thinking was confined by the reform model. Now we will turn to another Tunisian 
writer, whose writings proposed to problematizes the reform model, raising question on who benefits from 
this reform agenda.  
 
 
 
                                                 
413 Munim Sirry, Scriptural Polemics: The Qur’an and Other Religions, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). See “Friendship with the Unbeliever.” P. 182-193.  
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CHAPTER VI: YOUNG RADICAL: RAJA BEN SLAMA AND THE NEW ARAB 
WOMEN FACING THE TURĀTH 
By Spring 2016, six of the founding members of the Arab Rationalist Association who had 
convened in 2002 in Jūrj Ṭarābīshī’s apartment in Paris had passed away. With their departure, Arkoun, 
Ṭarābīshī, Abu Zayd, Lafif Lakhdar, Al-ʿAzm, and Shakir Nabulsi, left behind a massive body of writings 
that laid the foundation for the advent of a radical new generation of scholars.414 The second generation 
of the post-colonial Arab state was born during the post-1967 era, two decades after the end of WWII. 
They took the writings of the previous generation as a starting point for protesting against what they 
perceived as “the skewed and unhealthy relationships” between contemporary Arabic speakers and the 
Turāth.  
Over the course of the last two decades of the twentieth century, the first generation of the post-
colonial state were able to carve out a space where they had the freedom necessary to write and think 
critically despite a stringent censorship policy that many Arab states placed on publications, translations, 
and journalism.415 Most significantly they made a remarkable headway in the direction of establishing 
new perceptions and understandings that gave shape to new morals, commitments, and philosophical 
assumptions of the ensuing generation.416 In particular, it was the laborious work of crafting a new 
conceptualization of the Turāth that left a lasting impact on the younger generation. This was made, as we 
have seen in previous chapters, by challenging common readings of the Turāth and reordering the past to 
give voice and presence to the many absences and silences in Arab history. The quest to recast Arab 
collective memory facilitated a new reading of Arab history and the exploration of questions of amnesia 
in contemporary Arab culture. Despite this original work the older generation of Arkoun and his disciples 
                                                 
414 For a full list of the first generation’s members of the Arab Rationalist Association see Wael Sawah, “ʿAshar Sanaūat 
Wal-Sūʿal Yatakarr: Jadal al-Dimocratiyya Wal-ʿIlmaniyya.,” in Al-Awan. April 27, 2017. (After a Decade and the Same 
question keeps pressing: The Dialects between Democracy and Secularity).   
415 Brian Whitaker, What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East (London: Saqi, 2009). 
416 On the differences between the two generations see: Shawqi Bin Hassan, “Jurj Tarabishi: Mughamarat Taḥrir al-ʿAql al-
ʿArabi,” alaraby.co.uk, March 18, 2016. (Tarabishi: The Adventure to Liberate Arab Reason.) 
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were severely criticized for veering away from politics and focusing merely on “plumping the cultural 
domain.”417 Their engagement with the cultural field, it must be added, emanates from their conviction 
that the way history is told and memorized not only shapes choices made by individuals but also configures 
the contours of community, creed and faith. In other words, political change can no longer be effective 
unless predicated on and preceded by arduous cultural work. namely, culture trumps economy, Freud 
trumps Marx (see chapter IV.)  
As the cohort of the founding fathers petered out, a new generation of young intellectuals, who 
had been weaned on their translations and writings, came to the fore as the new leaders of the Association. 
This group of young scholars had a propensity for the radical, reading poststructuralists like Derrida, 
Foucault, and Lacan. Unlike their predecessors, who read Marx and Sartre growing up, the young radicals 
seemed less concerned with class revolution, the disappearance of the Arab bourgeoisie, nationalism and 
independence. Instead they focused on issues of subjectivity, womanhood, difference, and violence. 
Growing up under relatively secular but autocratic regimes, they viewed the (Islamic) opposition with 
suspicion and dread more than they feared the repressive incumbent regimes. They were in no position to 
yield power and authority to the traditionalists.418 Insisting on their right to be culturally different, they 
took pride in engaging the theological field and in defying ubiquitous theological interpretations.419 In 
fact, the engagement of young radicals with the theological field became the new norm, an unimaginable 
pursuit only a few decades ago.  
Assertive and defiant, these young radicals emerged most visibly in the decade that preceded the 
Arab Spring, a decade that saw many sit-ins, street protests and demonstrations in many cities around the 
                                                 
417 Yāsīn Ḥājj Ṣāliḥ. Al-Thaqāfah Ka-Siyāsah: Al-Muthaqqafūn Wa-Masʾūlīyatuhum Al-Ijtimāʿīyah Fī Zaman Al-Ghalayan 
(Beirut: al-Muʾassasah al-ʿArabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 2016). 
418 I use the term traditionalists carefully. This is the word the members of the Arab Rationalist Association used to refer to 
the protagonists of the Turath. It was used interchangeably with the other word Turathists (al-Turathiyyun). This is a group of 
intellectuals who called for a return to the Turath to find a different, more organic and authentic model than the state-
sanctioned modernity.    
419 Bin Slama, one of these young radicals who propagates what she calls “philosophy of difference” and speaking from the 
position of a female, wrote “There are different ways of being a Muslim, above all there is the possibility to be a Muslim 
without being Muslim, the way Derrida was a non-Jew Jew. That means that he no longer disavowed his Jewish roots but his 
thought was not bounded by a Jewish framework.” See Rajāʾ Bin Salāmah. Fī Naqd Insān Al-Jamūʿ. al-Ṭabʿah 1, Mufakkir 
Al-ʿArabī (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿah, 2008), 123.  
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Arab World. The protests they organized, however, played into the hands of their foes (the Traditionalists.) 
In late 2010, as scattered strikes escalated into full-fledged revolutions, ending an era in Arab politics, 
these young radicals saw their dreams come true, though only briefly and for a short time. With the 
beginning of the Arab Revolutions, the Arab world ushered in a new era that initially sparked hope and 
excitement but wound up dampening the mood and expectations. Except in Tunisia, the Arab Spring left 
a bleak sociopolitical landscape in its wake, with little hope for real change. As many observers of the 
Arab Middle East and North Africa have recently attested, the Revolutions in the Arab World ended up 
bringing “Islamists more influence and power than they had ever enjoyed before.”420 The growing power 
and reception of so-called “mainstream Islam” 421 stood at the center of the young radicals’ concerns, as 
they grew less tolerant of traditionalists.  
One expression of this newfound radicalism of the young generation is captured in the subtle shifts 
in their language. The transition from demanding “freedom of belief,” to the insistence on “freedom of 
consciousness” is an emblematic example. Though for many, the differences between the two principles 
remain hardly discernable, they are crucial to the young radicals. While the first principle (freedom of 
belief) is designed to secure individuals a free choice of belief (Islam, Christianity or Judaism,) the second 
is much more radical, since it guarantees individuals the freedom of embracing any religious belief or 
non-belief (atheism, Gnosticism). This shift indicates only the beginning of their departure with the 
previous generation, whose strategy was-- at best-- to try to contain and reverse the authority of 
traditionalists, rather than defying them.  
Unsatisfied with the historical strategy of their predecessors, young radicals designed a different 
approach towards Islamists, the Turāth and its protagonists. Rather than face down Islamists on al-Jazeera 
or in public squares,422 the younger generation preferred to engage the frame of reference that fuels 
                                                 
420 Olivier Roy, “Political Islam After the Arab Spring.” In Foreign Affairs, Volume 96, Number 6. November 2017. P. 128. 
421 The idea of mainstream Islam introduced recently by Shadi Hamid and William McCants. It excludes extremist groups 
and refers to those Islamic parties that “operate within the confines of institutional politics and are willing to work within 
existing state structures, even ostensibly secular ones.” See the introduction in Shadi Hamid and William McCants, eds., 
Rethinking Political Islam, 1 edition (New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
422 See for example Raymond William Baker, Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
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Islamists and traditionalists’ discourse. Following the ideas put forward by the post-structural school, 
young radicals’ primary point of departure was that Islam constitutes a discursive tradition that enables 
not only different modes of religiosity but also non-religiosity. They infused their writings with this kind 
of radicalism that aimed at unmooring current cultural institutions, upsetting faith.They worked to disrupt 
national myths that creatda sense of belonging and attachment for millions of pious men and women who 
uncritically embraced their religion, cultural icons, and national ethos. What makes this group so 
distinctive is their appropriation of new styles of reasoning and new forms of knowledge and persuasion, 
which endow their writings with an irreducible sense of radicalism.  
Rajāʾ Bin Salāmah (henceforth Slama) counts among the youngest scholars of the team. She was 
the first to propound Derrida’s ideas in Arabic to establish the right for women difference She referred to 
the unarticulated history of women in Islam as “Muted Rhetoric” Ṣamt al-Bayyan.423 Slama was 
designated to take a leading role early on when  appointed as the first chief-editor of the openly secular 
website al-Awan in 2007. A woman full of secular passion, with a resolute willingness to state what others 
understood but declined to express, Slama is credited for tweaking the conversation on the secular by tying 
it directly to women bodies. In the contemporary Arab world, she explains, “it is politically correct to talk 
about secularism in general, but one could cross the line when he talks on secularism with regard to women 
bodies or their Hijab.”424 At its core, Slama’s project takes issue with the prevailing cultural parameters 
and taxonomies, or with what is permissible and what is not. Slama demonstrates that it is insufficient to 
raise questions on how lines are being drawn in Arab culture to investigate the sayable and the unsayable. 
This had been the project of the preceding generation. More pertinent to her project now is to show how 
these lines, most often drawn by men, exclude “women.”  
  Though hardly apolitical, Slama shied away from the ideological labyrinth that trapped 
Arab intellectuals for generations. Like many of her associates, Slama felt under no obligation to yet again 
                                                 
423 translated also as Paralyzing, Ṣamt al-Bayyan is the title of one of her early books, see: Raja Ben Slama. Ṣamt al-Bayyan. 
Cairo, al-Majlis al-Aʿlah, 1999.  
424 See the preface to one of her students’ book in Āminah Waslātī. al-Marʾah wa-al-mashrūʿ al-ḥadāthī fī fikr al-Ṭāhir al-
Ḥaddād (Ṣafāqis : Ṣāmid lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʿ, 2012). P.7-8.  
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engage the trope of reform (Iṣlaḥ) that had marked Arab thought since the nahḍa.425 In fact, she positioned 
herself against the Iṣlaḥ movement, a positioning from which her radicalism unfolded. Rather than call 
for “reconstructing a dead tradition,” Slama insisted “on deconstruction” in order broaden the intellectual 
field with new horizons and research possibilities. For Slama, Deconstruction meat plumbing the depths 
of the social and political problems that hobble Arab societies, namely digging up the root textuality that 
underpins morality, community, and emotions. Arab society, Slama maintains, does not only suffer high 
rates of unemployment, education, lack of decent housing, health care, soaring poverty and a gruesomely 
crumbling infrastructure, real problems that Arab governments miserably failed to address. Beside these 
challenges, however, another set of problems seems to elude intellectual scrutiny, namely the unaccounted 
for sexual harassment, early marriage, women’s inferior social position, and the many entrenched attitudes 
of men’s virility that inform their approach toward the Other (women.) As far as Slama is concerned, these 
are not purely political issues but cultural challenges that warrant further investigation. The antidote for 
the current social ills and political crisis is not to be found in the replacement of one political regime with 
another (especially one which might turn out to be more conservative.) In a rebuke to many critics who 
dismissed the project of the Association’s cultural agenda as aprimarily educational project, Slama 
demonstrated that ingrained cultural attitudes toward women, for instance, cannot be reduced to or 
dismissed as mere political issues. Eliminating legal barriers might be helpful and necessary to 
establishing gender equality, Slama argues, but women’s parity with men cannot be reached through 
political legislation. According to Slama, genuine change requires an intellectual effort that would spur a 
grass-roots effort to shift norms. If political legislations were the only means to address Arab women’s 
inferiority then why, asks Slama, did the many legislations that banned female genital mutilation failed to 
quash this activity? Ending the practice that gives women the same legal status as minors, Slama holds, 
must go hand in hand with a shift in embedded cultural orientations.426  
                                                 
425 In a departure with the literature that portrayed the Nahda as a reform project, Makdisi shows that it included a stream of 
thought that was irreducibly radical. See: Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global 
Radicalism, 1860-1914, The California World History Library 13 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 
426 “Who Murdered Dalal?” in Bin Slama. Naqd al-thawābit : ārāʾ fī al-ʿunf wa-al-tamyīz wa-al-muṣādarah (Beirut: Rabitat 
al-ʿAqlaniyin al-Arab, 2005), 106-113. 
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To advance the cause of gender equality, Slama takes a genealogical approach that begins with the 
far past or the Turāth. Praising this approach as the most efficient, Slama explained that genealogy meant 
to excavate the conditions that made women’s inequality with men more acceptable or natural. For Slama, 
the preceding generation of Arab intellectuals was held captive to the idea of historicizing as a means to 
invalidate the textuality of the Turāth. While conceding that this was a good start in the right direction, 
she nonetheless added that historicizing is inadequate for meeting the challenges in Arab society. The 
strategy she lays out for herself is to denaturalize this embedded inequality by turning to study the Turāth, 
not only to historicize it, but also to defamiliarize this lopsidedness between women and men. In her 
writings, Slama pays tribute to the pioneering works of the well-known Moroccan feminist and historian 
Fatma al-Mernissi (1940-2015) for blazing a trail in the direction of establishing the unwritten “Islamic 
women history,” but Slama deploys Derrida’s concepts on the Turāth more efficiently. One should recall, 
however, that Mernissi’s exploration of the Turāth remains foundational in its disruption of gendered roles 
and spaces. Al-Mernissi’s idea of “engineered sexual relations,” for example, gained much popularity in 
the Arab feminist movement.427 Yet, while al-Mernissi’s generation is well studied, very little scholarship 
had addressed Slama’s generation of Arab women feminists. 
Like al-Mernissi, Slama suggests that not only historical but also literary approaches informed by 
psychoanalysis can shed light on less celebratory aspects of the Turāth. The texts of the Turāth are not 
innocuous or objective, writes Slama. She insists that only by uncovering the harm (pain) and revealing 
the (symbolic) violence these out-dated texts incur on modern Muslims, can one address the Turāth. For 
Slama, the textuality of the Turāth is not neutral but deeply biased, since it enables certain views and 
disables others, affirms one way of seeing while precluding others. The Turāth enforces an assortment of 
ethics, conducts, modes of behavior and mores while remaining silent on the flagrant discrimination 
against women’s bodies in society. In her writings, she recounts the unattended violence that these 
obsolete texts facilitate.  
                                                 
427 Bin Slama, “Wadaʿn Fatima Al-Marnisis,” Al-Awan (blog), November 30, 2015, https://www.alawan.org/2015/11/30/ 
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 The transition from historicizing the Turāth to revealing the violence and pain it inflicts on 
women’s bodies and on other vulnerable sectors of society captures the main shift in the generational gap 
between young radicals and their predecessors. Rather than struggle to relegate  the Turāth to the past, 
young radicals portrayed the Turāth, itself, as a problem of the past that spelled trouble in the 
present.According to Slama, the Turāth is a problematic of the past that carried over into the present 
because modern day Arab intellectuals failed to lay the past to rest and “mourn over it.”428 Borrowing the 
idea from Sigmund Freud, Slama argues that mourning is essential for Arab societies to transcending the 
past.429 Slama shows that the roots of the Turāth are poisonous and spread pain throughout the social body, 
not least of all the most vulnerable parts of Arab society. Therefore, Slama warns, it is indispensable that 
“We take a decision regarding our heritage”430 before embarking on any political change. What is the 
decision for which she advocates? What does it look like? What is her evidence and justifications?  
While Slama writes on a diverse range of topics and engages internal political debates in 
contemporary Tunisia, this chapter addresses the three issues in her writings designed to encounter the 
collective slide toward the Turāth. First, her invocation of the muted violence [al-ʿunf al-hadiʾ] generated 
by Islamic laws. Second, her proposals to transform the relation between the sacred and profane domains 
in Arab culture. And third, her prescription for a wholesale reorganization of former history based on the 
invention and re-imagination of new interpretive ties or ʿAlaqah Taʾwiliyyah, which give rise to new 
“hermeneutical connections” with past historical events.431  
The three themes of muted violence, the Turāth, and alternative history made up the core of 
Slama’s intellectual project. Slama interlaced these themes in her work on creative writing, romance in 
Islam, Sunni modes of mourning, death rituals, and the Shariʿa. She explored the fluid relations between 
                                                 
428 Slama developed the idea of modernity as mourning over the past (see below in the chapter.) She appropriated this idea 
from Sigmund Freud’s Melancholia and Mourning. See her article “Al-Ḥadāthah wal- Hiddad” in Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, 
ed., Al-Ḥadāthah Wa-Al-ḥadāthah Al-ʿArabīyah: Muʾtamar Ishhār Al-Muaʾssasah Al-ʿArabīyah Lil-Taḥdīth Al-Fikrī, Muhdá 
Ilá Idwārd Saʿīd, 30 Nīsān/Ibrīl - 2 Ayyār/Māyū 2004, al-Ṭabʿah 1 (Damascus: Dār Bitrā, 2005). 
429 Rajāʾ Bin Slama. Bunyān al-Fuḥūlah : Abḥāth al-Mudhakkar wa-al-Muʾannath (Damascus, Syria: Dar Bitra lil-Nashir, 
2005), 143. 
430 Rajāʾ Bin Slama. Fī Naqd Insān Al-Jamūʿ. al-Ṭabʿah 1, Mufakkir Al-ʿArabī (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿah, 2008), 15. 
431 For a counterpoint to Slama’s secular and hermeneutical approach to the Turath see: Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, 
Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation,” Public Culture 18, no. 2 (March 20, 2006): 323–47. 
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Huddud and romance, the formation of the Shariʿa and the emergence of diverse styles of mourning, and 
the rise of Umma, which facilitated a new style of being. This chapter explores how the second generation 
of post-colonial Arab writers expressed their anxieties and concerns over Islamic history, individual 
freedoms, subjectivity, and the Turāth through the writings of Slama. In what follows I will not limit the 
scope of the interrogation to the ways Slama’s generation embodies new ideals and commitments which 
break with previous generations of intellectuals. The main intent is to explore Slama’s strategies for coping 
with the Turāth. What are the frameworks she fashions to make possible the emergence of a distinctive 
Arab subjectivity? What kind of violence does current Islamic normativity sustain? Before exploring these 
questions, a note on the historiography is in order.  
Historiography 
The second generation of the post-colonial Arab state rarely figures in the current scholarship on 
the Arab world. Born in the post-1967 era, this generation came of age in the late 1990s (Slama’s first 
work, for instance, was a dissertation written in 1999.) Their writings were infused with the unrelenting 
battle against the past’s awakening. Unlike their predecessors, who thought of the Turāth as dead, this 
generation grew up wrestling with the Turāth. Since the late 1970s, following the perceptible 
disenchantment with the Arab national state and its miscarried modernist projects, many turned to the past 
in search of alternative models. The “return to the roots” was and still is at the center of the current 
intellectual and public debates in the Arab world. Nothing in this debate is particularly unique to the Arab 
region, since many Western and non-Western societies witnessed an analogous appeal toward their 
authenticity and undead past.432 Yet, within the Arab world the debate on the Turāth prompted a cultural 
war between those who advocated a return to the Turāth on the grounds that it could offer a way out of 
the current crisis that paralyze Arab societies, and those who deemed the call to resort to the Turāth a giant 
step backward. Curiously, the fresh controversy around the Turāth that began in the 1970s was glossed 
over and reduced to the perennial debate between Islamists and secularists, dulling the critical edge and 
novelty of these recent debates.  
                                                 
432 Gideon Rose, “The Undead Past,” Foreign Affairs, December 12, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-12-
12/undead-past. 
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The controversy over the Turāth disrupted the rigid intellectual identities (Left v. Right, Islam v. 
modern), precipitating new questions on who is a progressive in the Arab world today. In the wake of the 
Turāth debate, the old familiar division between secular and Islamic grew increasingly obsolete and 
irrelevant. This is because the current intellectual exchange of the last three decades is no longer between 
Western-oriented scholars and conservative Islamists, though the Turāth debate has been mistakenly 
portrayed this way. Rather, the dispute over the Turāth takes place exclusively among “modernist” 
scholars, namely intellectuals informed by western philosophical and literary tastes. This is to say that the 
debate over the Turāth reflects the ongoing cultural war within the so-called liberal camp rather than 
outside of it.433 More concretely, it is a cultural war between the many intellectuals affiliated with the 
Center for Arab Unity Studies and the few affiliated with the Arab Rationalist Association. While both of 
these groups viewed conservative Islamists with suspicion, their ideas diverged on the status of the Turāth 
and the meaning of authenticity. (see chapter I and II) 
Current intellectual historiography has been astonishingly silent on these debates. Very few 
scholars endeavored to explain the new intellectual trends in the region. One can only speculate that behind 
this disregard lies the fact that the center of the culture war on the Turāth  is not the Eastern Mediterranean 
but North Africa.434 Yet, intellectual history should afford a broader view of the full range of the 
individuals who articulate ideas, the institutions that disseminate this knowledge, and the people who read 
about these ideas. However, current Arab intellectual history falls short in this regard, and remains 
transfixed on the interrogations of the nahḍa, which restrict and limit the scope of Arab intellectual 
explorations. Very few works of intellectual history have questioned the geography of this frame.435  
                                                 
433 Unaware of the new fault lines among current Arab scholars, many historians and sociologists have confused and lumped 
them together. See, for example: Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, 1 edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
434 The Francophone culture was contrasted with the Turath in countries like Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The public 
controversy on school curriculum and the use of the French language were only two examples of the raging cultural war in 
North Africa. 
435 Hamzah Dyala, “The Making of the Arab Intellectual: Empire, Public Sphere and the Colonial Coordinates of Selfhood 
(Hardback) - Routledge,” Text, Routledge.com, accessed December 17, 2017, https://www.routledge.com/The-Making-of-
the-Arab-Intellectual-Empire-Public-Sphere-and-the-Colonial/Hamzah/p/book/9780415488341; Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914; Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: 
Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Ami Ayalon, The Arabic Print 
Revolution: Cultural Production and Mass Readership, 1800-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316584521. 
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The nahḍa framework continues to inform the way in which Arab thought is examined by scholars. 
Even the so called post-colonial Arab thought is subjected to the nahḍa framework, resulting in many 
misconceptions along the way. Viewing the current cultural war on the Turāth through the lens of the 
nahḍa leaves many blind spots in accounting for new trends in Arab intellectual history. This is, among 
other reasons. why North Africa, slowly becoming the center of Arab intellectual gravity , still remains 
neglected. The Turāth remains another blind spot in the historiography of the Middle East because of this 
inherently subjective approach that governs (and plagues) many written intellectual histories of the Arab 
world, which focused primarily on the Levant and Egypt, the traditional centers of literature and thought 
since the nineteenth century. Even recent works made little effort to correct this entrenched imbalance in 
the field.436 Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss’s otherwise excellent work lays claim to rewriting a new 
intellectual history “beyond the liberal age” but also fails to include the traditionally marginal region of 
North Africa in its comprehensive reappraisal of Arab intellectual history, as one critic rightly pointed 
out.437 The historical gap is still awaiting for more historical research.  
One of the tragic consequences of this unconscious omitting of the spirited intellectual debates in 
North Africa is not only the fragmentation of the unity of Arab thought between important centers and 
irrelevant margins, but also the absence of the thrust that new debates facilitate. The new terminology and 
idioms that gained currency among a growing circle of young Arab intellectuals in North Africa remain 
out of reach for readers of Arab intellectual history and constantly confuse Middle Eastern historians. The 
most significant example is the recent reactions to the writings of Kamel Daoud, Bin Slāma, Hamīd Zināz, 
and Said Nashīd. These intellectuals represent a group of progressive writers, for they engage in writings 
not only on Turāth, but also on the construction of faith, sexuality, and the formation of identity. They 
conceive themselves as progressive not because they call for a revolution, but primarily because they 
perceive themselves as culturally transgressive. Kamel Daoud, whose writings invoked much talk in the 
West, is a good example to reckon with. 
                                                 
436 Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss, eds., Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the 
Nahda (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
437 Idriss Jebari, “Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda,” Global 
Intellectual History 0, no. 0 (2017): 1–8. 
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When Algerian author and columnist Kamel Daoud published an article in 2015 elaborating on 
“the sexual misery of the Arab world” he created a commotion a and confused his readers. Daoud’s widely 
read articles in the New York Times complimented his previous writings, which reflected his anger and 
disenchantment with the contemporary Arab world, where young writers are sacrificed on the altars of the 
national agenda or conservative Islam. Yet, his scathing criticism of the “rotted values” in Arab culture 
led to a deluge of denunciation and reproof from Western writers (with post-colonial sensibilities) and 
academics who accused him of indulging in “Oriental clichés.” Can these writings, which Daoud 
represents, be reduced to orientalism? Only those few scholars with a nuanced understanding of current 
Arab debates and a contextualized sense of the cultural war raging in North Africa could grasp the 
positionality from which Daoud speaks. In fact, the articles Daoud published in Le Mond and the New 
York Times were not unique in their tone but reflected a broader sensibility among the second generation 
of post-colonial Arabs. 
This chapter addresses the new cultural sensibilities that this generation developed. Rather than 
brushing aside their talk as a rehashing of Orientalist stereotypes, or dismissing them as self-hating 
intellectuals, to the purpose of this chapter is to understand who gets deemed progressive in the current 
Arab intellectual landscape and why. By interrogating the ways these writers forged their narratives about 
current Arab political culture, women, violence, sexuality and gender, one can cull some understanding 
of what it takes to be a progressive. Current historiography has yet to address these questions. By looking 
into the writing of Daoud’s colleague, Bin Slama, I will interrogate the politics this generation valorized 
and inquire what it means to be progressive in the Arab world today? It is through this widening of the 
scope of Arab intellectual history to include the exciting discussions unfolding in North Africa, that the 
rigid boundaries of the historiographical field are being revisited and revised. 
Illegitimate Pain 
The young radicals approached the cultural war on the Turāth equipped with different terminology, 
focusing on addressing more obscure aspects of Arab and Islamic history, while opting for less trodden 
paths into this history. This group of radicals was less concerned with the question that had long harangued 
Arab intellectuals: what should they re-adopt from the Turāth and what should they toss away? Nor they 
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were consumed by the almost inevitable clash between ideals of Islamic governance and the practical 
difficulty of applying them. The young radicals were trying to break with these questions and the 
intellectual tradition that attempted to reconcile the Turāth with modernity. Theirs is a protest against this 
mode of intellectual conversation and framework.   
Fundamentally, the young radicals questioned the value of the Turāth, a questioning informed by 
their exasperation over the “relapse to the Turath.”438 What does it mean to turn to the Turāth at the end 
of the twentieth century? To what ends? What positionalities and cultural implications are re-affirmed 
through the Turāth? what was excluded in the process? How does the turn to the Turāth enhance the status 
of historical truth and truth order? And above all, what cultural and social possibilities does relapse to the 
Turāth open up? Examining these questions, Slama invites her readers to think about the Turāth as a 
cultural framework and a set of cultural references that inflict illegitimate pain on the formation of 
women’s subjectivity in the Arab world. Latching onto certain truth regimes facilitated by the Turāth 
framework comes at the expense of women’s demand for equality. For Slama, it merits asking, who’s 
interests are being served by the continuing emphasis on the Turāth? Who benefits and at what price? For 
Slama, the answer is clearly men. Not the Arab man in general, but those who appropriate the Turāth to 
justify and consecrate the status quo.   
Slama’s explorations of illegitimate pain emerges from these questions. The idea of illegitimate 
pain offers new intellectual possibilities for understanding the delirious impact of the Turāth and current 
Islamic modes of religiosity on the construction of women’s subjectivity. In so doing Slama charts a new 
course that problematizes more than it provides answers. As she embarks on this debate, Slama 
differentiates between two types of pain: the natural and unnatural pains. Her interest lies in the latter 
category for it is a man-made, artificial pain that shall be avoided. In fact, Slama approaches the topic by 
posting probing questions. She asks how one proceeds to write a history of pain. How does one account 
for an elusive and intangible phenomenon like pain? In what ways do the current commitments to religion 
                                                 
438 The “relapse to the Turath” is the translation of the frame al-Nukus ʾila al- Turāth coined and employed by Ṭarābīshī over 
the two decades starting in 1990. See his works Al-Muthaqqafūn Al-ʿArab Wa-Al-Turāth: Al-Taḥlīl Al-Nafsī Li-ʿUṣāb Jamāʿī 
(London: Riyāḍ al-Rayyis, 1991); See also the collections of article in Jūrj Ṭarābīshī. Min Al-Nahḍah ʾIlá Al-Riddah: 
Tamazzuqāt Al-Thaqāfah Al-ʿArabīyah Fī ʿAṣr Al-ʿAwlamah. Al-Ṭabʿah 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Sāqī, 2000). 
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generate and sustain illegitimate pain? These questions haunt Slama and define her method and approach 
in exploring Arab and Islamic history.439 For Slama the challenge of accounting for illegitimate pain 
emanates from the fact that the conventional methods through which religion and the Turāth are being 
interrogated preclude any exploration that make ideas of individual pain thinkable.  
Slama sets to question the Turāth and the ways it gives rise to current Islamic forms through which 
violence occurs.440 Current modes of Islamic religiosity, Slama argues, inflict pain by normalizing 
outdated social categories and conceptions, and by making legitimate non-operational judgments which 
all combined to perpetuate the secondary status of certain groups in Arab society. Rather than striving to 
obliterating social differences between men and women, these categories work to order society 
hierarchically and along patriarchal lines. This inherently prejudicial social ordering that finds its authority 
and legitimacy in the Turāth excludes ethnic groups (Christians,) labels others as inferior (women), and 
externalizes yet others (seculars). However, the pain this system inflicts on woman seems to carry no 
weight in the eyes of many Arab intellectuals, who seem oblivious to the pain and sufferingthat the Turāth 
wreaks on women and blocks the formation of their subjectivity. This is because the forms of suffering 
the Turāth produces are not legible for many Arab men who continue to deny the benefits of a 
psychoanalysis that opens windows into the internal life of Arab women. The mere focus on the external 
aspect of society (political, social and economic), rather than venturing a peek into the internal side 
(culture, values), results in propping up the status quo and denies women the equality they yearn for for.441   
Slama calls this pain “illegitimate pain” [al-ʾAlam al-la Mashruʿ] since it is not visited upon women 
by nature or produced by the human condition, a pain triggered by natural death, separation, or illness. 
The illegitimate pain is a product of artificial rules, cultural agreements, and ingrained values which are 
concealed within larger masculine systems. While the Islamic belief system, like any belief system, 
produces “hurt, hegemony, and discrimination among believers,” these injurious fallouts are not 
                                                 
439 See Slama explains her approach on pain in Rajā Bin Slama, “ḥiwar Maftuḥ ḥawla Naqd al-ʿunf al-la-Mashruʿ,” in Al-
Hiwar al-Mutamadin. January 26, 2014, http://www.ahewar.org/debat/s.asp?aid=397751. 
440 Bin Slama. Bunyān al-fuḥūlah: Abḥāth al-Mudhakkar wa-al-Muʿannath. Damascus, Dar Bitra lil-Nashir. pp. 104. 
441 “Frūīd wal-Arab” in Bin Slama, Fī Naqd Insān Al-Jamūʿ. al-Ṭabʿah 1, Mufakkir Al-ʿArabī (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 2008), 
156–163. 
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“distributed evenly” between all sections of society. The mechanisms of the Islamic tradition are not 
neutral but authorize certain positions and attitudes, and validate certain customs that all seem to play 
down and impede women’s equality in society. Unfortunately, Arab women have assimilated these rules, 
a result of centuries of indoctrination, and they keep reproducing them.442   
Yet there exists a different kind of illegitimate pain that Islamic movements and fundamentalists 
aggravate using the Turāth: the violence of Islamic law (Shariʿa) that no longer resolves people’s problems 
but tanle them up. The Shariʿa, Slama maintains, accelerates and confounds questions of identity rather 
than alleviate them.443 Since these “medieval laws” are “silent” on modernity demands and “incongruent” 
with modern sensibilities like equality, freedoms and individual dignity, they spell trouble for the 
formation of Arab women’s identity and women’s development as independent subjects. Rejecting to 
recognize that the “pain sources” are integral to the Shariʿa corpus, Slama reasons, precludes the adoption 
of human rights in the Arab World. However, Slama argues that Arab regimes’ reservations and 
misgivings toward fully embracing enactments of Human Rights, reservations articulated by pretenses of 
cultural particularities, take their cues from the Shariʿa. So long as the pain sources continue to be untapped 
and unmapped, the Shariʿa will reign supreme. It is precisely because certain pain is not recognized in and 
of itself, that social and political change is stunted and imperiled in current Arab societies. For only with 
the appreciation of the adverse effects of the pain that the Turāth perpetrates and generates, can the 
prospects for change become real. New realities unfurl with this recognition and with awareness of the 
harms and damages produced by current systems (textuality, public memory, and the Turāth).   
Exploring the illegitimate pain opens a window for Slama to expand the scope of her evaluation 
of the Turāth, or what she calls the obsolete normative legal system that reigns intact. The conversation 
on the Shariʿa, as far as Slama is concerned, should not be limited to the implementation of huddud, or 
what huddud should be followed or tossed out. This approach leads nowhere, since it is restricting the 
                                                 
442 Bin Slama, 106. 
443 A similar suggestion of the impossibility of the application of the Shariʿa laws was proposed by Islamic legal historian 
Wael Hallaq but from a different perspective. Hallaq’s Arabic translation is a bestseller in the Arab world. See Wael B. 
Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament, Reprint edition (Columbia University 
Press, 2012). 
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field of investigation to legal codes without studying the insidious political, social and psychological 
harms that this framework sustains. For Slama, the conversation on the Shariʿa should look beyond the 
Islamic meanings of these rules and consider the ways in which the Shariʿa discourse precludes the 
emergence of new categories (freedom), concepts (equality), and understandings essential for the initiation 
of Arab societies into the 21st century. Most significantly, she points to the diverse ways in which the 
current understanding of Shariʿa laws hinder the integration of alternative value systems, namely human 
rights, into society. A staunch believer in unity of human beings and their universal values, or what she 
calls “human oneness,” Slama argues that “what commonalities humans share are superior to whatever 
sets them apart.” The idea that she conveys here is not only to water down the guiding principles of the  
Shariʿa, but also to assert that humanity comes first and religiosity comes after.444  
One salient aspect of a society that lives along the Turāth is what Slama calls normative regimes. 
“Normative regimes,” Slama explains, are sites where the distance between good and evil is unbridgeable 
and the boundaries between these two domains are clearly drawn. They are characterized by the absence 
of gray areas, a space that “affords possibilities of life, art, and creativity.” Normative regimes are the 
most obvious legacy of the Turāth that disqualify gray areas, which give momentum to the good to emerge 
from the evil. Evil is not invariably evil, Slama insists, nor does good remain constantly good. Good and 
evil are not absolutes, but relational. They are defined by space and time and subject to history. They are 
not rigid concepts but elastic ideas, fluid notions subject to change and evolution. The convergence 
between good and evil is what theological movements and traditionalist reject and detest. This immaculate 
rejection of the intermingling of the good and evil characterizes normative regimes where pain is most 
amplified and where gray areas are crossed off. Cultural productivity and creativity takes place when these 
two seemingly separate domains (good and evil) collapse into each other. For traditionalists, however, 
good is good and evil is evil, two essentials that never converge. This is how “hopes, desires, and unique 
needs are derailed in the Arab world,” writes Slama.   
                                                 
444 For an opposing view on Slama’s call, especially her call to adopt Human Rights, see the scathing critique by Massad. 
Joseph Andoni Massad, Islam in Liberalism (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2015). See in particular 
Chapter four. 
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 While significant dimensions of Islamic law practices have long gone, erased by the sweeping 
force of modernity, normative systems, which were informed by the Turāth, lingered. This is a cultural 
relic that deprives the evolution of new Islamic perceptions to feed new cultural norms. For Slama, cultural 
renewal depends on dismantling these values rather than reforming them. The reckoning with the “cultural 
constants” Thawabit Thaqafiya remains the order of the day for young radicals. The need to destabilize 
and dislocate these “cultural constants” that relentlessly bedevil any ambitious program for change might 
not be readily communicable to Western frameworks that lack categories like “cultural constants.”445 This 
is where Slama locates her generation’s task: in naming events unnamed.  
The power of this generation, Slama writes, lays not in the number of its followers but in their 
ability to call things out. Their power resides in their ability to problematize. “Even if we are few in 
numbers we enjoy the power of naming.” The power to name is the most important for these young 
radicals for events unnamed have no meaning nor do exist as independent things. For example, Slama 
writes that “violence never name itself as such.”446 What she alludes to is that violence is not recognized 
as such as long as it is not designated with a name. Though these scholars have no major power to sway 
politics away from traditionalists, they are engaged in a process of conferring meaning on many cultural 
practices: The ability to describe historical and global events (narrativize) and explain social processes 
(analyze). They are the ones who indulge in conceptualizing and recounting the diverse dimensions of 
experiences that go unnamed.  
An Unlikely Beginning 
In the early 2000s, Slama’s radical proclivities grew noticeable as her warnings about the dangers 
of Turāth fell on deaf ears. Slama began designing her message to win over the youth who faced the 
religious message ill prepared. The specific audience Slama turns to is Arab millennials, who share some 
of her anti-Turāth sensibilities. In a series of defensive articles in al-Hiwar al-Mutamadin, Slama offered 
                                                 
445 The idea of “cultural constants” appears in Slama’s title “Naqd al-Thawabit” where she notes that the Arabic word 
Thawabit has no meaning in either French or English, therefore is not a translatable concept to these languages. Bin Slama. 
Naqd al-thawābit : ārāʾ fī al-ʿunf wa-al-tamyīz wa-al-muṣādarah (Beirut: Rabitat al-Aqlaniyin al-Arab, 2005) p. 6.  
446 Ibid. pp. 152–3. 
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a broad social and cultural characterizations of her generation’s sensibilities that sustain and fuel their 
critical drive. 
 The young radicals belong to a generation born in the late 1960s and 1970s, and as 
mentioned earlier, they come of age in the late 1990s at the peak of Islamic activities in the Arab world. 
This group includes university lecturers, journalists, novelists, artists, and playwrights who shared a 
common interest in translations. An overwhelming majority of these young radicals are city dwellers. 
They frequent their own dingy cafes, work with a relatively few and distinct publishing houses that gave 
rise to similar aesthetics and literary tastes. Their shared reading list unifies their judgments and shapes 
their sentiments. They habitually exchange books and, curiously enough, divide up translation work 
among themselves. These readings and translations instilled in this group a set of moral principles and 
values that left a lasting effect on their writings. Though scattered between Paris, Tunis, Beirut, and 
Casablanca, their commitment to secularism, Human Rights, women’s and minority rights, gave evidence 
to what Reymnd Williams called “structure of feeling.”447 Explaining this idea, one of William’s students 
argued that structures of feeling “can and do become ideological, but at their iception are always distinct 
from the ideological formations to which they stand in relation.”448 As an emerging group with similar 
feelings, the young radicals were unified by their suspicion towards the powerful traditionalists in Arab 
society. Indeed, this group has some claim to being regarded as the first organized anti-Turath party in the 
Arab world. 
The young radicals refuse to live on the fringes of society, a far cry from the isolated life-style of 
their predecessors. They cultivated a different set of principles that defined their concept of progress. 
Instead of calling for a class revolution to upend the social order, they preferred civil disobedience. Acts 
of disobedience were propounded by exploring the moral imperatives of cultural deviation (as opposed to 
cultural conformity) and theological unorthodoxy (as opposed to theological complicity.) For many of 
                                                 
447 Raymond Williams. Marxism and Literature, Marxist Introductions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
448 “Structure of feeling are generated by specific social groups in the course of their experience of and participation in 
everyday social life..what distinguishes a structure of feeling is that it is emergent and provisional, not so much a fully 
articulated realization or achievement as one in the creative throes of becoming articulated.” see: Michael Pickering. History, 
Experience, and Cultural Studies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 33–35. 
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them, cultural and political defiance reflect the essence of humanity.449 In a marked departure from their 
trainers and spiritual fathers, the young radicals abhorred the idea of Arab nationalism. In fact, Slama not 
only viewed the idea of pan Arabism with contempt, but also expressed open admiration of Israel and 
Jews’ intellectual achievement.450 Yet, very few things bind this group together as their newfound 
sensibilities with regard to the political possibilities of texts. They have curated language and themes to 
address these untold political aspects of the Turāth texts. This is reflected most vividly in the shared idioms 
and vocabulary that inform their writings. Though their engagement in unconventional themes like pain 
and violence, gender and romance, do not necessarily replace or triumph over the old intellectual 
engagement, but evolve from existing ones, they always expand and alter the intellectual playing field. In 
particular, the proposals for reading the Turāth, using post-structural tools, gives a fresh slant to this 
generations’ sensibility towards the written word. 
Slama grew up in Tunisia under Bourgibah but opened her eyes to the political world only under 
the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali. She spoke little of the second but admired the father of the nation 
whose last order was to have the words “Emancipator of Women” inscribed on his tomb. In her numerous 
writings, Slama curiously makes no mention of the defeat of 1967, the meta-event that informed the 
experience and careers of her teachers. It is not that this event escaped her writings. Rather, it indicates 
that the young radicals were molded by slightly different experience. Slama’s generation was informed 
by the Black Decade (al- ʿAshriyya al-Sudaʾ) the decade-long civil war in Algeria between a tyrannical 
government and doctrinaire Islamists that began in 1991. More than four hundred Algerian intellectuals 
were slayed in this brutal war, Slama registers. Curiously, Slama pays tribute to these intellectuals and 
refers to this internal war more often than she does to the 1967 war.   
Like the rest of the young radicals, Slama drew much inspiration from a new historical 
understanding of the Turāth based on a recent conception that views the past as a construction.451 
                                                 
449 On the moral necessity for cultural disobedience see: Saʿīd Nāshīd. Al-Ikhtiyār Al-ʿilmānī Wa-Usṭūrat Al-Namūdhaj. al-
Ṭabʿah 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿah lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr, 2010), 14. 
450 Slama expressing her ideas on an article on the reception of Sigmund Freud in the Arab world. See Rajāʾ Bin Slāma, Fī 
Naqd Insān Al-Jamūʿ. al-Ṭabʿah 1, Mufakkir Al-ʿArabī (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 2008).  
451 Michel-Rolph Trouillot. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1995). 
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Psychoanalysis and post-modern theories, however, were essential building blocks in her analysis. These 
theories did more than open up new intellectual horizons for her and challenge current Islamic normativity. 
Slama’s intervention in the history of women in Islam, for instance, demonstrates that many of the current 
Islamic principles toward women are a matter of luck and historical contingency rather than a design. 
Slama does not believe that historical facts are malleable, but she is convinced that historical narratives 
are easily twisted. Those young scholars like Slama who took aim at disrupting and undermining the 
hegemonic narratives, which happen to be Islamic, call themselves seculars. Introducing herself to a group 
of readers fascinated with her approach to the study of Islam, Slama writes “I approach religion through 
a secular and non-religious lens. I have called for [the establishment of] a new religion. Namely, building 
a new relation with religion in agreement with human rights and diversity.”452  
Slama does not falter on her secular identity. Secularism for her is neither foreign nor an imported 
ideology. It is a legacy that Tunisia’s first president implanted in Tunisia ever since he reformed the majala 
of personal code in 1956. In this sense, Slama thinks of herself as a guardian of a secular national legacy 
that she inherited in the same manner Islamists think of themselves as custodians of Islamic inheritance 
(literary Turāth.) At an early age Slama developed a temperament that runs counter to the ascending 
Islamic moralities. In an interview to the journal Maktuob, she reminiscences, “I was admitted to the 
University(!) where I saw the Islamic movement first hand, which later morphed into the Ennhada [Islamic 
party.] I found them shutting down restaurants before us to enforce fasting during [the month of] Ramadan. 
I saw them hiding knives and chains in the university’s mosque. I could not shape my personality nor any 
[style of] writing far from this violence… I grew up with the Tunisian revolution, alongside a new 
generation of Islamists who grew up with me. I found them taking over the regime after the revolution, 
trying to steer the revolution and the nation into their [Islamic] direction. I could not carry out my research 
on eroticism and psychoanalysis away from this renewed violence. I might have spent much of my 
energies and a [crucial] part of my life fretting over political Islam at the expense of [a scholarly] 
                                                 
452 “Hiwar Maftuh with Raja Bin Slama.” In Al-Hiwar al-Mutamadin. 6 February 2011.  
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production in my narrow field. This might turn out to be a blunder, but this was the fate of my generation. 
No one can jump above history.”453 
Encountering these “infiltrating forces” intent on veering the revolution toward Islam, is the “fate 
of” Slama’s generation. This is the cultural context in which she premises her work on the question of 
how to defend the hard-earned liberties, human rights values, and sensibilities that have increasingly come 
under assault in recent decades. Slama’s treatment of this question is informed by her positionality as a 
woman and a Francophile. In her writings, she frets over the return of the medieval alongside Freud’s 
return of the repressed. Slama writes that “medieval Islam” represents the repressed in current Arab 
culture. This insight calls to address this phenomenon rather than disregarding it (in a rebuke to Arab 
Marxists.) To fend off Tunisia’s moderate character against the “obscurantists,” she calls to “Tunisize 
Islamists before they Islamize Tunisia.”454  
The new explorations of Arab and Islamic Turāth, a frenzy whipped up by the promise that the 
Turāth could provide an untrodden path to cultural renewal, caught Slama, young radicals and other 
Francophiles by surprise. For them nothing looked promising in the return to the Turath, which announced 
the beginning of the reversing and dismantling of the hard-fought rights that Arab women wrestled with 
over the course of the last few decades since Tunisia’s independence. Indignant and discontent, Slama and 
the young radicals viewed the turn toward the Turāth with suspicion, a precarious slippery slope that might 
awaken the repressed Islamic medieval. If Arab intellectuals would take this course, she cautioned, this 
will have a chilling effect on the cultural, social, and intellectual well-being of Arab society. Seculars, 
who formerly reviled and detested any engagements with the Turāth, found themselves goaded into that 
debate that they thought was behind them.  
The specter of the Turāth aggravated the plight of Francophone and secular Tunisians and other 
young radicals around the Arab world. The return to the Turāth was carried over the ascending social 
                                                 
453 Raja Bin Slama “Al-Azhar and the Oil impeded Arab modernity project” June 23, 2015. Nour al-Dinn Tayib. Kalimat. 
S.N. 2620. http://thaqafat.com/2015/06/26592 
 
454 A few years before his death Habib Bourgibah decreed to have the two words “Women Emancipator” engraved on his 
tomb. As Ben Slama writes, Bourgibah’s spirit swept through Tunis and careened off Islamic missions. Rajāʾ Ben Slama, Al-
Hijāb Wal-Marʾah (The Hijab and Women) (Damascus, Syria: Dār Bitrā lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2009). 
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powers, which was poised to unravel the entire Francophone world in the name of authenticity. The 
attempt to weed out all the traces of French values and eliminate all signs of modern culture left these 
scholars distraught. The question was how to respond to this excessively politicized use and abuse of the 
Turāth.  
Fully convinced that a century long of intellectual exchanges with Islamists amounted to no more 
than a futile talk, Slama wondered whether the previous generation of intellectuals had drained their 
energies in their attempts to sway Islamists into reforming their understanding of the Turāth. “Have we 
wasted too much time arguing against Islamists? Had the argumentations against Islamists led to enough 
knowledge to create a new [form of] religiosity (Tadayyun Jadīd)? How can we practically gauge the 
effects of these engagements with Islamists?”455 This is how Slama and the young radicals felt of their 
teachers, who sapped their energies fighting against Islamists to no avail. This disappointment with the 
teachers braced them for the confrontation against the protagonists of the Turāth. 
 
Echoes of a Grim Past: Standing up to the Turāth 
Slama rails against the collective tendency in the last few decades to stir the Turāth back to life. 
The preoccupation, or the obsession, with Islamic textuality indicates that “we have not weaned ourselves 
of the ties with the beginnings and origins”456 of Arab culture. Identifying the Turāth as an elaborate 
system that enforces an unquestioned hierarchy and patriarchy, Slama’s uneasiness arises from the fact 
that the Turāth enjoys unrivaled authority among ordinary citizens. Given that it is a form of life that 
provides a framework of formally organized collectivity, the Turāth is political. For Slama and the young 
radicals this form of life increases the friction with their notion of selfhood and infringes on their 
conceived idea of individual freedoms. Slama believes that individuals think in accordance with the 
collectivity and society in which they live. Everyone is born into a tradition (Turāth) that provides him 
with directions not only on how to behave but also on how to think and how to find meaning. The way 
                                                 
455 Bin Slāma, “Hal Najnī Thimar Fashal al-Iṣlaḥ al-Dinnī?,” in Al-Hiwar al-Mutamadin, accessed December 6, 2017, 
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=415642. 
456 Bin Slāma, Fī Naqd Insān Al-Jamūʿ, 125. 
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individuals conceive women’s bodies and sexuality, pass judgments and separate between virtue and sin, 
are not individual traits but learned cultural and societal values. Slama concedes that since individuality 
is hopelessly intertwined in culture, the deconstruction of Turāth is a political act.  
In 2015 Slama took the initiative to rally Arab intellectuals to re-conceptualize the Turāth, 
reclaiming it from the hands of the Turāthists, and subjecting it to new scrutiny using new methodological 
approaches. Left to traditionalists, Slama maintained, the Turāth had been misconstrued, manipulated and 
squeezed into an Islamic box. In a paper that launched a conference entitled “Tunisian intellectuals against 
Terror,” Slama took the opportunity to broach the Turāth and the value of history. Held in the capital 
Tunis, Slama dwelled on the enabling conditions essential to the process of history writing. In the lecture, 
she spoke of “the prospects for rewriting history”457 in this time when the Arab world is roiling under the 
violence of the Islamic State. History writing, Slama suggested, is not invariably possible or easily 
accessible. Some underlying conditions should be available to trigger a comprehensive reappraisal of 
history. In fact, it might be “impossible” to rewrite history “except in an [unusual] historical moment 
which is open to all forms [of knowledge] and [radical] possibilities.” The contemporary Arab world 
reached that point, where all possibilities are open as truth regimes are being subjected to new revisions. 
For Slama the unprecedented atrocities and barbarism Islamic groups committed in the name of Islam 
afford such a unique moment to “rearticulate the Turāth.” As a psychologist, Slama recognizes that many 
ordinary Muslims throughout the Arab world were alarmed by the extreme groups which wreaked havoc 
and caused mass murder on an unprecedented scale unknown in Islamic history. The fact that many were 
appalled by the violent acts proved for Slama that minds and hearts are ripe for a revisionist perspective 
on the Turāth. A new take on the Turāth is possible “only when history is recognized,” Slama concluded 
in her paper. Her call to come to terms with the Turāth was due to the promise it holds out: to relativize 
dogmatic assertions of immutable truths that Turāthist narratives circulate. Through contextualizing past 
historical events, Slama believes that history is a powerful strategy to provincialize absolute Islamic truths.  
                                                 
457 Raja Bin Slama, “Muʾtamar Al-Muthaqafiyn Al-Tunissiyyin ḍid Al-ʾIrhab,” Al-Hiwar al-Mutamadin, accessed December 
5, 2017. 
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Acting upon these principles that she previously downplayed, Slama authored a Manifest entitled 
“Our Liability toward Terror committed in the name of Islam,”458 signed by eminent Arab writers, poets, 
filmmakers and artists. In this document, she delineated the principles that guide young radicals towards 
the unfolding political events in the Arab world. Confining the resort to the Turāth only to scholars and 
specialists, Slama denies and deplores the common ahistorical use of Islamic texts and corpus. “We 
renounce the employment [literarily re-enacting] of this corpus of the old texts.” The fact that these texts 
are being abused for political expediency, enforces young radicals to instantly act. She writest “it is 
incumbent upon us to refute and oppose the invigoration (tafʿil) of this corpus and all the mechanisms that 
lead to its activation.” Rather than resorting to the Turāth, she calls to focus on reforming the theological 
field in the Arab world.  
A staunch secularist, Slama began calling for the forging of a new relationship of contemporary 
Arabs with the Turāth. Saʿīd Nashīd, her colleague in the Association, pointed out that the challenge of 
the Turāth lies in the fact that it was written in medieval times. “The conundrum of all religious texts is 
that they were written in a stage in which society lacked social institutions, authority lacked laws [to 
provide checks and balances], knowledge lacked methodologies, and language lacked rules.”459 The 
invoking of these archaic texts in modern society, with its highly elaborative institutions, laws, and rules 
only makes them incongruent with the collective impulse toward forward movement. Namely, by 
imposing these archaic texts on modern society they generate a cognitive dissonance among individuals 
and inhibit the process of progress and change in society. 
The current culture war that generates greater social polarization, Salma avers, was ignited by 
“individuals and groups circumscribed to Islam.”460 This war is carried out “in the name of a certain 
reading of Islam, and it obliges us, educated men and women in the Arab and Islamic world, not to remain 
idle.” How should Arab intellectuals face down this culture war, according to Salma? “Our response to 
the [current cultural] war should not focus on exonerating Islam, since the terrorists carry out their actions 
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in the name of certain reading of Islam.” The solution Slama offered is to insist on a historical approach 
that decentralizes these readings. “We should acknowledge the historicity of the texts of our theological 
heritage [Turāth.] We should ensure that these [texts] are impossible to deploy [device] today, and we 
should bear the fallout of this impossibility.” Slama acknowledges the challenge of digesting and 
assimilating the reality that the Turāth can no longer fit contemporary Arab needs. Therefore, she 
encourages her followers to mourn (Hiddād) the past to make way for a new age of modernity. 
An Alternative Approach to the Turath: Productive Mourning 
Taking a cue from Lafif Lakhdar, her countryman and colleague, Slama establishes the idea of 
mourning to exit the Turāth. Like Lakhdar, Slama believes that what stands between the current Arab 
subject and his willingness to embrace life in the twenty-first century is a textuality of which he had only 
a vague memory. Yet, this memory of the Turāth, no matter how misguided, shapes his resentment toward 
women’s freedoms and sexuality. This memory also prevents him from embracing different modes of 
being. This is not the individual’s fault but, rather,  the fault of generations of Arab intellectuals, beginning 
with the nahḍa. Instead of awakening the Arab individual from their intoxication with the Turāth, the 
nahḍa’s primary failure was manifested in establishing a new form of continuity with the Turāth. Rather 
than curbing the invocation of the Turāth, during the nineteenth century, literary history flourished and 
expanded with the unintended result of establishing new bridges to the past. These literary histories by the 
most eminent pioneers of the nahḍa created continuity with the past more than they led to a historical 
break with that imagined past. Contemporary Arab subjects, Slama explains, grew comfortable thinking 
about their current life conditions in comparison with the fabricated Turāth. In other words, the nahḍa 
here is not celebrated as an era that effected a historical break but an era that enhanced the ties with the 
Turāth, dangerously forging new and imagined strings that pull Arabs towards their past.   
Though Slama appreciates the nahḍa, she is still a fierce critic of the politics it unleashed. The first 
nahḍa, Slama writes, triggered anti- nahḍa sentiments. The development of the nahḍa movement was 
stunted by two forces. First, the “religious censorship” embodied in the institute of Al-Azhar exerted 
unyielding pressure on reformers like ʿAli ʿAbd al-Raziq, Taha Hussain, and Mansur Fahmi, to check and 
impede their progressive ideas. This religious authority imperiled the growth of the nahḍa movement by 
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“dulling the edges of the keen minds and reducing the innovative thrust the nahḍa scholars fought to bring 
about.”. The second anti-nahda wave resulted from the oil leap or al- Ṭafrah al-Nifṭiyya, which made it 
possible to “spend $70 million on popularizing Wahhabism and its thought all over the Muslim world.” 
This campaign had two edges: it put to death the nahḍa movement and helped anchor the current mode of 
religiosity among growing generations of Muslims.” 
Yet, there remained in the Arab world small islands that kept the fire of progressive thinking alive, 
not least of all Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco. While previous generations of Arab intellectuals failed to 
contain and check the movement toward the Turāth, Slama proposed a different strategy. The remedy for 
the undead past is to murder it. Modernity means mourning the past, she insists. Rather than celebrate the 
Turāth, the solution is to mourn its passing:“either we continue to cry over the past, imagining its 
restoration to life, or we realize the impossibility of its restoration to life… either we bury our mortalities 
and acknowledge their finitude and mourn over them, or we continue running after them, yielding to 
depression, imitating them in their death, rejecting life and its joy. This is the significant lesson Freud 
passed down to us in his Mourning and Melancholy.”461 Mourning, Slama expounds, is a healthy process 
to undertake, since it marks a collective confession of the passing of a tradition. It implies the last act of 
the death of the past. Since many Arab intellectuals perpetually put off the act of mourning, the past and 
the Turāth weigh them down, disrupting modern time with theological temporalities. Meaning, so long as 
intellectuals exhibit a recalcitrant refusal to mourn the passing of the Turāth, the formation of Arab 
subjectivity will live on synchronically in modernity and the Turāth. The fact that the Turāth resists death 
and lives on in the present undermines the process of history, Slama argues. One example of this can be 
found in the writing of the history of women in Islam. In Europe, women were accused of alliances with 
Satan, a conception that triggered a widespread witch hunt. Thousands of women were subjected to all 
forms of torture, abuse, and murder. In Islam, women’s history has not been written yet, Slama said. “One 
reason for this absence is simply that this history that we must write did not even past.”462  
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  Mourning for Slama constitutes a realization and a declaration that Arabic speakers can no longer 
embrace a non-linear, relational understanding of time that infuses present-day temporalities with the 
Turāth. It is a realization that would make it impossible to hark back to the Turāth. That mix of 
temporalities only aggravates Arab peoples’ attempts to assimilate into the new (diachronic) times. 
Without a conscious decision to upend this relational (synchronic) time, individuals will be straddled with 
an unmitigated sense of guilt that quenches creativity and originality. The mourning of past historical 
episodes proposes that Slama meant to bring a closure to the open-ended relations with the Turāth. To 
disentangle these histories, she wants to mourn over the past to prevent people from reverting to it.  
Transforming Relations with the Turāth 
The manner in which contemporary Arab societies remember their past and celebrate their cultural 
icons leaves the young radicals deeply anxious and overwhelmed. The relations between present and past 
are crucial for young radicals intent on bringing about change to engrained cultural attitudes. Much of the 
great tribulations of this time, Slama maintains, are attributed to a distorted memory of the Arab and 
Islamic past. “We are afflicted with a disorder that has to do with archive and memory, since we are not 
able to distinguish between memory and amnesia… We are unable to [craft] a decent policy toward the 
archive, which helps us keep past things past and put others to waste. Only a distorted memory claims to 
preserve everything.”463 
While Slama’s predecessors (Arkoun, Tarabishi, Abu Zayd) sought to chip away at the systematic 
cultural erasure that circumscribed the multifaceted Turāth within the limits of Islam, Slama and the young 
radicals are in agreement in their opposition against the excessiveness that attend to the obsessive 
preservation of “everything past.”  Speaking of the necessity for sifting through the past, Slama suggests 
establishing a new policy (by means of guidelines within intellectual circles) to encounter the deluge of 
the past into the present. The problem is not the past, in and of itself, but the way contemporary Arab 
societies treat that past; the “distortion in present Muslim societies” comes down to their “relation with 
the origin, memory, and archive.”464 
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To decentralize the widespread conception of the past in contemporary Arab societies, Slama 
demonstrates that her goal is not to reinterpret sacred texts to derive yet another equitable model of 
relations between women and men. Hers is a far cry from rebuilding or reforming past histories. Instead, 
she privileges desacralizing the past by building a new conception (rather a new relation) around the idea 
of sacred that is related to specific time and place. For Slama, the idea of sacred [al-Mukadas] emerges 
from a specific space and time to alleviate a cultural anxiety or answer a social need. With this localized 
sense of the sacred, Slama reads the Turāth to parochialize the value of the sacred in Islamic textuality. 
The challenge is to make this relational conception of the sacred legible and approachable to the 
traditionalists who “dissolve history by perceiving sacred texts viable everywhere and anywhere.”465  
Past generations of Arab intellectuals focused on reforming Islam without addressing the sacred. 
They wagered on transforming certain Islamic principles to meet the needs of modernity. This intellectual 
effort fell short of creating new relations with the past. By asking, “how shall we reap the fruits of Islamic 
Reformers’ failure?” Slama demonstrates that her generation’s proclivities are far removed from previous 
generations of Arab reforms and intellectuals. In her comparison between the two generations, Slama 
writes that scores of reformers and intellectuals endeavored to disseminate ideas that called on separating 
between religion and “sacred violence,” or “between religion and the insanity that produces violence.” 
Yet, only a tiny minority called for a wholesale abolishment of the entire logic of reform and insisted on 
building different relations with the past. “These voices have been drowned out by louder voices that 
insisted on the literary implementation of Shariʿa’s rules and the return to the fundamentals. Shall we reap 
the fruits of this failure by accepting religious renewal?”466 In her mind Slama was alluding to the 
courageous and novel Tunisian voices at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as al-Tahir al-
Haddad, whom the nahḍa literature had marginalized.467   
The Shariʿa is only a text for Slama and her collegues. Over the course of fourteen centuries, 
Muslims grew accustomed to attaching a sacred value to it. What remains of much concern is not “[sacred] 
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texts as such, but the ways in which current Muslims relate to them.”468 Here, Slama avoids embracing 
the call for a comprehensive annulment of the Shariʿa. Her insistence on shifting Muslim relations with 
their Shariʿa saves her from the fate that Lafif Lakhdar faced when he called for the Shari’a’s wholesale 
abolishment. Yet, like Lakhdar, Slama thought that one of the reasons for the limited success of Arab 
seculars in reaching out to a broader swath of Arab readers is due to their hesitation on acknowledging the 
expiration or the termination of the Shariʿa. Their avoidance of clashing with the masses and their inability 
to tell the truth held back the cause of Arab seculars back. 
Conclusion 
One of the marks the last decades of the twentieth century carry is the entrenching of the Turāth 
into daily language. With the beginning of the 1980s, many school systems around the Arab world began 
marking the Turāth Holiday (Yaūm al-Turath) in their calendars beside national and religious holidays. 
The Turāth increasingly offered a compelling vocabulary to daily practices. Even seculars had to adjust 
their language and vocabularies. While in the 1950-60s secularism was grounded in western philosophies 
made available in Arabic in the mid-century, by the end of the century secular justifications were couched 
in Turāth language.   
Bogged down with a Turāth discourse that produces and perpetuates certain viewpoints while 
excluding others, Arab intellectuals of the Association called to explore the contents of the Turāth while 
emphasizing the unthinkable aspects of Arab history. The younger generation of the Association however, 
come up with new categories like pain and violence to chart a new approach to the Turāth, undermine its 
essential understandings and destabilize its age-old meanings. In her wrestling with the Turāth, Slama 
asks what sympathies are enabled by the current understanding of the Turāth? She writes that the current 
“distorted appreciation” of the Turāth sustains categories like normative regimes that divide the world into 
good and evil domains, foreclosing any other possibility. 
While the first generation took to historicizing the foundational texts of Arab history as the only 
means of limiting their scope and influence, young radicals like Slama took a giant step ahead in standing 
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up to the Turāthists by different means. They politicized literary criticism and weaponized psychoanalysis 
to show the concealed political and violent implications of the Turāth texts. One example of this approach 
can be witnessed in the way Slama addresses the controversial issue of Hijāb. Slama writes that the 
question of Hijāb should not only focus on its religious aspects. namely whether the Hijāb is inscribed in 
the Quran or not. The main question for Slama is to move beyond the theological debate and explore the 
social and cultural consequences made possible by the notion of Hijab as an institution. Adopting an 
archeological view of the study of Hijāb, Slama maintains that ideas of stoning women (rajm) for adultery 
take their meaning and justification only through the framework of the Hijāb (Institution). Rather than 
locating the discourse on Hijāb in the limited theological domain, as many scholars have done before her, 
Slamainvestigates the Hijāb’s relation to the political, by asking: what justifies the common Islamic ideals 
of guardianship Quamah that is translated in precluding women to travel without man’s trusteeship?469  
The example of the Hijāb embodies the way Slama and other young radicals approach the Turāth. 
They think of the Turāth as a jumble of ideas and institutions interlocking in systems of meanings and 
semantics. The hidden connections between stonning and Hijāb is a good example that captures Slama’s 
idea of dislocation. Veering away from legal Islamic codes, Slama is more concerned with the possibilities 
and conditions that the idea of Hijāb opens up or forecloses. These literary readings, which assume that 
text are not neutral but highly political, are only carried out by the second generation of the post-colonial 
Arab state and under the conditions of increasing paranoia with regard to the past. 
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CONCLUSION 
In late Spring 2014, I went to Paris to meet Jūrj Ṭarābīshī, “one of the most prolific and powerful 
thinkers of the second half of the twentieth century”470 in the Arab world. Armed with a notebook full of 
questions about his life and intellectual experiments, I was eager to meet a writer whose intellectual input 
and career have reshaped the contours of Arab thought. As soon as Ṭarābīshī emerged from the crowd in 
a stuffy café, I recognized his long face that Arab magazines’ cartoonists made public. His bald head was 
particularly shiny on that rare sunny day, with a shaved and clean face. Ṭarābīshī invited me to his place, 
a neat and spacious apartment where he convened in the last decade with Nassir Hamid Abu Zayd, 
Mohammad Arkoun, Lafif Lakhdar and Al-Hawni.   
Located in a predominantly Arab suburb around Paris, nothing in his apartment conveyed that a 
man of letters lived there. In fact, it left me with the impression that Ṭarābīshī led a quite ordinary life: he 
smoked frequently, watched Al-Jazeera news, listened to Arabic music (Sabah Fakhri and Jūrj Wassūf.) 
Yet, he lived a quite ascetic life, as he rarely ventured outside his apartment, nor did he seem to recognize 
his North African neighbors. Ṭarābīshī spent his time within the walls of this apartment, reading novels 
but seldom watching Hollywood movies. Decorated with pictures of his three daughters, one could not 
see any of his books around. Only one book, by the French writer Marcel Gauchet, was placed unattended 
on the furthest corner near the patio. A cluster of newspapers was stacked around an old computer stall 
that separated his dining from his living room with its khaki couches. With gloomy expectations about the 
prospects of Syria, he started the conversation by venting his frustrations: “we are through with 
progressive Arab politics. We are through with secularism. No secularism in the Arab world. Nor is there 
any Arab philosophy or Arab philosophers.” With a gravelly voice, Ṭarābīshī was unambiguously 
indignant and his narrative was not entirely coherent. He spoke passionately but digressed. Despite his 
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oceanic knowledge of the history of Syria since WWII, Ṭarābīshī notoriously took liberty with historical 
facts and dates. Still, ideas gush from him in great cascades.  
“During the 1990s” he said, “I attended a conference in one of the Arab Gulf states [unnamed] and 
I took the opportunity to purchase some books on the Arab Turāth.” Stopping for a minute to speak of his 
growing interest with the Turāth at the beginning of the 1990s, he continued: “to my dismay, I could not 
find any book whatsoever on the Medieval rationalist Islamic group of Ikhwān al-Ṣafā.” One bookseller 
indicated to Ṭarābīshī that he could only find the books of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā in an old bookstore owned 
by an ex-Socialist. “What kind of Turāth is being propounded?” Ṭarābīshī asked while looking at me with 
disbelief. “Why is this progressive and rationalist school [of Ikhwan al-Ṣafā] being excluded from our 
Turāth? What is our Turāth and who decides on how to teach the Turāth in our school systems?” Ṭarābīshī 
then abruptly halted the intriguing questions on Turāth, turning the conversation to his writing against 
Jābirī. He promised to get back to the topic of Turāth but never did.  
Prodding him to elaborate further on the formation of the new Arab intellectual landscape in the 
post-1967 era, Ṭarābīshī had only to smear recent Arab culture, speaking of his failed generation. Despite 
his expansive writings, translations, and output, Ṭarābīshī rightly complained of the fact that his name 
remained unrecognized. “Ever since I left Syria,” Ṭarābīshī bitterly recalled, “I was never invited to my 
beloved country or acknowledged for what I have done.” Yet, despite this outrage, Ṭarābīshī did not hold 
a grudge against Syria and its regimes. The raging war in Syria compelled him to endorse Assad. “What 
is the alternative?” he asked rhetorically. Pressing him on the question of his support of Assad, Ṭarābīshī 
could not see that this endorsement of the regime was incongruent with his radical politics. Evading my 
political questions, he wanted to focus the discussion on Arab thought instead. His mind was haunted by 
something else: Mohammad Abed al-Jābirī. “When Mohammad Jābirī visited me in this apartment in 
1987, I agreed with him on the challenge of authenticity and the Turāth as top subjects on Arab 
intellectual’s agenda.” Before becoming enemies, Ṭarābīshī and Jābirī had a great friendship that went 
back to 1957 when the latter came to Damascus University on a fellowship to study Arabic. Unprompted, 
Ṭarābīshī said “Jābirī was not particularly adroit with girls,” sneering at the differences that set them apart: 
“I was a handsome young man.” Throwing things into a conversation out of context is by no means 
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spontaneous when coming from one of the Arab world’s authorities on Sigmund Freud. This “Freudian 
Slip” meant to say that the acrimony between the two reaches back to the slight differences in the ways 
they approached women. Namely, at the center of the recent spat between the Mashriq and the Maghreb, 
which was inflated to an unprecedented scale with Ṭarābīshī and Jābirī, lies deep cultural differences in 
orientations, not only towards women, but also with regard to issues like religion, nationalism and sex.  
Despite their shared national experience, Ṭarābīshī and Jābirī were pulled in different and 
increasingly diverging directions in the wake of the defeat in 1967. For Jābirī, the defeat signaled that the 
project of decolonization pioneered by intellectuals in Beirut and Cairo had fallen short of addressing the 
pressing question of Turāth. For Ṭarābīshī, the mere question of engaging the Turāth meant a giant step 
backwards, a question that “ripped through Arab culture”.471 If there is a cause at the root of this growing 
disparity between the Mashriq and the Meghrib, between Ṭarābīshī and Jābirī, it lies  in the undiminished 
sense of disillusionment with the post-colonial condition. This sense of frustration and outrage that Samir 
Kassir and Elizabeth Kassab adeptly captured, began with the defeat in 1967.  
In the wake of the defeat in 1967 war, the vanquished nations of the Arab world found their solace 
and comfort in their past experience, which gradually emerged as a cultural question. Writers who 
previously dedicated themselves to existentialist philosophy had to pause and reckon with the unprocessed 
weight of the Turāth. One of those well-known scholars was Badawī, an Egyptian philosopher and a 
genuine translator of European ideas. “The annus horribilis of 1967 forced Badawi to rethink the ongoing 
riddle of Arab existence. He was hardly alone. Gradually, he gave up the synthesis of Western and Islamic 
philosophy and returned—some say escaped—to the warm bosom of religious heritage, or turath, where 
he longed for a different kind of homecoming… this form of return was not just a personal journey but a 
generational move away from the universal culture of the 1960s and deeper into the familiar and safer 
domains of religiosity.”472 
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Even more than the surprise of the defeat itself, it was the reactions to the defeat that unsettled 
many Arab intellectuals. One of those shattering surprises was the disheartening realization of the 
resilience and permanency of the undead past. Speaking of the traumatic effects of the defeat of 1967, 
Ṭarābīshī recalled during the interview that “I danced in my life twice, the first time was when the war in 
June 1967 started. The second time was when the Islamic revolution in Iran overthrew the Shah in 1979.” 
The war in 1967 seemed, initially at least, to merit Ṭarābīshī’s exultation: it promised not only to redress 
what Ṭarābīshī’s generation conceived as “the wrongs of colonialism,” but the preparations of the war 
were also seen as a giant step forward that would do away with the past. Ṭarābīshī danced in June 1967 
because he thought that his generation was making good on their longstanding promises to change the 
Arab man: free, sovereign and authentic. Like many of his colleagues, Ṭarābīshī’s dance reflects this 
dream, enhanced and fostered by existential ideals of being, authenticity, independence, and self-
determination. As the war ended and the news spread that Arab armies were in disarray, Ṭarābīshī 
regretted dancing. It is only when one reconsiders why Ṭarābīshī avowed not to dance any longer that one 
can approach the question of what was defeated in 1967?   
More than a mere military defeat, 1967 signaled a defeat of a generation’s collective vision. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, the remarkable yet forgotten Syrian Marxist, Yassin al-Hafiz, explicated in his 
autobiography The Defeat and the Defeated Ideology that what the 1967 war debunked was not Arab 
militaries, nor Arab regimes. Rather it was an “absolute cultural defeat” (hazimah ḥaḍariya shamilah) that 
was discredited in 1967. Yet, what did al-Hafiz mean by cultural defeat? Al-Hafiz’s statement comports 
well with Ṭarābīshī’s disillusionment with his dance, a feeling that touched a host of other Arab Leftists 
who saw their careers taking radical turns after the 1967 war: Edward Said, Hisham Sharabi, Fawwāz 
Tarabulsi, Yazid Sāyigh, Sadiq al-Azm, Mutāʿ Safadi, Radwan al-Sayyid and countless others. As this 
dissertation demonstrates throughout, it was a certain vision that was defeated in the 1967, a vision that 
took for granted the obsoleteness of the Arab cultural past. It is this vision that ignored the centrality of 
Turāth in shaping people’s lives and tastes, a vision that gave rise to unrealistic cultural ambitions and 
political projects that fell and shattered like breaking glass. The defeat proved that Arab Leftists were 
eager to get ahead of themselves, that they refused to redress their relations with the Turāth in order to 
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pave the way for the future through ideas like socialism, Arab nationalism, and Marxism. In a sense, the 
Arab Left wanted to do history by skipping over their burdening history; they disregarded their past and 
embraced others’ future. The return to the Turāth, however, sounded the death knell of this vision, 
awakening Arab intellectuals to all their illusions. The defeat served as a wakeup call, a harbinger that the 
past was both unchecked, unprocessed and undead.  
Discarding the previous visions of decolonization provided a cultural context in which new 
questions and social themes emerged. This is the context in which, for the first time in modern Arab 
history, religion, or Islam specifically, becomes a problem. In no other time in the entire modern history 
of the Arab world was religion articulated as a problem as it was with the generation of the 1960s. In 1969, 
a young Marxist, Yale graduate student, Sadiq al-Azm gave expression to the rising anxiety around Islam 
when he published Critique of Theological Thought. Azm spoke for many among the Arab Left and his 
book instantly became a bestseller. Never before the 1967was Islam seen as a cultural problem. If any 
distinctive line exists that sets apart the intellectual debates of the post-1967, it is this epistemological 
break with the previous discourses that sought to accommodate Islam into modernity. Ever since the 
beginning of the Arab Awakening of the 19th century, Islam was conceived as amenable to changes and 
reform. Starting with Tahtawi through Abduh to Ali Abd al-Raziq, Islam was made to fit with modernity 
and reconciled with the frameworks of modernity.  
This course Azm initiated in Critique of Theological Thought was central to a group of thinkers 
and writers in Beirut and elsewhere in the Arab world. This initial understanding that Islam is a problem 
(rather than an asset) was at the root of the continuing conversation that morphed into the Turāth. In the 
years that followed its publication, both fundamental Islam and authoritarian Arab regimes coalesced to 
squeeze out dissention, unorthodox voices, and defiance. Soon Al-Azm and his publisher were taken to 
court, forcing Arab states to implement stringent rules of publication, increase the regulation of free 
thinkers, and check irreverent publications that stir public disturbances. Stifling the works of radical Arab 
Leftists prompted many of them to seek refuge in the West, particularly in Paris.    
The Arab Rationalist Association picked up where Al-Azm and his publishing house of al-Tali’a 
left off. The circumstances that goaded them to embrace radicalism and resume what Azm had begun were 
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clear: increased marginalization, public alienation, and a mass appeal to the Turāth. The more the second 
generation felt left behind, the more their critical tone appeared.   
The Arab Rationalist Association fashioned two generations. The young radicals’ departure from 
the first generation was crucial and detrimental. While the first generation deemed the metaphorical Arab 
tree unstable and embarked on trimming the dry and dead branches, the second generation thought the 
roots of the tree, which feed and fuel the branches, are the source of vice and evil. Any treatment of 
contemporary Arab society, they maintained, should not cut off undesired branches, crop unwanted leaves 
to make Arab society look orderly. For them, the idea was to assail the Islah movement, which meant 
more work would be required to dig up the roots.  
Yet, what the members of the Association could not see was that their opponents were partly right 
in holding on to the belief that secularism could be built on unsecular/theological foundations. In fact, the 
deconstruction of the sacred text, which hold the community of believers together and binds them into one 
human group that helps them endure tyrannical regimes afflicting them with numerous atrocities, remains 
essential in to the formation of their subjectivity. This subjectivity prioritized faith, which shielded it 
against unfair regimes. Indeed, over the years of the post-colonial experiment in the Arab world Islam 
provided the only refuge from the violence of the nation state. 
At the time that the Association insisted on cutting the roots of the Arab tree, other groups sounded 
the alarm against such a hasty and imprudent move. Cutting the roots might not lead to the opening of 
new horizons. Along the way it might lead society astray. Among others things, cutting the roots means 
taking away the main attachments that provide a sense of normalcy in times of extreme uncertainty. But 
it also stands that if people are torn from their attachments they might be prone to grab bad norms in their 
place. Take away their sense of belonging to the Islamic faith and the result is that each one will seek a 
new identity in his tribe, village and region. They might not embrace the secular but they might become 
the worst version of themselves.  
On March 2016, two years after the interview, Ṭarābīshī passed away quietly in his apartment in 
Paris, surrounded only by his wife and three daughters. None of his post-colonial colleagues lived enough 
to stand by him. Even his close friend Sadiq Al-Azm could not attend his funeral. Times have dramatically 
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changed for Syrian intellectuals. Over the course of the Syrian war the relations between these two eminent 
Syrian intellectuals strained and almost severed with Azm’s insistence on taking a stand against the 
tyrannical regime in Syria. Ṭarābīshī’s voice always dithered when he was asked to condemn the regime, 
evading the clear language that many of his readers found so compelling in his writings.473  
Dozens of obituaries appeared in Arabic dailies the next morning commended Ṭarābīshī’s 
intellectual works. They spoke highly of his meticulous translations and intellectual input since the 
beginning of the 1960s. Some have captured the current tragedy unfolding in Syria with the loss of one of 
its major sons, describing an entire world receding as new times of terror looms ahead. None, however, 
pointed out the Arab Rationalist Association that Ṭarābīshī worked hard to establish. Foregrounding his 
late writings on the Turāth came at the expense of downgrading his main legacy of the Association. Why 
was the Association forgotten? Was it by mere accident that the Association went unmentioned? 
Overlooking the Association speaks loudly of limited reach of this group of intellectuals. It conveys, to 
some degree, the clear message that the last word on the Turāth has yet to be determined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
473 Ḥājj Ṣāliḥ, Al-Thaqāfah Ka-Siyāsah, 2016. 
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